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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis tests Oliver Williamson’s proposition that transaction cost 
economics can explain the limits of firm size. Williamson suggests that 
diseconomies of scale are manifested through four interrelated factors: 
atmospheric consequences due to specialisation, bureaucratic insularity, 
incentive limits of the employment relation and communication distortion 
due to bounded rationality. Furthermore, Williamson argues that 
diseconomies of scale are counteracted by economies of scale and can be 
moderated by adoption of the multidivisional organisation form and by 
high internal asset specificity. Combined, these influences tend to cancel 
out and thus there is not a strong, directly observable, relationship 
between a large firm’s size and performance. 
 
A review of the relevant literature, including transaction cost economics, 
sociological studies of bureaucracy, information-processing perspectives 
on the firm, agency theory, and studies of incentives and motivation 
within firms, as well as empirical studies of trends in firm size and 
industry concentration, corroborates Williamson’s theoretical framework 
and translates it into five hypotheses: (1) Bureaucratic failure, in the form 
of atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and 
communication distortion, increases with firm size; (2) Large firms exhibit 
economies of scale; (3) Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure 
have a negative impact on firm performance; (4) Economies of scale 
increase the relative profitability of large firms over smaller firms; and 
(5) Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two transaction cost-related 
factors: organisation form and asset specificity. 
 
The hypotheses were tested by applying structural equation models to 
primary and secondary cross-sectional data from 784 large US 
manufacturing firms. The statistical analyses confirm the hypotheses. 
Thus, diseconomies of scale influence the growth and profitability of firms 
negatively, while economies of scale and the moderating factors have 
positive influences. This implies that executives and directors of large 
firms should pay attention to bureaucratic failure. 
  
To Charlotte, Simon and Rasmus 
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 1. SUMMARY 
This research tests whether diseconomies of scale influence corporate 
performance. It uses Coasian transaction cost economics (Coase 1937) and 
Williamson’s thinking on the nature of diseconomies of scale and the 
limits of firm size (Williamson 1975, 1985; Riordan and Williamson 1985) 
to develop a theoretical framework for describing diseconomies of scale, 
economies of scale, and moderating factors. It validates the framework 
against the relevant literature and translates it into five hypotheses. The 
hypotheses are tested in structural equation models against the 784 largest 
firms in the US manufacturing sector in 1998. The findings are consistent 
with Williamson’s limits-of-firm-size framework. 
Diseconomies of scale are a neglected area of study (see also Chapter 2). 
Observers from Knight ([1921] 1964) to Holmström and Tirole (1989) have 
pointed out that our understanding of bureaucratic failure is low. The 
neglect is to some extent due to a disbelief in the existence of diseconomies 
of scale (e.g., Florence 1933, 12; Bain 1968, 176). It is also due to a dearth of 
theoretical frameworks that can help inform our understanding of the 
nature of diseconomies of scale. However, if diseconomies of scale did not 
exist, then we would presumably see much larger firms than we do today 
(Panzar 1989, 38). No business organisation in the United States has more 
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than one million employees1 or more than ten hierarchical levels. No firm 
has ever been able successfully to compete in multiple markets with a 
diverse product range for an extended period of time. Common sense tells 
us that there are limits to firm size. Common sense does not, however, 
prove the point. Unfortunately, scientific inquiry has not yet focused on 
finding such proof. 
The US manufacturing sector has, as a whole, been remarkably stable over 
the last century. Contrary to popular opinion, markets have on average 
not become more concentrated (e.g., Nutter 1951; Scherer and Ross 1990). 
Large firms are not increasingly dominant. Large manufacturing firms in 
the United States employed 16 million people in 1979 versus 11 million in 
1994, while private sector employment grew from 99 to 123 million people 
(Council of Economic Advisers 1998; Fortune 1995a). 
Williamson (1975, 117–131) found that the limits of firm size are 
bureaucratic in origin and can be explained by transaction cost economics 
(see also Chapter 3). He identified four main categories of diseconomies of 
scale: atmospheric consequences due to specialisation, bureaucratic insularity, 
incentive limits of the employment relation and communication distortion 
                                                 
1 The largest company, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., had 910,000 employees in 1998. The largest 
manufacturing company, General Motors Corporation, had 594,000 employees. 
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due to bounded rationality. Economies of scale2 in production costs and 
transaction costs tend to offset these diseconomies of scale (Riordan and 
Williamson 1985). Moreover, the disadvantages of bureaucracy can be 
moderated by using the multidivisional organisation form (M-form) and by a 
judicious optimisation of the degree of integration through high internal 
asset specificity (Williamson 1975, 1985). Together, these influences on firm 
performance form the theoretical framework used in this research. 
The literature review supported the framework. There are, as far as this 
researcher could determine, around 60 pieces of work that deal with 
diseconomies of scale in a substantial manner (see Appendix A). Based on 
these and other more fragmentary sources, it was possible to validate 
Williamson’s framework and his categorisation of the factors driving 
diseconomies of scale, economies of scale and the moderating factors, 
except that the literature review was inconclusive regarding economies of 
scale. The framework was translated into five testable hypotheses, 
summarised in Figure 1 (see also Chapter 4). 
                                                 
2  A standard definition of economies of scale, taken from The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 
Economics, is that they exist if the unit cost of producing one additional unit of output decreases. 
They are driven by (a) the existence of indivisible inputs, (b) set-up costs and (c) the benefits of 
division of labour (Eatwell, Milgate and Newman 1987, 80–81). In the case of the multi-product 
firm, economies of scale exist if the ray average cost decreases as output increases. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Firm
Performance
Growth
Profitability
Moderators
Asset Specificity
M-Form Organisation
Economies of Scale
Diseconomies of Scale
Atmospheric Consequences
Bureaucratic Insularity
Incentive Limits
Communication Distortion
Size
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
 
 
 
The first two hypotheses test the tautological statement that diseconomies 
of scale and economies of scale increase with firm size. The last three 
hypotheses test how a firm’s performance is affected by the diseconomies 
of scale, economies of scale and moderating influences. 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of atmospheric consequences, 
bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and communication 
distortion, increases with firm size 
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H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure have a negative 
impact on firm performance 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large firms 
over smaller firms 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two transaction cost-
related factors: organisation form and asset specificity 
The third hypothesis has four sub-hypotheses, which test each of the 
diseconomies of scale factors. 
H3a: Atmospheric consequences have a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
H3c: Incentive limits have a negative impact on the performance of large 
firms 
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H3d: Communication distortion has a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
The fifth hypothesis has two sub-hypotheses for organisation form and 
asset specificity, respectively. 
H5a: Large M-form firms perform better than large U-form firms 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects a firm’s performance 
positively 
The hypotheses were tested against a sample of the 784 largest 
manufacturing firms in the United States in 1998, for which primary and 
secondary data were collected from a number of sources, including 
company organisation charts, official filings and annual reports, 
biographies of executives, historical company documents, corporate web 
sites, magazine articles, corporate watchdogs, Compustat and academic 
research. The hypotheses were operationalised based on the literature 
review and it proved possible to collect enough data for most of the 
variables to create a statistically robust sample (see also Chapter 5). 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to create path diagrams 
representing the hypotheses. Two sub-models containing these path 
diagrams capture the relationships (see also Chapter 6): sub-model a: firm 
  
7
size and the diseconomies/economies of scale (H1 and H2); and sub-
model b: diseconomies/economies of scale, moderating influences and 
firm performance (H3, H4 and H5). 
Table 1 summarises the findings for each hypothesis (see also Chapter 7). 
All hypotheses were confirmed except for H3d (communication distortion), 
for which the result was inconclusive. The strongest negative influence 
from diseconomies of scale on a large firm’s performance appears to be on 
its ability to grow, while there is less negative influence on profitability. 
Thus, Penrose’s claim ([1959] 1995, 261–263) that diseconomies of scale 
reduce the growth capability of large firms, appears to be validated. 
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Table 1. Summary of Findings 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGSa 
Hypothesis Literature Finding Statistical Finding 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of 
atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic 
insularity, incentive limits and 
communication distortion, increases with 
firm size 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale Confirmed Confirmed 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from 
bureaucratic failure have a negative 
impact on firm performance 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3a: Atmospheric consequences have a 
negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative 
impact on the performance of large firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3c: Incentive limits have a negative 
impact on the performance of large firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3d: Communication distortion has a 
negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
Confirmed Inconclusive 
H4: Economies of scale increase the 
relative profitability of large firms over 
smaller firms 
Inconclusive Confirmed 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated 
by two transaction cost-related factors: 
organisation form and asset specificity 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H5a: Large M-form firms perform better 
than large U-form firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects 
a firm’s performance positively 
Confirmed Confirmed 
a
 For simplicity, the word ”confirmed” is used, although ”not rejected” is more accurate. 
 
 
 
The implications are that diseconomies of scale are real and important 
contributors to a firm’s performance, in a negative way. However, 
economies of scale can offset some of these negative consequences. Finally, 
the use of M-form organisation and pursuit of high internal asset 
specificity can moderate the negative impact of diseconomies of scale. 
These findings make it possible to create conceptual cost curves and 
growth curves that extend neoclassical theory. The curves are found in 
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Chapter 7, together with cost and growth curves plotting data from the 
sample used in the research. 
There are several practical implications (see also Chapter 8). Among them 
are that corporate strategies are interconnected with the organisational 
choices made. That is, structure does not necessarily follow strategy. In 
light of this, it is understandable that mergers or acquisitions often fail, 
especially when the rationale for the merger-and-acquisition activity is to 
capture revenue growth opportunities. It is also evident that the focus on 
corporate governance over the last decade has its benefits. Other things 
equal, good governance allows large corporations to expand their limits-
of-firm-size horizon. Moreover, as initiatives in large corporations are 
increasingly team-oriented, it is not surprising that senior executives pay 
more attention to motivation and how to structure incentives to extract 
optimal effort from the employees. 
In the next chapter, the research objectives are defined and the importance 
of the research is discussed, linking it back to perspectives on economies of 
scale and diseconomies of scale in neoclassical theory and transaction cost 
economics. The chapter then explores the definition of the firm and 
metrics for measuring firm size. Finally, trends in firm size and 
concentration in the US manufacturing sector are discussed. 
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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
Why are large firms so small? What stops firms from effortlessly 
expanding into new businesses? Only fragmentary research exists today as 
to why the largest business organisations do not have ten, twenty or a 
hundred million employees rather than a few hundred thousand. 
According to Arrow (1974, 55) a “tendency to increasing costs with scale of 
operation” due to the cost of handling information and the irreversible 
cost of building organisational knowledge leads to limits of firm size. 
Coase (1937, 397) found that these costs—labelled “diseconomies of scale” 
in this thesis to contrast them with “economies of scale”—are associated 
with the resources required to manage the firm’s internal planning 
processes, as well as the cost of mistakes and the resulting misallocation of 
resources, especially under conditions of uncertainty. 
The thesis builds on original research carried out in the subject area. 
Specifically, it tests whether Williamson’s “limits of firm size” discussion 
in Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975, 117–
131) and in The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985, 131–162), which 
extend Arrow’s and Coase’s arguments, are valid. The findings include a 
look at the nature of diseconomies of scale and factors which moderate 
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their impact, as well as a quantification of the impact of diseconomies of 
scale on firm performance. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) provides the theoretical foundation for 
this research. There are other partial explanations of diseconomies of scale, 
such as those found in neoclassical economics (e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston 
and Green 1995; Scherer and Ross 1990); agency theory (e.g., Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1985; Jensen and Meckling 1976); growth theory (e.g., Penrose 
[1959] 1995); evolutionary theory (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982); sociology 
(e.g., Blau and Meyer 1987); and Marxist theory (e.g., Marglin 1974). These 
explanations are not the focus here, although they will be used to 
illuminate and test particular aspects of the TCE argument described in 
Chapter 3. 
The purpose of the research is to create a theoretically robust and 
empirically tested framework that can be used by executives and others to 
inform strategic and organisational choices for large corporations. These 
choices may help decision-makers achieve higher growth and profitability 
by minimising diseconomies of scale due to atmospheric consequences, 
bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and communication distortion (as 
defined in Section 3.1.2); to capture economies of scale; to optimise 
organisational structures; and to maximise asset specificity within the 
corporation. 
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These issues are addressed empirically through a statistical analysis of the 
784 largest manufacturing firms in the United States in 1998.3 This limited 
analysis4—covering one year, one industry sector and one country—lends 
credence to Williamson’s limits-of-firm-size argument; no aspect of his 
theoretical discussion is refuted. The analysis also supports Penrose’s 
assertion ([1959] 1995, 261–263) that diseconomies of scale mainly reduce 
growth of large firms rather than decrease their profitability. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the research objectives and their 
importance in more detail, defines firm size, and documents trends in firm 
size over the last century. 
                                                 
3 Having more than $500 million in annual revenue. 
4 The United States was chosen because it is a large and competitive market, the manufacturing 
sector was chosen because of the depth of earlier research and the availability of data, and a 
single, recent, year was chosen because much of the data was not available further back. 
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2.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This section gives an initial problem definition and discusses the 
importance of the research. It spells out why diseconomies of scale are real 
and pervasive, yet poorly understood. In fact, while the economics 
literature often includes cost curves that bend upward at large firm sizes, 
there are only around 60 pieces of work that explicitly discuss the nature 
of the diseconomies,5 and only a few of these have attempted to quantify 
the diseconomies of scale. 
2.1.1 Problem Definition 
In the early 1920s, Knight ([1921] 1964, 286–287) observed that “the 
diminishing returns to management is a subject often referred to in 
economic literature, but in regard to which there is a dearth of scientific 
discussion”. Since then, many authorities have referred to the existence of 
diseconomies of scale, but no systematic studies of the general issue exist. 
The basic dilemma is illustrated by the mismatch between theoretical 
expectations and real-world observations. On the one hand, if 
diseconomies of scale do not exist, then there should be no limits to firm 
growth and size. We would observe an inexorable concentration of 
industries and economies until only one global firm was left. The answer 
                                                 
5 There is also a vast literature on the size-distribution of firms, but it generally does not discuss 
the specific mechanisms underlying bureaucratic failure. 
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to Coase’s question (1937, 394): “Why is not all production carried on by 
one big firm?” would be: it will. Similarly, Stigler (1974, 8) wrote that “if 
size were a great advantage, the smaller companies would soon lose the 
unequal race and disappear”. This is not happening. On the other hand, if 
a given industry has an optimum firm size, then we would expect 
increased fragmentation as the overall economy grows. This would be in 
line with Stigler’s survivor-principle argument which holds that “the 
competition between different sizes of firms sifts out the more efficient 
enterprises” (1958, 55). Again, this is not happening. Lucas (1978, 509) 
observed that “most changes in product demand are met by changes in 
firm size, not by entry or exit of firms”. The size distribution of firms has 
been remarkably stable over time for most for the last century, when 
measured by number of employees or as a share of the total economy (as 
discussed in Section 2.3). 
Cost curves (Figure 2) are used in neoclassical theory to illustrate 
economies and diseconomies of scale (e.g., Marshall [1920] 1997, 278–292; 
Scherer and Ross 1990, 101). 
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Figure 2. Neoclassical Relationship between Unit Cost and Output 
NEOCLASSICAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN UNIT COST AND OUTPUT
Output (Q) 
Long-Run
Average
Cost
(AC)
M
Source: Scherer and Ross (1990)
 
 
 
As the output Q increases, the average cost decreases due to economies of 
scale. At a certain point (M) the economies of scale are exhausted, while 
diseconomies of scale, presumably driven by diminishing returns to 
management (e.g., Coase 1937, 395), start to influence the unit cost. As 
output increases, the unit cost increases. In a competitive market, this 
implies an equilibrium output M where marginal cost not only equals 
marginal revenue, but also intersects long-run average cost at its 
minimum (e.g., Mankiw 1998, 296). 
In reality, however, this is not what is observed. Rather, the cost-
minimising part of the curve covers a wide range of outputs, and only at 
high output levels do diseconomies set in, if ever (Panzar 1989, 37–38). 
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McConnell’s quantification (1945, 6) and Stigler’s illustration (1958, 59), 
reproduced in Figure 3, are typical. 
Figure 3. McConnell/Stigler Relationship between Unit Cost and Output 
MCCONNELL/STIGLER RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN UNIT COST AND OUTPUT
Output (Q) 
Long-Run
Average
Cost
(AC)
Source: McConnell (1945), Stigler (1958)
1M 2M
 
 
 
 
This shape of the cost curve reconciles several real-world observations. 
(1) It explains why large and small firms can coexist in the same industry. 
There is a wide range of outputs, between the points 1M  and 2M , for 
which the unit cost is more or less constant. (2) It is consistent with Lucas’s 
observation (1978, 509) that, as the economy grows, existing firms tend to 
expand supply to meet additional demand, because most firms operate 
with outputs Q below the 2M  inflexion point. (3) It eliminates the 
supposition that economies of scale are exhausted at approximately the 
same point that diseconomies of scale start increasing unit cost, which is 
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indicated with 1M  being much to the left of 2M . (4) It demonstrates that 
there are indeed limits to firm size due to diseconomies of scale, as shown 
by the increasing unit cost beyond 2M —large firms have not expanded 
indefinitely. 
However, if the reasoning above is correct, it is still unclear why the cost 
curve bends upwards at 2M . Neoclassical theory does not provide a 
satisfactory answer. As Simon ([1947] 1976, 292) said: “the central problem 
is not how to organize to produce efficiently (although this will always 
remain an important consideration), but how to organize to make 
decisions”.6 The first part of this statement refers to the negative derivative 
of the cost curve at outputs smaller than 1M , where economies of scale in 
production have not yet been exhausted, while the second part applies to 
the upward slope, where diseconomies of scale due to diminishing returns 
to management set in beyond 2M . 
Clarifying “how to organise to make decisions”—and thus the upward 
bend of the cost curve—will help executives optimise corporate 
performance. The current research investigates whether transaction cost 
economics can more thoroughly explain diseconomies of scale and what 
drives these diseconomies. It picks up on a debate that harks back to the 
                                                 
6 Simon echoed the writing of Robertson (1923, 25): ”It is the economies of large-scale government 
rather than of large-scale technique which dictate the size of the modern business unit”. (Note: 
government here refers to corporate organisation and governance, not national government.) 
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early 1930s when Florence (1933) and Robinson (1934), respectively, 
argued the case against and for limits of firm size. Florence believed that 
optimum firm size meant maximum firm size: “the more the amount of 
any commodity provided the greater the efficiency” and “there is in my 
view no theoretical limit to the increase in the physical return obtainable 
by larger-scale operations” (p. 12). He argued that no organisation would 
be too large for a single leader to control and thought that the only reason 
this had not happened yet was a certain lag between what managers at the 
time assumed they could do and the inevitable outcome (p. 47). 
In contrast, Robinson did not subscribe to this reasoning and he believed 
strongly in “the increasing costs of coordination required for the 
management of larger units” (p. 242). He argued that the existing facts—
the then newly released first report on the size distribution of British 
firms—supported the notion that optimum firm size was less than 
maximum firm size (p. 256). 
2.1.2 Importance of the Research 
Diseconomies of scale have not been extensively studied and thus there 
may be a genuine gap in our understanding of the firm. Transaction cost 
economics may help fill this gap because the theory embeds a number of 
concepts relating to the limits of the firm. Filling the gap may not only 
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affect the way we think about strategy and structure, but also help 
executives make more effective decisions. 
Limits-of-firm-size is not a major field of study (Coase 1993a, 228; 
Holmström and Tirole 1989, 126). There are around 60 articles or books 
that deal with the topic in a meaningful way (see Chapter 3 for a review 
and Appendix A for a list of references). Williamson (1985, 153), for 
example, stated that our understanding of bureaucratic failure is low 
compared with what we know of market failure. Given the relative 
slowdown in the growth of large firms over the last 30 years (see 
Section 2.3), understanding why market-based transactions are slowly 
winning over internally-based transactions matters more than ever. 
The second reason why this research is academically important is that it 
uses transaction cost economics in a somewhat new fashion. The 1970s 
were the defining years of TCE. At that time, large firms still appeared set 
to become ever more dominant, and TCE reflects this Zeitgeist. Thus, many 
of the theory’s applications have been in antitrust cases, rather than in 
studies of internal organisation. Further, TCE has arguably evolved over 
time from a general theory for understanding industrial organisation to a 
tool for primarily analysing vertical integration. For example, Shelanski 
and Klein (1995) surveyed the empirical transaction-cost-economics 
literature; out of 118 journal articles published between 1976 and 1994, 
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87 (74 per cent) related to vertical integration, make/buy decisions, or 
hybrid forms of vertical integration.7 Williamson’s introductory overview 
of TCE in the Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989, 150) called vertical 
integration the paradigm problem of TCE. This research breaks with that 
tradition by looking at the firm as a whole, rather than its vertical 
integration characteristics. 
Limits of firm size are also a real and difficult problem for business 
executives. The cost of suboptimal size—that is, a firm that is too large—is 
probably significant. For example, up to 25 per cent (Riahi-Belkaoui 
1994, 35–64) of the cost of goods sold of a large manufacturing firm can be 
attributed to organisational slack, often embedded in communication 
problems, bureaucratic inefficiencies and other diseconomies of scale 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Moreover, large firms have a tendency 
slowly to decline and disappear (Hannah 1996, 1). Shedding light on why 
this is the case may be socially and privately beneficial, Hannah pointed 
out, because “we have made great strides in storytelling, but a clearer, 
surer recipe for sustained success for large corporations has remained 
elusive” (p. 24). 
                                                 
7 Shelanski and Klein claimed that vertical integration research has declined as a share of the total 
over time, but a categorisation by year shows that the share is stable or may in fact have 
increased. 1976–1979: 5 articles, 40 per cent vertical integration; 1980–1984: 26 articles; 73 per cent 
vertical integration; 1985–1989: 53 articles, 72 per cent vertical integration; 1990–1994: 34 articles, 
82 per cent vertical integration. 
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2.2 DIMENSIONS OF FIRM SIZE 
This section defines size and shows the trends in firm size in the US 
manufacturing sector. Large manufacturing firms in the US have shrunk 
relative to the total manufacturing sector and the economy as whole over 
the last 20 to 25 years, while overall industry concentration has been rather 
stable over the last 100 years. Applying the survivor principle (see p. 14, 
above), this implies that there are indeed limits to firm size. 
2.2.1 Definition of the Firm 
To begin with, there are a number of definitions of what a firm is. The first, 
based on Coase (1937, 389), Penrose ([1959] 1995, 15), and Arrow 
(1964, 403; 1974, 33) holds that the boundary of the firm is where the 
internal planning mechanism is superseded by the price mechanism. That 
is, the firm’s border is at the point where transactions are regulated by the 
market rather than by administration. In most cases this means that the 
operating firm is equivalent to the legal corporation. An important, if rare, 
exception is a corporation in which divisions are totally self-contained 
profit centres. In this case the parent company is not a firm, because the 
company’s divisions by definition trade between themselves through 
market-based transfer prices. 
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The second definition is that ownership sets a firm’s boundaries (e.g., Hart 
1995, 5–8). With this definition, a firm is the combination of activities for 
which the bearers of residual risk are one and the same. One problem with 
this definition is that employees are not “owned”, so they therefore would 
not be considered part of the firm. Another issue is how units such as a 
partly-owned subsidiary should be treated. For example, General Motors 
Corporation owned 82 per cent of Delphi Automotive Systems in early 
1999, but Delphi would not be viewed as part of General Motors under the 
above definition. Still, this definition is quite similar to Coase’s because 
employment contracts can be viewed as temporary ownership claims, and 
partial ownership is still uncommon even though alliances and carve-outs 
have grown in popularity. 
A third definition sees the firm as a network (Richardson 1972, 884–887). 
McDonald’s Corporation, for example, extends far beyond its corporate 
ownership, because it also consists of a network of thousands of 
franchisees over whom McDonald’s have a high degree of contractual 
control (Rubin 1990, 134–144).8 
The fourth definition is based on the firm’s sphere of influence. This 
includes distributors, alliance partners, first- and second-tier suppliers,  
                                                 
8 18,265 at the end of 1999. 
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and so on (Williamson 1985, 120–122). Toyota Motor Corporation, for 
example, directly employed 215,000 people in 2000, but its sphere of 
influence probably extended over more than one million people. 
In all four cases, it is theoretically somewhat difficult to draw the 
boundaries of the firm and to distinguish the firm from the whole 
economy. Nevertheless, it is, to use the words of Kumar, Rajan and 
Zingales (1999, 10), possible to create an “empirical definition”. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the firm is defined as having commonly owned 
assets—the ownership definition—but employees are also treated as part 
of the firm. This definition relates closely to Hart’s definition (1995, 7), and 
publicly available data follow it. It is also commonly used in research 
(Kumar, Rajan and Zingales 1999, 11). Thus, a firm is an incorporated 
company (the legal entity) henceforth. 
2.2.2 Definition of Size 
There are various ways to measure the size of a firm. Size is most often 
defined as annual revenue, especially by the business press. However, this 
measure is basically meaningless because it tells nothing about the depth 
of the underlying activity. Based on this measure, the world’s four largest 
companies were Japanese trading houses in 1994 (Fortune 1995b). They 
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had between 7,000 and 80,000 employees, but almost no vertical 
integration. 
A better measure of size is value added, which is more or less equivalent 
to revenue less externally purchased products and services. This metric 
gives a precise measure of activity, but it is usually not publicly available 
for individual firms. 
Number of employees is the most widely used measure of size. A review 
by Kimberley claims that more than 80 per cent of academic studies use 
this measure (1976, 587). In line with Child’s observation (1973, 170) that 
“it is people who are organized”, it is not surprising that the number of 
employees is the most used metric for measuring firm size. 
Finally, assets can define size (e.g., as described by Grossman and Hart 
1986, 693–694). As with revenue, this measure may not reflect underlying 
activity; but for manufacturing firms, asset-to-value-added ratios are fairly 
homogeneous. Asset data for individual firms are usually available back to 
the 1890s and are therefore a practical measure in longitudinal studies. 
In sum, the best measures of size are value added and number of 
employees, although assets can be used in certain types of studies. This 
research uses number of employees as the size metric because the data are 
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available and diseconomies of scale should be associated with human 
frailties. Moreover, this research deals with bureaucratic failure, which in 
the end is the result of coordination costs. Such costs are best measured in 
relation to number of employees (Kumar, Rajan and Zingales 1999, 12). 
The definitions are summarised in Table 2 with the suitability for the 
research at hand indicated by the shadings, ranging from high (black) to 
low (white). 
Table 2. Definition of the Firm and Firm Size 
DEFINITION OF THE FIRM AND FIRM SIZE 
Size Metric 
Firm Definition 
Internal Planning
(Coase) 
 
Ownership 
 
Network 
Sphere of 
Influence 
Revenue     
Value Added     
Employees     
Assets     
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2.3 TRENDS IN FIRM SIZE 
The US economy is the basis for the analysis in the current research 
because it is large, fairly homogenous and transparent, and it has a high 
level of competition between firms. Within this economy, the research 
focuses on the manufacturing sector.9 
Large manufacturing firms play a major role in the US economy. The 
Fortune industrial 500 companies controlled more than 50 per cent of 
corporate manufacturing assets and employed more than eleven million 
people in 1994, the last year for which the Fortune industrial ranking was 
compiled (Fortune 1995a). Their sphere of influence was approximately 40 
million employees out of a total private sector workforce of 123 million. 
Contrary to popular belief, however, the importance of large firms is not 
increasing and has not done so for many years. Studies show that large 
manufacturing firms are holding steady as a share of value added since 
circa 1965 (Scherer and Ross 1990, 62). Their share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector has declined from around 60 per cent (1979) to 
around 50 per cent (1994). Moreover, as a share of the total US economy, 
they are in sharp decline. Large manufacturing firms employed 16 million 
people in 1979 versus 11 million in 1994 (Fortune 1995a, 185), while private 
                                                 
9 Alternative approaches would be to study the global manufacturing sector, the total US private 
sector, or both. However, statistics on the global manufacturing sector are not reliable, and the 
non-manufacturing sectors are often highly regulated. 
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sector employment grew from 99 to 123 million people (Council of 
Economic Advisers 1998, 322) over the same time period. 
Further evidence that large firms do not increasingly dominate the 
economy is available from a number of historical studies. Aggregate 
industry concentration has changed little since the early part of the last 
century.10 Nutter (1951) studied the concentration trend between 1899 and 
1939 and found no signs of increased aggregate concentration during this 
period, mainly because new, fragmented industries emerged, while older 
ones consolidated (pp. 21, 33). Bain (1968) found the same trend between 
1931 and 1963, but with less variability between industries. Scherer and 
Ross (1990, 84) used Nutter’s method and showed that aggregate 
concentration increased slightly, from 35 per cent in 1947 to 37 per cent in 
1982. Similarly, Mueller and Hamm (1974, 512) found an increase in four-
firm concentration from 40.5 per cent to 42.6 per cent between 1947 and 
1970, with most (70 per cent) of the increase between 1947 and 1963. 
Bain (1968, 87) calculated that the assets controlled by the largest 200 
nonfinancial firms amounted to about 57 per cent of total nonfinancial 
assets in 1933.11 He also estimated that the 300 largest nonfinancial firms 
                                                 
10 Note that there have been significant changes within individual industries. 
11 A similar study by Berle and Means ([1932] 1991) has been partly discredited. For example, 
Scherer and Ross (1990, 60) found that Berle and Means, based on the “meager data then 
available,...overestimated the relative growth of the largest enterprises”. 
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accounted for 55 per cent of nonfinancial assets in 1962. The largest 200 
firms therefore accounted for approximately 50 per cent of nonfinancial 
assets in 1962 (using the current researcher’s estimate of the assets 
controlled by the 100 smallest firms in the sample). This researcher’s data 
showed that the top 200 nonfinancial firms controlled less than 50 per cent 
of the total nonfinancial assets in 1994. Adelman (1978) observed a similar 
pattern when he studied the 117 largest manufacturing firms between 1931 
and 1960. He found that concentration was the same at the beginning and 
at the end of the period (45 per cent). He concluded that “overall 
concentration in the largest manufacturing firms has remained quite stable 
over a period of 30 years, from 1931 to 1960”. Allen (1976) updated 
Adelman’s number to 1972 and reached the same conclusion. The current 
research replicated the analysis for 1994 and found the same concentration 
number to be 45 per cent. Both sets of longitudinal data indicate that large 
firms represent a stable or declining fraction of the manufacturing sector. 
Finally, Bock (1978, 83) studied the share of value added contributed by 
the largest manufacturing firms between 1947 and 1972. There was a large 
increase between 1947 and 1954, and a further slight increase until 1963. 
Between 1963 and 1972, there was no increase. Scherer and Ross (1990, 62) 
confirmed the lack of increase through the end of the 1980s. Sutton 
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(1997, 54–55) reached a similar conclusion in a comparison of 
concentration in the US manufacturing sector between 1967 and 1987. 
As for the future, the stock market does not expect the largest firms to 
outperform smaller firms. The stock market valuation of the largest firms, 
relative to smaller firms, has declined sharply between 1964 and 1998 
(Farrell 1998). In 1964 the largest 20 firms comprised 44 per cent of total 
stock market capitalisation in the United States; in 1998 they accounted for 
19.5 per cent. Market value primarily reflects future growth and profit 
expectations, and thus the market is increasingly sceptical of large firms’ 
ability to compete with smaller firms. This could be due to industrial 
evolution, but if it is assumed that diseconomies of scale do not exist, then 
the largest 20 firms should presumably be able to compensate for a relative 
decline in their mature businesses by effortlessly growing new businesses. 
A study of firms on the New York stock exchange (Ibbotson Associates 
1999, 127–143) similarly showed that small firms outperformed large firms 
between 1926 and 1998. The total annual shareholder return over the 
period was 12.1 per cent for the largest size decile and 13.7 per cent for the 
second largest size decile. It increased steadily to 21.0 per cent for the 
smallest size decile (p. 129). The real return to shareholders after 
adjustment for risk (using the capital asset pricing model) was 0.28 per 
cent for decile 1, +0.18 per cent for decile 2 and rising steadily to +4.35 per 
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cent for decile 10 (p. 140). Note, however, that market capitalisation was 
used as the definition of size in this study. 
The above evidence shows that concentration in the manufacturing 
sector—defined as the share of value added, employment, assets or market 
capitalisation held by large firms—has changed little or has declined over 
much of the last century. The size of large manufacturing firms has kept 
pace with the overall growth of the manufacturing part of the economy 
since the 1960s in value-added terms, but has declined in employment 
terms since 1979 (and has declined relative to the total US corporate sector 
and the global corporate sector). This indicates that there is a limit to firm 
size and that this limit may be decreasing in absolute terms, all of which 
supports the research findings of this thesis. 
The next chapter explores these limits of firm size through a review of the 
relevant literature. A theoretical framework is constructed based on 
transaction cost economics, and the literature is surveyed to validate the 
framework. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is divided into two parts. The first part defines the 
theoretical framework and discusses the transaction-cost-economics 
literature relating to the framework. The second part examines the 
evidence in transaction cost economics and other fields which supports 
(and occasionally contradicts) the theoretical framework. The chapter 
shows that a robust theoretical framework can be constructed based on 
transaction cost economics, and that the theoretical and empirical 
literature is congruent with this framework. 
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Transaction cost economics focuses on the boundary of the firm 
(Holmström and Roberts 1998, 73; Williamson 1981, 548)—that is, the 
distinction between what is made internally in the firm and what is 
bought and sold in the marketplace. The boundary can shift over time and 
for a number of reasons, and the current research looks at one aspect of 
these shifts. As firms internalise transactions, growing larger, bureaucratic 
diseconomies of scale appear. Thus, a firm will reach a size at which the 
benefit from the last internalised transaction is offset by bureaucratic 
failure. Two factors moderate these diseconomies of scale. First, firms can 
lessen the negative impact of diseconomies of scale by organising activities 
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appropriately and by adopting good governance practices. Second, the 
optimal degree of integration depends on the level of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and transaction frequency. 
Coase’s article “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) establishes the basic 
framework. “Limits of Vertical Integration and Firm Size” in Williamson’s 
book Markets and Hierarchies (1975) suggests the nature of size limits. “The 
Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features” in Williamson’s 
book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) expands on this theme 
and explains why the limits exist.12 Riordan and Williamson’s article 
“Asset Specificity and Economic Organization” (1985) augments the 
theoretical framework presented here by combining transaction costs with 
neoclassical production costs. The remainder of the section discusses the 
details of the argument. 
3.1.1 Reasons for Limits 
Coase’s paper on transaction costs (1937) is the foundation of the New 
Institutional Economics branch of industrial organisation. Coase asked 
two fundamental questions “Why is there any organisation?” (p. 388) and 
“Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?” (p. 394). He  
                                                 
12 Published earlier by Williamson in a less-developed form (1984). 
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answered these questions by emphasising transaction costs, which 
determine what is done in the market—where price is the regulating 
mechanism, and what is done inside the firm—where bureaucracy is the 
regulator. Coase pointed out that “the distinguishing mark of the firm is 
the supersession of the price mechanism” (p. 389). To Coase, all 
transactions carry a cost, whether it is an external market transaction cost 
or one that accrues from an internal bureaucratic transaction. “The limit to 
the size of the firm would be set when the scope of its operations had 
expanded to a point at which the costs of organizing additional 
transactions within the firm exceeded the costs of carrying out the same 
transactions through the market or within another firm” (Coase 1993b, 48). 
According to Coase, the most important market transaction costs are the 
cost of determining the price of a product or service; the cost of 
negotiating and creating the contract; and the cost of information failure. 
The most important internal transaction costs are associated with the 
administrative cost of determining what, when and how to produce; the 
cost of resource misallocation, because planning will never be perfect; and 
the cost of lack of motivation on employees’ parts, given that motivation is 
lower in large organisations. In any given industry, the relative magnitude 
of market and internal transaction costs will determine what is done 
where. 
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Coase thus created a theoretical framework which potentially explains 
why firms have size limits. However, this is only true if there are 
diminishing returns to management within the firm (Penrose 
[1959] 1995, 19). Williamson (1975, 130) later argued that this is the case, 
asking his own rhetorical question: “Why can’t a large firm do everything 
that a collection of small firms can do and more?” (Williamson 1984, 736). 
Williamson pointed out that the incentive structure within a firm has to 
differ from market incentives. Even if a firm tries to emulate the high-
powered incentives of the market, there are unavoidable side effects, and 
the cost for setting up incentives can be high. In other words, combining 
small firms into a large firm will never result in an entity that operates in 
the same way as when independent small firms respond directly to the 
market. 
3.1.2 Nature of Limits 
Williamson (1975, 126–130) found that the limits of firm size are 
bureaucratic in origin and can be explained by transaction cost economics. 
He identified four main categories of diseconomies of scale: atmospheric 
consequences due to specialisation, bureaucratic insularity, incentive 
limits of the employment relation and communication distortion due to 
bounded rationality. 
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Williamson’s categories are similar to those Coase described in 1937. 
Coase talked about the determination (or planning) cost, the resource 
misallocation cost and the cost of lack of motivation. Williamson’s first 
and second categories correspond broadly to the determination cost; the 
third category to the demotivation cost, and the fourth category to the 
resource misallocation cost. Williamson’s categories are, however, more 
specific and allow for easier operationalisation as is shown in Chapters 5 
and 6. The four categories are detailed below: 
Atmospheric consequences. According to Williamson (1975, 128–129), as 
firms expand there will be increased specialisation, but also less 
commitment on the part of employees. In such firms, the employees often 
have a hard time understanding the purpose of corporate activities, as 
well as the small contribution each of them makes to the whole. Thus, 
alienation is more likely to occur in large firms. 
Bureaucratic insularity. Williamson (1975) argued that as firms increase in 
size, senior managers are less accountable to the lower ranks of the 
organisation (p. 127) and to shareholders (p. 142). They thus become 
insulated from reality and will, given opportunism, strive to maximise 
their personal benefits rather than overall corporate performance. 
According to Williamson, this problem is most acute in organisations with 
well-established procedures and rules and in which management is well-
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entrenched. The argument resembles that of agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Jensen 1989), which holds that corporate managers tend to 
emphasise size over profitability, maintaining excess cash flow within the 
firm rather than distributing it to a more efficient capital market (a 
lengthier comparison of agency theory and transaction cost economics 
appears in Section 3.2.1.3). As a consequence, large firms tend towards 
organisational slack, and resources are misallocated. If this is correct we 
would expect, for example, to see wider diversification of large firms and 
lower profits. 
Incentive limits of the employment relation. Williamson (1975, 129–130) 
argued that the structure of incentives large firms offer employees is 
limited by a number of factors. First, large bonus payments may threaten 
senior managers. Second, performance-related bonuses may encourage 
less-than-optimal employee behaviour in large firms. Therefore, large 
firms tend to base incentives on tenure and position rather than on merit. 
Such limitations may especially affect executive positions and product 
development functions, putting large firms at a disadvantage when 
compared with smaller enterprises in which employees are often given a 
direct stake in the success of the firm through bonuses, share participation, 
and stock options. 
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Communication distortion due to bounded rationality. Because a single 
manager has cognitive limits and cannot understand every aspect of a 
complex organisation, it is impossible to expand a firm without adding 
hierarchical layers. Information passed between layers inevitably becomes 
distorted. This reduces the ability of high-level executives to make 
decisions based on facts and negatively impacts their ability to strategise 
and respond directly to the market. In an earlier article (1967), Williamson 
found that even under static conditions (no uncertainty) there is a loss of 
control. He developed a mathematical model to demonstrate that loss of 
control is a critical factor in limiting firm size, and that there is no need to 
assume rising factor costs in order to explain such limits (pp. 127–130). His 
model showed that the number of employees can not expand indefinitely 
unless span of control can be expanded indefinitely. Moreover, he applied 
data from 500 of the largest US firms to the model, showing that the 
optimal number of hierarchical levels was between four and seven. 
Beyond this, control loss leads to “a static limit on firm size” (p. 135). 
Williamson pointed out a number of consequences for these four 
diseconomies of scale.13 
                                                 
13 Williamson’s descriptions are confusing. They are scattered throughout the chapters referenced, 
inserted between theory and examples. The consequences discussed here are this researcher’s 
attempt to clarify Williamson’s descriptions. 
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• Large firms tend to procure internally when facing a make-or-buy 
decision (1975, 119–120). 
• They have excessive compliance procedures and compliance-related 
jobs tend to proliferate. Thus, policing costs, such as the cost of audits, 
can be disproportionately high (1975, 120). 
• Projects tend to persist, even though they clearly are failures 
(1975, 121–122). 
• Information is often consciously manipulated to further individual or 
sub-unit goals (1975, 122–124). 
• Asset utilisation is lower because high-powered market incentives do 
not exist (1985, 137–138). 
• Transfer prices do not reflect reality, and cost determination suffers 
(1985, 138–140). 
• Research and development productivity is lower (1985, 141–144). 
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• Large firms often operate at a suboptimal level by trying to manage the 
unmanageable, forgiving mistakes, and politicising decisions 
(1985, 148–152). 
Table 3 outlines the links between limiting factors and the consequences 
listed above. 
Table 3. Links between Limiting Factors and Consequences 
LINKS BETWEEN LIMITING FACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
Consequences 
Factors 
Atmospheric 
Consequences 
Bureaucratic 
Insularity 
 
Incentive Limits 
Communication 
Distortion 
Internal 
procurement 
Moderate Strong Strong  
Excessive 
compliance 
procedures 
Strong Strong Strong Strong 
Project persistence Strong Strong Moderate  
Conscious 
manipulation of 
information 
 Strong  Strong 
Low asset 
utilisation 
Strong   Strong 
Poor internal 
costing 
  Strong Strong 
Low R&D 
productivity 
Strong Moderate Strong Strong 
Dysfunctional 
management 
decisions 
Strong Strong  Moderate 
 
 
 
Each of the factors which limit size appears to have several negative 
consequences for firm performance. Given the strength of many of these 
links, it is plausible to assume that a large firm will exhibit lower relative  
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growth and profitability than a smaller firm with the same product and 
market mix. 
3.1.3 Economies of Scale 
Transaction cost economics does not usually deal with economies of scale, 
which are more often associated with neoclassical production costs. 
However, Riordan and Williamson (1985) made an explicit attempt to 
reconcile neoclassical theory and transaction cost economics and showed, 
among other things (see also pp. 43–44, below), that economies of scale are 
evident in both production costs (p. 371) and transaction costs (p. 373), and 
that both can be kept internal to a firm if the asset specificity is positive. 
That is, the economies of scale can be reaped by the individual firm and 
are not necessarily available to all participants in a market (pp. 367–369). 
3.1.4 Moderating Influences on Firm-Size Limits 
While the four categories relating to diseconomies of scale theoretically 
impose size limits on firms, two moderating factors tend to offset 
diseconomies of scale: organisation form and degree of integration. Both 
are central to transaction cost economics, and in order to test the validity 
of the diseconomies-of-scale argument, it is necessary to account for these 
factors. 
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Organisation form. Williamson (1975, 117) recognised that diseconomies 
of scale can be reduced by organising appropriately. Based on Chandler’s 
pioneering work (e.g., 1962) on the evolution of the American corporation, 
Williamson argued that the M-form organisation lowers internal 
transaction costs compared to the U-form organisation.14 It does so for a 
key reason: The M-form allows most senior executives to focus on high-
level issues rather than day-to-day operational details, making the whole 
greater than the sum of its parts (p. 137). Thus, large firms organised 
according to the M-form should perform better than similar U-form firms. 
Degree of integration. Williamson showed that three factors play a 
fundamental role in determining the degree of integration: uncertainty, 
frequency of transactions and asset specificity, under conditions of bounded 
rationality (Simon [1947] 1976, xxvi–xxxi) and opportunism (Williamson 
1993). 
High uncertainty, such as business-cycle volatility or rapid technological 
shifts, often leads to more internal transactions; it is difficult and 
prohibitively expensive to create contracts which cover all possible 
outcomes. Thus, with higher uncertainty, firms tend to internalise 
activities. In addition, if the transactions are frequent they tend to be 
                                                 
14 Often referred to as “functional organisation” by other authorities, including Chandler. 
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managed internally because the repeated market contracting cost usually 
is higher than the internal bureaucratic cost. 
While uncertainty and frequency play some role in creating transaction 
costs, Williamson considered asset specificity the most important driver of 
integration (e.g., Riordan and Williamson 1985, 366). Asset specificity is 
relatively independent of the other factors that affect firm-size limits 
(p. 368), and therefore the current research focuses on it. 
With high asset specificity, market transactions become expensive. Asset 
specificity refers to physical, human, site, or dedicated assets (Williamson 
1985, 55), which have a specific use and cannot easily be transferred.15 
Opportunistic behaviour can be expected if the asset is part of a market 
transaction. For example, a supplier invests in specific tooling equipment 
dedicated to one customer. Over time, the customer will be able to put 
pressure on the supplier because the supplier has no alternative use for the 
investment. The supplier ultimately lowers its price to the variable cost of 
production in order to cover fixed costs. But by owning the asset, a firm’s 
incentive to cheat disappears, and the cost of creating contractual 
safeguards is reduced (Williamson 1985, 32–35). 
                                                 
15 Williamson (1996, 59–60) added brand name capital and temporal specificity. 
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Neoclassical production costs also exhibit diseconomies as a function of 
asset specificity (Riordan and Williamson 1985, 369): 
The diseconomies are arguably great where asset specificity 
is slight, since the outside supplier here can produce to the 
needs of a wide variety of buyers using the same (large scale) 
production technology. As asset specificity increases, 
however, the outside supplier specializes his investment 
relative to the buyer. This is the meaning of redeployability. 
As these assets become highly unique, moreover, the firm 
can essentially replicate the investments of an outside 
supplier without penalty. The firm and market production 
technology thus become indistinguishable at this stage. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4, in which the differential production cost 
(ΔC) and transaction cost (ΔG) for markets and hierarchies are shown as a 
function of asset specificity. The curves show that markets have a large 
production cost advantage when asset specificity is low, but it approaches 
zero for high asset specificity (ΔC). For transaction costs, the market has an 
advantage for low asset specificity and a disadvantage for high asset 
specificity (ΔG). 
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Figure 4. Production Costs and Transaction Costs as a Function of Asset Specificity 
PRODUCTION COSTS AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
AS A FUNCTION OF ASSET SPECIFICITY
Average
Unit
Cost
ΔC + ΔG
ΔC
ΔG
Asset
Specificity
Source: Riordan and Williamson (1985)
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The implication of the asset-specificity argument, from both a transaction- 
and production-cost perspective, is that firms with high asset specificity 
will not reach the limits of size as quickly as those with low specificity. 
Thus, Riordan and Williamson found that “larger firms are more 
integrated than smaller rivals” (p. 376). 
In closing, a framework based on transaction cost economics has been 
constructed which establishes a rationale for firm-size limits. Four 
factors—atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic insularity, incentive 
limits and communication distortion—make it difficult for firms to expand 
indefinitely. These negative influences can be offset by economies of scale, 
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and they can be moderated by the choice of an appropriate organisational 
form and by increasing internal asset specificity. The framework is next 
tested against the literature. 
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3.2 EVIDENCE 
In general, there exists only limited research on diseconomies of scale. This 
is somewhat surprising, because many authorities point out that analysing 
the limits of firm size is critical to our understanding of the modern 
economy. Fortunately, the relevant literature yields fragments of evidence 
that not only confirm the existence of diseconomies of scale, but also 
explicate various features of bureaucratic failure. The composite picture 
derived from a review of this literature supports the theoretical framework 
developed in the previous section, and the hypotheses articulated later in 
the thesis (see Chapter 4). 
This section begins with a review of the literature relating to diseconomies 
of scale and a comparison with Williamson’s theoretical framework. The 
following part reviews the various perspectives on the relationship 
between economies of scale and diseconomies of scale. Next, the section 
discusses the support in the literature for the moderating factors. The 
fourth part briefly reviews what impact, if any, the choice of industry has 
on a firm’s performance. Finally, the literature findings are summarised in 
a concluding part. 
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3.2.1 Diseconomies of Scale 
The literature relating to firm-size limits does not follow Williamson’s 
categorisation. Thus, the relevant studies are reviewed by general topic 
and author, covering bureaucracy and its negative effect on size, 
information loss, agency theory, and employee incentive problems. At the 
end of the section the arguments are summarised and related back to 
Williamson’s four sources of diseconomies of scale. 
3.2.1.1 Bureaucracy: Negative Consequences of Size 
A number of sociological studies describe negative consequences of size 
which correlate well with Williamson’s propositions in Section 3.1. Pugh 
et al. (1969) and Child (1973), among others, showed that size leads to 
bureaucracy. Large firms are usually highly bureaucratised through 
formalisation, and to the extent that bureaucracies breed diseconomies, 
this limits the growth of such firms. Williamson made a similar point: 
“almost surely, the added costs of bureaucracy are responsible for 
limitations in firm size” (1996, 266). According to Blau and Meyer the 
diseconomies of bureaucracy fall into three major categories: (1) excessive 
rigidity, (2) conservatism/resistance to change, and (3) perpetuation of 
social-class differences (1987, 139–161). 
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Of these, the first one is relevant here because conservatism is essentially a 
subcategory of rigidity, and social-class differences fall outside the scope 
of this research. Excessive rigidity appears as organisations formalise work 
practices through bureaucratic procedures (Merton 1957, 197–200). 
Problems are solved by adding structure and the firm reaches a point at 
which the added structure costs more than the problem solved; Blau and 
Meyer referred to this as the “problem—organisation—problem—more 
organisation” spiral of bureaucratic growth (1987, 147). These researchers 
showed that factors external to the firm, such as increased number of 
customers or number of tasks to be performed, have little to do with 
increased bureaucracy. In the end, the added policies and procedures of 
bureaucracy stifle flexibility. 
Crozier (1964) also emphasised rigidity as the most important dysfunction 
of bureaucracy. In fact, he viewed the bureaucratic organisational model 
as inherently inefficient, especially under conditions of uncertainty. 
Managers become increasingly insulated from reality, while lower levels 
of the organisation experience alienation. As Stinchcombe (1965) 
demonstrated, one consequence of such rigidity is that firms tend to 
maintain the organisation form they had when they were created. 
Pondy (1969) studied administrative intensity in different industries and 
what causes variations in intensity. He found a positive correlation 
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between size of administration and firm size when he included a measure 
of ownership-management separation. This is in line with Williamson’s 
notion of bureaucratic insularity: the larger the organisation is, the more 
managers are shielded from reality, and the more distant the owners are 
from daily operations. 
Using a demographical research approach, Carroll and Hannan 
(2000, 289–290) argued that older firms exhibit organisational inertia and 
find it increasingly difficult to adapt to external changes: “…old 
organizations are disadvantaged compared to younger ones in changing 
environments. Alternatively, accumulating rules, routines, and structures 
might simply impose an overhead cost that reduces the efficiency of 
organizations even in stable environments”. 
A similar logic based on institutional economics can be found in Olson 
(1982). His theory holds that as the institutional structure of a country 
ages, growth-retarding organisations such as an increasingly complex 
legal system, special-interest groups and nongovernmental watchdog 
organisations will become increasingly abundant. The theory and empiry 
specifically predict that older countries with stable institutions will exhibit 
lower economic growth (p. 77). If this logic holds for corporations as well, 
then older firms will experience less growth. 
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3.2.1.2 Information Loss and Rigidity 
A few studies from the firm-as-information-processor school of thought 
relate to diseconomies of scale. (Several studies within this school relate to 
the size distribution of firms, but do not discuss the nature of the 
diseconomies of scale at length. See Sutton (1997, 43–48) and Axtell 
(1999, 4–5) for summaries.) Arrow (1974) found that employees in large 
organisations tend to be highly specialised. Thus, coordination through 
communication becomes increasingly important. Because information 
flows carry a cost, organisations code (through formal or informal rules) 
the information available. Coding economises on resources, but it also 
leads to information loss and rigidity (p. 55). This means (1) that the more 
hierarchical levels there are, the more information loss or distortion 
results; and (2) the older the firm is, the higher the rigidity. 
Simon ([1947] 1976) made a similar point. Based on his concept of 
bounded rationality—”human behavior is intendedly rational, but only 
limited so” (p. xxviii)—he found that information degrades as 
communication lines are extended. Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) 
added to this perspective by noting that there are inevitable signal delays 
in an organisation. The more hierarchical levels to be traversed, the longer 
and more frequent the delays are. Summarising the lessons learnt during a 
career as a corporate executive, Barnard ([1938] 1968) argued that the size 
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of unit organisations is “restricted very narrowly by the necessities of 
communication” (p. 110) and that “the size of executive organizations is 
limited generally by the same conditions that govern the size of unit 
organizations” (p. 112).16 
Control-loss problems may contribute to diseconomies of scale as well. 
McAfee and McMillan (1995) argued that people in organisations exploit 
information asymmetries to their advantage (or in Williamson’s words 
(1993), they are opportunistic). Dispersion of knowledge within the 
organisation combined with individual self-interest make conflict of 
interest and sub-goal pursuit inevitable. McAfee and McMillan noted, 
among other things, that efficiency falls as the hierarchy expands, and that 
“long” hierarchies are not viable in competitive industries (p. 401). Qian 
(1994), similarly found that in long hierarchies, employees do not 
contribute with a high level of effort. Employees have incomplete 
information about their role in the enterprise and thus suffer from a lack of 
motivation. Moreover, managers will need to monitor employee effort, 
leading to higher costs and further resistance or lack of commitment. 
However, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001) made the case that long 
hierarchies, under certain restrictive conditions (p. 4), do not lead to 
control loss: “provided the required conditions on contracting sequence, 
                                                 
16 That is, the mechanism which determines how large a department can be, also determines how 
large the firm can be. 
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verifiability of subcontracts and unlimited liability of intermediate agents 
hold, our model questions the common notion that larger, more complex 
hierarchies are less efficient owing to ‘control losses’ with respect to 
incentives or coordination” (p. 4). It is unclear, however, whether these 
conditions are met by real-world firms. 
 
3.2.1.3 Agency Theory 
An early version of agency theory argued that very large firms do not 
strive for profit maximisation. According to Monsen and Downs, such 
firms need to build “bureaucratic management structures to cope with 
their administrative problems. But such structures inevitably introduce 
certain conflicts of interest between men in different positions within 
them. These conflicts arise because the goals of middle and lower 
management are different from those of top management. The 
introduction of these additional goals into the firm’s decision-making 
process also leads to systematic deviations from profit-maximizing 
behavior” (1965, 222). Monsen and Downs furthermore found that the 
motives of managers differ from those of owners. Managers tend to 
maximise personal income, while owners maximise profits. It is 
impossible for owners of large firms to control the behaviour of managers. 
Consequently, profit maximisation does not occur. The outcome is akin to 
what Williamson labelled bureaucratic insularity. 
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Silver and Auster (1969) argued that the “divergences of interests within 
the firm and the costs of dealing with them” (p. 277) mean that “the 
entrepreneur’s time is a limitational factor” (p. 280). Employees typically 
“shirk their duties unless the employer takes steps to prevent this” 
(p. 278). As a result, senior executives will have less time for strategising 
and entrepreneurialism, all other things being equal. Silver and Auster 
furthermore made two predictions based on this argument: (1) the higher 
the labour content is of an industry’s value added, the sooner the total cost 
curve will turn up, meaning such industries will be more fragmented; and 
(2) the more supervision employees require, the lower the industry 
concentration ratio. 
More recently, Jensen has deepened and extended these arguments (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986, 1988, 1989, 2000). He defined 
agency costs as the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss. The 
magnitude of agency costs depends on a number of factors, including the 
transparency of the firm’s activities and the market for managerial talent. 
Jensen did not, contrary to Monsen and Downs or Silver and Auster, 
explicitly state that agency costs increase with the size of the firm. Jensen 
demonstrated, however, that managers emphasise firm size over 
profitability: “Managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow 
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beyond optimal size. Growth increases managers’ power by increasing the 
resources under their control. It is also associated with increases in 
managers’ compensation” (1986, 323). He looked at the profitability of 
diversified firms, noting that they are less profitable than focused firms. 
Agency theory and transaction cost economics are similar in many 
respects and it is not surprising that the two theories lead to the same 
conclusions. However, some authorities contend that agency theory is a 
special case of TCE and thus does not capture all the costs associated with 
transactions. Specifically, Williamson (1985, 20–21) and Mahoney 
(1992, 566) argued that agency costs correspond to the ex post costs of TCE. 
Meanwhile, TCE works with both ex ante and ex post costs.17 Table 4 
compares the two theories. 
Table 4. Comparison of Agency Costs and Transaction Costs 
COMPARISON OF AGENCY COSTS AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transaction Costs 
Agency Costs Ex ante Ex post 
• Search and information costs 
• Drafting, bargaining and 
decision costs 
• Safeguarding costs 
• Monitoring and enforcement 
costs 
• Adaptation and haggling  
costs 
• Bonding costs 
• Maladaptation costs 
• Monitoring expenditures of the 
principal 
• Bonding expenditures by the 
agent 
• Residual losses 
 
                                                 
17 In contrast, Williamson (1988, 570) argued that agency costs correspond to TCE’s ex ante costs. 
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Other critics have pointed out that agency theory poorly explains the 
boundaries of the firm (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales 1999, 5). Hart 
(1995, 20), for example, noted that “the principal–agent view is consistent 
with there being one huge firm in the world, consisting of a large number 
of divisions linked by optimal incentive contracts; but it is also consistent 
with there being many small, independent firms linked by optimal arm’s-
length contracts”. For that reason, TCE provides a more nuanced 
foundation for the current research. 
3.2.1.4 Employee Incentives and Lack of Motivation 
A number of authorities have argued that job satisfaction is lower in large 
organisations and at large work establishments. Employees in large firms 
are paid significantly more than those in small firms. The reason often 
given for this disparity is that higher compensation makes up for a less-
satisfying work environment (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff 1990, 29). 
Scherer’s work (1976) is representative of the extensive research conducted 
at the establishment level. In a review of the literature, including his own 
original research, he concluded that worker satisfaction was 30 per cent 
lower in large establishments18 compared to small establishments (p. 109).  
                                                 
18 More than 500 employees. 
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Meanwhile, compensation was more than 15 per cent higher for 
equivalent job descriptions (p. 119). He argued that because establishment 
size is correlated to firm size, the effects of alienation in large firms appear 
to be significant. Later work, sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission 
in the United States, confirmed these findings (Kwoka 1980). 
Brown, Hamilton and Medoff (1990) found that large firms pay a wage 
premium of 10–15 per cent over small firms when adjustments have been 
made for other effects such as unionisation and skill levels (p. 42). They 
did not conclude that this difference is necessarily related to alienation, 
but regardless of the cause, large firms seem to pay substantially higher 
wages than smaller ones. 
In addition, span-of-control problems make it increasingly costly to extend 
incentive contracts to employees as firms grow (Rasmusen and Zenger 
1990, 69). Thus, large firms favour fixed-wage contracts based on tenure 
rather than performance and make extensive use of monitoring to control 
productivity. In contrast, smaller firms link pay and performance closely 
(p. 80). As a result, the larger firms have a fairly narrow spread of salaries 
and do not attract top talent; smaller firms may employ both superior and 
inferior talent, but they reward individuals accordingly. Rasmusen and 
Zenger’s data strongly supported these conclusions, especially in 
functions with indivisible work, where success is dependent on joint 
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contributions by several individuals (e.g., in research and development). 
The closer match between performance and pay in small firms puts large 
firms at a disadvantage, in line with Williamson’s incentive limits as a 
source of diseconomies of scale. Olson (1982, 31) noted that: “in the 
absence of selective incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes 
as group size increases”. A similar argument was made by Axtell (1999), 
who, based on agent-based computational modelling, found that the 
number of free riders in a firm grows with firm size and that the limits of 
firm size are set at the point where the advantages of joint production (i.e., 
economies of scale) are smaller than the disadvantages of having many 
free riders in the firms whose work effort cannot be effectively monitored 
(p. 54): “We have interpreted firm growth and demise as a process in 
which agents are attracted to high-income firms, these firms grow, and 
once they become large get over-run with free-riders.” 
Many authorities point out that R&D productivity is significantly lower in 
large firms. Cooper (1964) surprised business leaders and academics with 
his article “R&D Is More Efficient in Small Companies”. Based on 25 
interviews with managers at large and small firms, he argued that small 
firms have three to ten times higher productivity in development than 
large firms. The key reasons: (1) small firms are able to hire better people 
because they can offer more tailored incentives; (2) engineers in small 
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firms are more cost-conscious; and (3) internal communication and 
coordination is more effective in small firms. These reasons match three of 
Williamson’s four sources of diseconomies: incentive limits, atmospheric 
consequences and communication distortion. 
Later work has confirmed Cooper’s anecdotal evidence both theoretically 
and empirically. Arrow (1983) demonstrated that large firms will invest 
suboptimally in development because of information loss, and that small 
firms have a particular advantage in novel areas of research. Schmookler 
(1972) found that large firms (more than 5000 employees) trail small firms 
in the number of patented inventions, the percentage of patented 
inventions used commercially and the number of significant inventions 
(p. 39). Yet they spend more than twice the resources per patent (p. 37). 
Schmookler listed four reasons for the higher effectiveness and efficiency 
of small firms in R&D: a better understanding of the problem to be solved, 
greater cost-consciousness, a more hospitable atmosphere for creative 
contributions and superior quality of technical personnel (p. 45). Thus, 
Schmookler quantified and confirmed Cooper’s initial evidence, noting 
that “big firms tend to provide a haven for the mediocre in search of 
anonymity” (p. 43). In addition, Zenger (1989, 1994) studied employment 
contracts in R&D in high technology. He found that organisational 
diseconomies of scale overwhelm technological economies of scale in 
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R&D. His statistical analysis of Silicon Valley firms showed that small 
firms attract better talent than large firms, motivate employees to try 
harder and tend to better tie compensation to performance (1994, 725). 
Finally, leading anti-bigness ideologues have provided plenty of anecdotal 
evidence for such arguments, although they are lacking in formal findings. 
Peters (1992) supported the notion that R&D is less effective in large 
organisations. He argued that large firms are massively overstaffed in 
development and that there is little correlation between size of R&D 
budget and output, offering several case examples as proof. Brock (1987) 
argued that bigness retards technological advance because large firms are 
overly risk averse. 
Peters, who since the early 1980s has crusaded against large firms, has 
discussed diseconomies of scale in several books and articles. His views 
were summarised in “Rethinking scale” (1992). Peters contended there 
that decentralisation is necessary for large firms, but very few are as 
decentralised as they can and should be. Without decentralisation, they 
are not adaptable enough to respond to changes in the marketplace: “If big 
is so damn good, then why is almost everyone big working overtime to 
emulate small?” (p. 13). Moreover, Peters argued that any firm would be 
well advised to reduce vertical integration, although he does not offer 
evidence for why this is true. Overall, he found that the bureaucratic 
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distortions of traditional firms lead to lower profitability and growth. In 
contrast, successful firms mimic the market as much as possible. These 
ideas are in line with Williamson’s description of firm limits, except for the 
notion that firms should always reduce vertical integration. 
Schumacher (1989, 245) identified the lack of motivation in large 
organisations as the key disadvantage of size, providing a useful 
summary: “for a large organisation, with its bureaucracies, its remote and 
impersonal controls, its many abstract rules and regulations, and above all 
the relative incomprehensibility that stems from its very size, motivation is 
the central problem”. 
3.2.1.5 Reconciliation with the “Limits of Firm Size” Framework 
The above observations on diseconomies of scale do not map perfectly to 
Williamson’s four sources of diseconomies of scale. Some are similar to his 
sources, others to his outcomes. Table 5 shows that Williamson’s 
framework is strongly supported. The most important contrary evidence is 
Mookherjee and Reichelstein’s finding (2001) that long hierarchies do not 
necessarily lead to control loss, and Brown, Hamilton and Medoff’s 
discussion (1990) of the reason for labour cost differentials between large 
and small firms. They noticed the differential, but found no link to 
motivation. 
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Table 5. Sources of Limits of Firm Size 
SOURCES OF LIMITS OF FIRM SIZE 
Atmospheric 
Consequences 
Bureaucratic 
Insularity Incentive Limits  
Communication 
Distortion  
Arrow (1974): Rigidity to 
change 
 
Blau and Meyer (1987): 
Excessive rigidity 
 
Brown, Hamilton and 
Medoff (1990): 
Unexplained wage 
differential 
 
Child (1973): Insularity 
 
Cooper (1964): R&D 
cost control 
 
Crozier (1964): 
Alienation 
 
Kwoka (1980): Low job 
satisfaction in large 
firms 
 
Merton (1957): Rigidity 
 
Pugh et al. (1969): 
Insularity from reality 
 
Qian (1994): Monitoring 
costs/inadequate effort 
levels 
 
Scherer (1976): Low job 
satisfaction in large 
firms 
 
Schmookler (1972): 
R&D cost 
consciousness; Climate 
for innovation 
 
Schumacher (1989): 
Low motivation 
Blau and Meyer (1987): 
Excessive rigidity 
 
Brock (1987): Risk 
aversion 
 
Carroll and Hannan 
(2000): Firm age leads 
to insularity 
 
Child (1973): Insularity 
 
Crozier (1964): Rigidity 
 
Jensen (1986): Firms 
larger than optimum 
 
Merton (1957): Rigidity 
 
Monsen and Downs 
(1965): Different 
owner/manager 
objectives 
 
Olson (1982): Rigidity 
 
Pondy (1969): 
Increase in 
administration 
 
Pugh et al. (1969): 
Insularity from reality 
 
Schmookler (1972): 
Understanding market 
needs in R&D 
 
Stinchcombe (1965): 
Perpetuation of 
organisation form 
 
Williamson (1996): 
Bureaucratic rigidity 
Axtell (1999): Free-rider 
problem 
 
Blau and Meyer (1987): 
Excessive rigidity 
 
Cooper (1964): R&D 
incentives 
 
Crozier (1964): Rigidity 
 
Olson (1982):Absence 
of selective incentives 
 
Peters (1992): Low 
productivity in R&D 
 
Rasmusen and Zenger 
(1990): Employment 
contracts 
 
Schmookler (1972): 
Quality of R&D 
employees 
 
Silver and Auster 
(1969): Limits to 
entrepreneurship 
 
Williamson (1996): 
Weaker incentives in 
bureaucracies 
 
Zenger (1989, 1994): 
Employment contract 
disincentives in R&D 
 
Arrow (1974): 
Specialisation leads to 
poor communication 
 
Arrow (1983): 
Information loss in R&D 
 
Barnard ([1938] 1968): 
Communication losses 
 
Cooper (1964): R&D 
coordination 
 
Geanakoplos and 
Milgrom (1991): 
Information signal 
delays 
 
McAfee and McMillan 
(1995): Lower efficiency 
 
Mookherjee and 
Reichelstein (2001): No 
control loss under 
certain restrictive 
conditions 
 
Simon ([1947] 1976): 
Processing bottlenecks 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Economies of Scale 
This brings us to economies of scale. According to some TCE-authorities 
(Masten 1982; North and Wallis 1994), these should not be incorporated 
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into the framework because they are independent of the choice of market 
or hierarchy, once technological indivisibilities are captured within the 
firm. That is, economies of scale will be reaped regardless of whether all 
production is carried out in one firm or in many firms. Thus, the 
intuitively appealing notion that the existence of economies of scale offsets 
size disadvantages is, according to these authorities, incorrect. This is at 
odds with Riordan and Williamson’s argument (1985) discussed in Section 
3.1.3. 
The argument has never been tested directly. However, since the 1950s, 
extensive research has covered the nature and magnitude of economies of 
scale in production costs, much of it emanating from the structure–
conduct–performance school of thought. This work has been explicated in 
a number of books, and the findings will only be briefly summarised here. 
In general, the research shows that economies of scale do not play a major 
role in explaining firm size. 
Bain pioneered this line of research in the 1950s and subsequently 
revolutionised the study of industry and firm behaviour with his book 
Industrial Organization (1968). “The Rationale of Concentration—Efficiency 
and Other Considerations” from that book reviews the scale-economies 
argument. Bain divided the analysis into plant- and firm-level analyses. At 
the plant level, economies of scale are exploited by specialising the work 
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force and management, and by using dedicated machinery. Each plant has 
a minimum optimal scale and beyond this scale few additional economies 
of scale can be exploited. Bain found that in a study of twenty industries 
(all within the manufacturing sector), only two (automobiles and 
typewriters) showed significant economies of scale: “in a preponderance 
of cases, plant scale curves tend to be at least moderately flat (and 
sometimes very flat)...in the bulk of cases, then, the relative flatness of 
plant scale curves virtually diminishes the importance of plant scale 
economies” (pp. 192–193). In other words, there is scant evidence at the 
plant level for benefits of size. 
At the firm level, Bain’s study showed that economies of scale derive from 
benefits of large-scale management, a large distribution system and 
purchasing power.19 He then noted that these firm-level economies of 
scale are elusive, if they exist at all. His research indicated that “where 
economies of the multi-plant firm are encountered, they are ordinarily 
quite slight in magnitude...the unit costs...are typically only 1 or 2 per cent 
below those of a firm with one plant of minimum optimal scale”. Of the 
twenty industries studied, Bain was able to quantify firm-level economies 
of scale for twelve industries. Of these twelve industries, none exhibited  
even moderate scale effects (p. 195). 
                                                 
19 Bain does not mention R&D and marketing, possibly because these functions were less important 
in the early 1950s. 
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Bain (1978) later summarised his argument as follows: “It is not true that 
existing degrees of concentration are adequately explained simply as the 
result of adjustments to attain maximum efficiency in production and 
distribution...Industries probably tend to be ‘more concentrated than 
necessary’ for efficiency—and the larger firms bigger than necessary” 
(p. 94). 
Scherer and Ross provided an overview of the economies of scale debate 
in “The Determinants of Market Structure: Economies of Scale” (1990). 
They underscored that it is difficult to draw simple conclusions about the 
relationship between size and returns. In general, they found that 
economies of scale are exhausted at a surprisingly small firm size.20 In a 
study of twelve industries, they found that market concentration could not 
be explained by minimally efficient scale considerations. The largest firms 
in the twelve industries were between two and ten times larger than 
economies of scale necessitated. Scherer and Ross argued that to the extent 
that economies of scale accrue for large firms in those industries, they 
derive from savings in overhead costs (including R&D and marketing) and 
fixed costs in tangible assets. The economies of scale in overhead are 
similar to the governance-cost scale economies discussed by Riordan and 
Williamson (1985, 373), indicating some support for their proposition. 
                                                 
20 They made the same argument at the product and plant level. 
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A number of theoretical studies (Ijiri and Simon 1964; Lucas 1978; Nelson 
and Winter 1982; Simon and Bonini 1958) have demonstrated that large 
firms evolve stochastically, regardless of economies of scale, for the simple 
reason that they beat the competition over time. Losers disappear, and 
winners grow at differential rates depending on how many times they 
won and how much time this took. Given this logic, firms are large 
because they are winners, not because they realise economies of scale. 
Based on realistic assumptions about industry growth rates, variance in 
firm profitability and so on, simulations have yielded firm-size 
distributions similar to those observed in real life. As Ijiri and Simon put it: 
“the observed distributions are radically different from those we would 
expect from explanations based on static cost curves...there appear to be 
no existing models other than the stochastic ones that make specific 
predictions of the shapes of the distribution” (p. 78). 
An empirical test of the stochastic evolution model was carried out by 
Rumelt and Wensley (1981), who looked at whether high market share led 
to high profitability, or whether successful firms with high profitability, 
also achieve high market share. They concluded that “scale economies 
and/or market power are much less important than stochastic growth 
processes” (p. 2). Note that the stochastic-growth-process argument also 
implies that older firms will be more profitable than younger firms. Again, 
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the older firms which still exist are survivors, while younger firms include 
both winners and losers. 
Finally, Peters argued that economies of scale do not exist any more—if 
they ever existed. In his words: “technology and brainware’s dominance is 
taking the scale out of everything” (1992, 14). Adams and Brock (1986), in 
case studies of the steel industry, automotive industry and conglomerates, 
found no evidence that size leads to production scale economies at the 
firm level. They claimed that it is “the quintessential myth of America’s 
corporate culture that industrial giantism is the handmaiden of economic 
efficiency” (p. xiii). 
In sum, these studies found only slight scale effects. The evidence in the 
literature review is therefore inconclusive with regard to the argument 
made by Riordan and Williamson (1985), that economies of scale offset 
diseconomies of scale. 
3.2.3 Moderating Factors 
This section reviews the literature to validate Williamson’s moderating 
factors: organisation form and degree of integration. It also discusses, and 
dismisses, a third moderating factor: financial synergies. The literature 
review lends strong support to Williamson’s framework. 
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3.2.3.1 Organisation Form 
Chandler has argued, in a series of well-known studies (Chandler 1962, 
1977, 1982, 1990, 1992; Chandler and Daems 1980), that large firms evolve 
from functional structures to multidivisional structures as they grow in 
size and scope of activities. In Chandler’s view, the functional (unitary) 
form is not able to achieve the necessary coordination to be successful in 
the marketplace; functional economies of scale are too small to make up 
for this deficiency. Thus, as firms became more diverse in the early 
twentieth century they adapted the multidivisional form pioneered by E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Company and General Motors Corporation. This 
line of reasoning is supported by most authorities, including Peters (1992), 
who found that decentralisation brings major benefits to large firms. Three 
important quantitative studies illustrate Chandler’s argument: 
Fligstein (1985, 385–386) showed that between 1919 and 1979, the number 
of large firms21 with the multidivisional form went from none to 84 per 
cent. He estimated that the spread of the multidivisional form is mainly 
due to the increase of multi-product strategies, in line with Chandler’s 
argument. Armour and Teece (1978) quantified the difference in profits 
between functional- and multidivisional-form firms in the petrochemical 
sector, and summarised as follows: “We find strong support for the M-
                                                 
21 The 131 (120) largest manufacturing firms by assets in 1919 (1979). 
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form hypothesis. In the 1955–1968 period the multidivisional structure 
significantly influenced (at better than the 99-per cent level) the rate of 
return on stockholders’ equity, raising it on average by about two 
percentage points...realized by the average functional form firm” (pp. 116–
117). Teece (1981) studied eighteen manufacturing industries and two 
retail industries. He found that the multidivisional form outperformed the 
functional form by an average of 2.37 percentage points (p. 188). He 
concluded: “the M-form innovation has been shown to display a 
statistically significant impact on firm performance” (p. 190). These 
authorities are typical of the strong support for Williamson’s view that 
organisational structure matters and that correct organisational choices 
can alleviate the effects of diseconomies of scale. 
3.2.3.2 Degree of Integration 
There is an extensive literature on vertical and lateral integration based on 
transaction cost economics and other theories. Mahoney (1989, 1992) and 
Shelanski and Klein (1995) provide summaries. Two issues are relevant 
here: 
• Do asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency explain the 
degree of vertical integration? 
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• Does Williamson’s framework extend to integration in general? 
Asset specificity has repeatedly been shown to be the primary determinant 
of vertical integration. A number of empirical studies confirm this (e.g., 
Masten 1984; Masten, Meehan and Snyder 1989, 1991; Monteverde and 
Teece 1982; Joskow 1993; Klier 1993; Krickx 1988). Uncertainty and 
frequency are less important. First, they only contribute to vertical 
integration in conjunction with asset specificity. Second, the empirical 
evidence does not hold up well in statistical analyses. Walker and Weber’s 
(1984, 1987) results are typical. They found that volume uncertainty had 
some impact on the decision to vertically integrate and that technological 
uncertainty had no impact on vertical integration. Transaction frequency 
has, unfortunately, not been studied explicitly, perhaps because it is not 
independent from various types of asset specificity. Piecemeal evidence 
from other studies suggests that it is even less important than uncertainty 
when asset specificity is part of the analysis (e.g., Mahoney 1992, 571). 
Finally, Holmström and Roberts (1998, 79) found that both uncertainty 
and transaction frequency are less important factors than asset specificity. 
As for the second issue, Williamson’s framework appears to extend to 
integration in general. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Teece (1976, 1980, 
1982) illustrate the use of TCE in lateral relationships. Asset specificity 
influences integration from a geographic reach, product breadth, and 
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vertical depth point of view. Teece (1976) showed that multinational firms 
only exist because the combination of asset specificity and opportunism 
leads to moral hazard, which is difficult to contain in market transactions. 
Without, for example, human asset specificity, a firm could just as easily 
license its technology to a firm in another country, reaping the benefits of 
development. Tsokhas (1986) illustrated this in a case study of the 
Australian mining industry. Other studies have shown that market 
diversity reduces profitability (e.g., Bane and Neubauer 1981). Thus, there 
is support for Coase’s 1932 view22 that the distinction between vertical and 
lateral integration is without value (1993c, 40). 
A number of studies of product breadth show that asset specificity plays a 
major role in explaining the success and failure of diversification. Rumelt 
(1974) found a strong correlation between profitability and human asset 
specificity—in this case the degree to which a firm draws on common core 
skills or resources (pp. 121–127). In two studies of the Fortune 500 list of 
American firms, he demonstrated that focused firms derive three to four 
percentage points higher return on capital than highly diversified firms. 
Subsequent studies “have merely extended or marginally modified 
Rumelt’s (1974) original findings” (Ramanujam and Varadarajan 
                                                 
22 Letter to Ronald Fowler, 24 March 1932. 
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1989, 539). In sum, asset specificity seems to explain integration in general, 
not only vertical integration. 
3.2.3.3 Financial Synergies 
A potential third moderating influence discussed by Williamson (1986) is 
the presumably efficient internal capital markets of large firms, which 
allows them to realise financial synergies. Bhidé (1990), however, refuted 
this line of reasoning and showed that the improvement in efficiency of 
external capital markets since the 1960s helps explain the trend away from 
diversification: “Investor power, which goes along with capital market 
sophistication, has reduced the ability of managers to preserve an 
inefficient organizational form”. Comment and Jarrell (1995, 82–83) 
reached the same conclusion based on an exhaustive statistical analysis of 
two thousand firms listed either on the New York Stock Exchange or on 
the American Stock Exchange between 1978 and 1989. 
There does not appear to be a strong reason to expand Williamson’s 
framework with this moderating influence. For the purposes of the current 
research the financial synergies are therefore excluded. 
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3.2.3.4 Reconciliation with the “Limits of Firm Size” Framework 
Table 6 summarises the moderating influences on diseconomies of scale. 
There is again strong support for Williamson’s framework. The choice of 
M-form organisation was found to influence firm performance positively. 
The determinant of degree of integration has been narrowed down to asset 
specificity, while uncertainty and transaction frequency were found to be 
less important. Financial synergies do not, however, moderate 
diseconomies of scale—at least not in the United States where the external 
capital markets are relatively efficient. 
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Table 6. Potential Moderators of Diseconomies of Scale 
POTENTIAL MODERATORS OF DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
M-Form Organisation Asset Specificity Financial Synergies 
Armour and Teece (1978): M-
form increases ROE 
 
Chandler (e.g., 1962), 
Chandler and Daems (1980): 
M-form alleviates coordination 
and control problems 
 
Fligstein (1985): Multi-product 
coordination favours M-form 
 
Peters (1992): Decentralisation 
is critical to firm performance 
 
Teece (1981): M-form firms are 
significantly better performers 
than U-form firms 
Bane and Neubauer (1981): 
Market diversity reduces 
profitability 
 
Coase (1993c): No distinction 
between vertical and lateral 
integration 
 
Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Teece (e.g., 1976): TCE 
applies to lateral integration 
 
Mahoney (1992), Holmström 
and Roberts (1998): Uncer-
tainty and frequency not 
important 
 
Masten (1984), Masten et al. 
(1989, 1991), Monteverde and 
Teece (1982), Joskow (1993), 
Klier (1993), Krickx (1988): 
Asset specificity more 
important than uncertainty and 
frequency 
 
Rumelt (1974): Product 
diversity reduces asset 
specificity 
 
Teece (1976), Tsokhas (1986): 
Asset specificity influences 
geographic reach 
 
Walker and Weber (1984, 
1987): Volume uncertainty is 
weak factor 
Bhidé (1990): Internal capital 
markets not efficient 
 
Comment and Jarrell (1995): 
Financial synergies not 
relevant 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Industry Influence 
Finally, industry influence is not part of the TCE proposition regarding 
limits of firm size, except indirectly (e.g., industries with high R&D-
intensity should show significant diseconomies of scale because incentive 
limits are important in such industries). A number of studies have shown 
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that there is weak correlation between profitability and which industry or 
industries a manufacturing firm participates in. Schmalensee (1985) 
suggested methods for disaggregating business-unit performance into 
industry, corporate-parent and market-share effects. Rumelt (1991) 
applied the method to manufacturing firms and found that industry 
effects accounted for 8 per cent of the explained variance in profitability. 
McGahan and Porter (1997) found a 19-per cent industry effect for all 
sectors of the economy, but only 9 per cent of explained variance in 
profitability for firms in the manufacturing sector (similar to Rumelt’s 
findings). Thus, industry appears to influence profitability in the non-
manufacturing sector, but only slightly in the manufacturing sector. The 
same appears to be true for firm growth. Hall (1986, 9) found, in an 
analysis of the relationship between firm growth and size in the US 
manufacturing sector, that the results were only marginally influenced by 
the use of industry dummies. 
The implication for the current research is that industry influences should 
not be included as a variable in the statistical analyses. 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
This literature review indicates that the TCE framework for firm-size 
limits is fairly robust. Most of the authorities support Williamson’s 
  
75
framework, and the mechanisms behind diseconomies of scale have been 
validated. The findings regarding economies of scale are somewhat 
inconclusive. The two transaction cost-based moderating influences on 
diseconomies of scale have both been validated. M-form firms outperform 
U-form firms, at least in the manufacturing sector. Asset specificity 
emerges as the most important driver of both vertical and lateral 
integration. 
Past research indicates that the sources of diseconomies are more 
important in certain contexts. For example, atmospheric consequences and 
incentive limits are especially severe in R&D-intense industries. 
Communication distortion, meanwhile, is most common in diverse firms 
and volatile industries. It is now possible to assess how important these 
effects are, as well as how large a firm has to be before the effects 
materialise. Assessing the importance of effects is at this point necessarily 
qualitative, based on the collective judgement derived from the literature 
review for each source of diseconomies of scale, economies of scale and 
the moderating factors. Table 7 summarises this judgement. “Good/Poor” 
indicates that if, for example, a firm has no problem with incentive limits, 
then performance (measured as financial results) will be comparatively 
good. “Importance” indicates if the effect is strong or weak. The “Impact 
Size” parameter roughly indicates at what size (number of employees) the 
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effect sets in. For example, the literature review indicates that the incentive 
disadvantage in R&D for large firms appears to be strong for firms with 
more than 500 employees in the R&D function (see pp. 58–59, above). 
“Context” shows which types of firms are most sensitive to the effects of 
diseconomies of scale, economies of scale and the moderating factors. 
Table 7. Extended TCE-Based “Limits of Firm Size” Framework 
EXTENDED TCE-BASED “LIMITS OF FIRM SIZE” FRAMEWORK 
Financial Results 
Sources of Limits of Firm Size 
Econo- 
mies of 
Scale 
Moderators 
Atmos- 
pheric 
Conse- 
quences 
Bureau-
cratic 
Insularity 
Incentive
Limits 
Commu-
nication
Distortion 
Organ- 
isation 
Form 
Degree
of 
Integra-
tion 
Good Low Low Low Low High M-form High 
Poor High High High High Low U-form Low 
Importance Fair Fair Fair in 
general; 
high in, 
e.g., R&D 
High Incon- 
clusive 
High Asset 
specifi-
city high;
uncer-
tainty 
low; fre-
quency 
negli- 
gible 
Impact Size: 
Small (<1,000) 
Medium 
Large (>10,000) 
Weak 
Fair 
Strong 
 
Weak 
Fair 
Strong 
 
Weak 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
 
Strong 
Fair 
Weak 
 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
Context R&D-
intense 
Manage-
ment/ 
board 
relation  
R&D-
intense 
Diverse 
firms; 
unpredict-
ability 
Over- 
head-
intense 
  
 
 
 
The table reveals, based on Williamson’s framework and the literature 
review, that all factors (except possibly economies of scale) should have a 
material influence on the performance of large firms. The following 
chapter builds on this finding as it translates the framework into five 
testable hypotheses. 
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
The previous chapter covered the theoretical and empirical studies—
particularly Williamson’s categorisation (1975, 117–131) of diseconomies 
of scale—that inform the current research. This chapter now translates the 
findings so far into five hypotheses. The hypotheses guide the quantitative 
tests performed in the statistical analyses, presented in Chapter 6. In the 
following, each individual hypothesis is first stated, and then discussed. 
At the end of the chapter, the hypotheses are summarised and linked. 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of atmospheric consequences, 
bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and communication 
distortion, increases with firm size 
Diseconomies of scale are bureaucratic in nature and are not easily 
observed. They exist because there are diminishing returns to 
management and because large firms cannot fully replicate the high-
powered incentives that exist in the market—leading to bureaucratic 
failure, the opposite of market failure. Based on Williamson’s 
categorisation, there are four types of diseconomies of scale: atmospheric 
consequences due to specialisation, bureaucratic insularity, incentive 
limits of the employment relation and communication distortion due to 
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bounded rationality. The first hypothesis postulates that these 
diseconomies of scale increase with firm size. 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale 
The theory around economies of scale is logically broken into two parts 
(H2 and H4). The second hypothesis posits that ray marginal cost decreases 
with firm output. This could be seen as a tautological statement, but as 
was shown in Chapter 3, large firms do not necessarily benefit from 
economies of scale. First, some authorities hold that economies of scale are 
exhausted at relatively small firm sizes and thus the cost curve should be 
flat for large firms. Second, it could be that economies of scale are available 
to all participants in a market. Given these two arguments, it is important 
to test whether economies of scale exist at all. That is, does ray marginal 
cost decline with increased output? The hypothesis says nothing about 
whether economies of scale have a material influence on firm 
performance, which is expressed in the fourth hypothesis. 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure have a negative 
impact on firm performance 
As was shown in Chapter 2, the average size of large manufacturing firms 
in the United States has declined since the 1960s, relative to the total 
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economy. Thus, as large firms have become more productive they have, on 
average, not been able to compensate fully for the per-unit decline in value 
added by expanding into new geographic markets (reach), new product 
areas (breadth), or by increasing vertical integration (depth). In line with 
Stigler’s survivor principle (see p. 14, above) this indicates that the 
diseconomies of scale have a material, negative influence on firm 
performance. The four types of diseconomies are exhibited through lower 
profitability and/or slower growth of the largest firms relative to smaller 
firms, other things—such as risk—being equal. 
Given this general assumption, it is also possible posit that each of the four 
types of diseconomies will have a negative impact on the performance of 
large firms. In the statistical analyses, the third hypothesis is broken down 
into four sub-hypotheses (see also pp. 119–120, below) concerning the 
negative impact on firm performance of atmospheric consequences (H3a), 
bureaucratic insularity (H3b), incentive limits (H3c) and communication 
distortion (H3d). 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large firms 
over smaller firms 
According to TCE, unit production and transaction costs decrease with 
increasing scale. However, the benefits of scale may be reaped by all 
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participants in a market, large or small, if the market is efficient. The 
theoretical framework holds that this is not the case and that most 
economies of scale will be proprietary to the firm in which they reside. 
Thus, the hypothesis is that large firms have higher relative profitability 
than small firms, other things being equal. (Note that the theoretical 
framework says nothing about whether large firms grow faster than small 
firms.) 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two transaction cost-
related factors: organisation form and asset specificity 
The theoretical framework holds that it is possible for firms to moderate 
the negative impact of diseconomies of scale. Transaction cost economics 
shows that large firms benefit from multidivisional structures, while 
unitary structures impede performance. Moreover, conscious choices 
about the degree of integration can affect performance. In particular, firms 
with a high degree of internal asset specificity will outperform those with 
low internal asset specificity. Therefore, for the purposes of the statistical 
analyses, the following sub-hypotheses are posited (see also p. 120, below): 
large M-form firms perform better than large U-form firms (H5a); and high 
internal asset specificity affects performance positively (H5b). 
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In sum, the performance of a firm depends on three influences. To begin 
with, four size-related factors contribute to diseconomies of scale and 
determine the firm’s size limit. Second, economies of scale increase with 
firm size. Finally, two factors, M-form organisation and high asset 
specificity, can moderate the diseconomies of scale. The hypotheses are 
summarised in Figure 5, which also includes the theoretical framework 
derived from Williamson (see Section 3.1). 
Figure 5. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Firm
Performance
Growth
Profitability
Moderators
Asset Specificity
M-Form Organisation
Economies of Scale
Diseconomies of Scale
Atmospheric Consequences
Bureaucratic Insularity
Incentive Limits
Communication Distortion
Size
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
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The question remains: are the hypothesised effects large enough materially 
to influence the performance of a large firm? Only an empirical analysis, in 
which the framework and hypotheses are operationalised, will answer 
this. The next two chapters focus on this operationalisation—first by 
describing the approach to the quantitative analysis, the data collected and 
the measures taken to ensure reliability in the statistical analyses 
(Chapter 5), and then by presenting the results of said analyses 
(Chapter 6). 
  
83
5. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter turns the attention from the literature review and the 
development of hypotheses to the empirical analysis. The first section 
discusses the positivist approach taken in the analysis and the implications 
of choosing between statistical methods. The second section moves from 
this general discussion to the specifics of the data used and the quality of 
the data. It finds that the data are suitable for the structural equation 
modelling employed in Chapter 6. 
5.1 APPROACH TO QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This section gives a general impression of the analytical approach and the 
method chosen for the statistical analysis. It begins with a discussion of 
why a positive, quantitative approach was chosen and what the inherent 
limitations of such an approach are. It then proceeds with an overview of 
the use of statistical methods in similar research to explain why structural 
equation modelling was used in the current research. Moreover, the 
limitations of structural equation modelling are discussed. Finally, the 
section compares two software packages suitable for the structural 
equation modelling—Amos and LISREL—and lays out the argument for 
why Amos was chosen. 
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5.1.1 Research Philosophy 
The positivist approach taken here emphasises universal understanding in 
Runkel and McGrath’s terms (1972, 81–89). They made the distinction 
between research aimed at explaining particular phenomena and research 
explaining universal phenomena. Typically, the former type of research 
uses field studies or experiments, while the latter often uses surveys and 
theory. According to their framework, any given research study inevitably 
is a trade-off between generalisability—do the findings apply in general, 
or do they only explain the situation at hand?—precision—is it reasonable 
to believe that the findings are accurate?—and realism—do the findings 
correspond well with the underlying reality? “Sadly, these are desirable 
but not simultaneously attainable; all three—realism, precision, and 
generality—cannot be maximized at the same time” (p. 115). This thesis 
aims to draw general conclusions even if precision and realism are 
reduced. 
One could take a phenomenological approach to the research, basing it on 
case studies and other qualitative methods. Cooper (1964) did so in his 
often-quoted study of R&D productivity in large and small firms. 
However, the current research relies on a positivist approach for reasons 
found in Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991, 23): This kind of 
approach allows for more independence from the observations; because 
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individual or group behaviour are not the concern of this research, little 
additional insight can be gained from action research or other studies in 
the field. Value-freedom is important because existing studies of limits of 
firm size are themselves value-laden. Causality can be deduced from the 
proposed data set and manipulation, and concepts can be operationalised 
to suit a positivist approach. The problem lends itself to reductionism 
because the influences in the theoretical framework can be disaggregated 
and independently operationalised. Moreover, as noted earlier, it should 
be possible to draw generalisable conclusions based on the fairly large 
sample detailed in Section 5.2. Finally, it is easier to make the necessary 
cross-industry comparisons with a positivist approach. 
This methodological choice means the work focuses on the facts (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991, 27). Thus, much care was taken with the 
data set and the emphasis is on looking for facts and causality rather than 
underlying meaning (in a phenomenological sense). The hypotheses were 
formulated before the quantitative research was carried out, rather than 
deduced from the data. In addition, a large sample was used and concepts 
were operationalised so that they could be measured. 
There are no studies of this general type on the particular issue of 
diseconomies of scale. However, generalised studies on, for example, the 
profit impact of an M-form organisation or the link between size, structure 
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and complexity are widely quoted in the literature (e.g., Rumelt 1974; 
Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989). This indicates that the generalised 
approach may add substantial value to the study of limits of firm size. An 
added benefit is that data are available to support a generalised study. 
Note that several studies have aimed at describing precisely particular 
aspects of limits of firm size, as discussed in Chapter 3. Zenger’s (1989) 
study of incentive limits in Silicon Valley is a good example. Several case 
studies also provide realistic views of what these limits look like in action, 
but in the end they have had only limited impact on academic thinking. 
The notable exceptions can be found in the work on institutions in society 
based on TCE, in which North was able to merge insights from case 
studies with a framework for institutional change (e.g., North 1985, 1987, 
1992; North and Thomas 1973). Chandler’s (e.g., 1962, 1977, 1990) work on 
the evolution of large firms has also had major impact on the thinking 
regarding bureaucracies. 
5.1.2 Statistical Technique 
This section describes the statistical technique chosen based on empirical 
research precedents, the nature of the statistical task at hand, and the 
specific structural equation modelling software available. 
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5.1.2.1 Empirical Precedents 
As discussed earlier, general statistical analyses of diseconomies of scale 
have not been attempted before, except for simple direct comparisons 
between firm size and performance. There are, however, a number of 
empirical studies of particular aspects of the limits of firm size or of 
general TCE problems. These offer guidance on the choice of statistical 
methods for the current research and the operationalisation of variables. 
There are two basic types of quantitative statistical analysis: older, non-
regression-based analyses and newer, regression-based analyses. This 
section considers the statistical approaches taken in a number of these 
studies. The intent is not to discuss particular findings, but rather to 
inform the choice of statistical method for the current research. 
Early inquiries (e.g., McConnell 1945; Stigler 1958) into relationships 
between profitability and firm size made simple comparisons between the 
dependent variable (profitability) and independent variable (size), using 
histograms with the size-bracket as the categorising variable. At best, these 
analyses indicated that relationships between the variables existed, but 
because they did not include modern tests of statistical significance, they 
left many questions unanswered. 
Later, researchers including Rumelt (1974), Teece (1981) and Palepu (1985), 
used comparisons of samples to demonstrate statistical significance. Their 
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methods ranged from simple comparisons of average profitability for two 
samples, to sophisticated tests of the statistical significance of the 
differences using parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (median and 
Mann-Whitney U-test) methods (Palepu 1985, 245–246). However, these 
techniques probably did not extract the full information content of the 
samples. For example, Rumelt later used a regression technique when he 
updated his analysis of diversification and structure (Rumelt 1982). 
Yet another statistical approach is to study the amount of variance 
extracted. Schmalensee (1985) used analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
arguing that: ”This study employs a simple analysis of variance 
framework that allows us to focus on the existence and importance of firm, 
market, and market share effects without having to deal simultaneously 
with specific hypotheses and measurement issues related to their 
determinants”. Put differently, analysis of variance is an excellent tool for 
exploratory analysis. Other examples of related studies employing 
ANOVA include Rumelt (1991) and McGahan and Porter (1997). 
Finally, most statistical analyses over the last 35 years relating to aspects of 
diseconomies of scale have used multivariate regression techniques 
(Armour and Teece 1978; Aw and Batra 1998; Child 1973; Comment and 
Jarrell 1995; Fligstein 1985; Kwoka 1980; Levy 1981; Lucas 1978; Mahoney 
1989; Masten 1984; Masten, Meehan and Snyder 1989, 1991; Olson 1982; 
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Pondy 1969; Pugh et al. 1969; Rasmusen and Zenger 1990; Rumelt 1982; 
Rumelt and Wensley 1981; Walker and Weber 1984, 1987; Zenger 1994). 
They ranged from simple regressions to complex structural equation 
models, and were used for both exploratory and confirmatory analyses. 
This brief overview indicates that researchers have increasingly used 
sophisticated statistical techniques, usually leading to multivariate 
methods of analysis. Stigler’s survivor principle (see p. 14, above) suggests 
that the added complexity of using these techniques is more than 
compensated for by the added insights they bring; otherwise researchers 
would not continue to employ them and the techniques would not 
survive. It is also true that the simpler techniques have more or less 
disappeared from the literature as statistical methods have evolved and 
computing power available to researchers has increased. 
5.1.2.2 Selection of Statistical Technique 
The current research uses multivariate analysis. As early as 1966, Gatty 
argued that “for the purposes of…any…applied field, most of our tools 
are, or should be, multivariate. One is pushed to a conclusion that unless 
a…problem is treated as a multivariate problem, it is treated superficially” 
(1966, 158). Or as Hardyck and Petrinovich put it ten years later: 
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“Multivariate analysis methods will predominate in the future…” 
(1976, 7). This has been born out over the last 25 years. 
Among different multivariate techniques, structural equation modelling 
(SEM) was picked based on Hair et al.’s classification scheme for choosing 
among techniques (1998, 20–21) and a review of the pertinent literature on 
SEM (Bollen 1989, 1–9; Kelloway 1998, 2–3; Maruyama 1998, 20–24). SEM 
is the most appropriate technique when multiple relationships between 
dependent and independent variables are studied. Moreover, SEM is well 
suited for confirmatory analysis and allows for efficient hypothesis testing, 
especially of complex models. Finally, SEM allows for the use of latent, 
unobserved variables. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, these three 
attributes are important in the current research. 
Structural equation modelling must be used judiciously, however. A 
number of criticisms of this technique have been summarised by 
Maruyama (1998, 272–278). SEM cannot be used to confirm a model. It can 
only fail to disprove it. This makes replicability important, and this is a 
key reason for using publicly available data in the statistical analyses 
described in Chapter 6. Related to this is the risk of inferring causality 
where none exists. Strong correlation does not imply causality. For this 
reason, the path diagrams used in the next chapter reveal causalities based 
on theory, not on a study of correlation. 
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In addition, incorrect operationalisation and naming of variables 
(especially latent variables) can lead to erroneous conclusions. In 
Maruyama’s words, “giving something a name does not necessarily make 
it what we call it or ensure that we understand the thing we have named” 
(p. 273). This is certainly a valid point for the present work. For example, 
incentive limits were operationalised, based on the theory, with relative 
R&D expense. But does this mean that the SEM model truly captures 
incentive limits, or does it merely capture relative R&D expense? 
Finally, SEM has often been used for model development rather than 
model confirmation. The current research has tried to avoid this by using 
path diagrams that have been derived directly from the theoretical 
framework, as expressed in the hypotheses. 
5.1.2.3 Amos versus LISREL 
Amos was used in the current research, instead of the more recognised 
LISREL SEM software package. 23 LISREL certainly has a much larger 
installed base and thousands of references in the literature. Amos is less 
well known and has only been cited in 56 references as of the year 2000, 
according to its vendor (SmallWaters 2000). Amos, however, is much  
                                                 
23 Information on Amos is available at http://www.smallwaters.com. 
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easier to use for the occasional statistician because it is based on 
interactive, graphical path diagrams; it is gaining ground among 
researchers for this reason. More important, Amos has one attribute that 
serves this particular research effort well: its ability to handle missing 
values in the data collected. 
LISREL uses pair-wise or list-wise deletion to handle missing data. Amos, 
on the other hand, uses full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
estimation, arguably a leading-edge technique (Arbuckle 1996). When data 
are missing completely at random, the list-wise or pair-wise deletion 
methods employed by LISREL are asymptotically equivalent to FIML, but 
the standard errors of the parameter estimates can be considerably larger 
for LISREL. This means that Amos makes more efficient use of the 
observations, a critical consideration in the current research because the 
number of large firms is limited and the sample size could not be 
expanded infinitely. Moreover, if data are not missing at random, the 
Amos FIML estimates tend to be less biased than when pair-wise or list-
wise deletions are used. Note that FIML does not impute missing values; 
instead Amos calculates the likelihood of the parameters based on each 
observed case. 
The major advantage of LISREL is that it sometimes handles ordinal data 
more correctly with polychoric or polyserial correlations. As is discussed 
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in Chapter 6, two variables are ordinal in this research.24 The only way 
Amos can handle ordinals is by treating them as continuous variables, 
which often leads to biased estimates, or by importing the covariance 
matrix from another SEM package, which eliminates the advantage of 
FIML estimation. The bias when treating ordinals as continuous variables 
is usually towards underestimates of coefficients and overestimates of 
standard errors and chi-square (Bollen 1989, 433–446). This suggests that 
Amos in most cases will underestimate a model’s fit. There is no suitable 
remedy for this in the present case (and usually not in other cases). 
LISREL’s weighted-least-square (WLS) approach with polychoric or 
polyserial correlations handles ordinals well if the underlying 
distributions are normal. This is definitely the case for one of the ordinals 
in the current research, and may be the case for the other ordinal.25 Yet 
some critics have argued that effective use of polychoric and polyserial 
correlation requires 2000 to 5000 observations (Yung and Bentler 1994), a 
number well beyond the sample available here. Indeed, Jöreskog and 
Sörbom, the creators of LISREL, concur with this opinion: “A poorly 
estimated asymptotic covariance matrix, such as estimated from a small 
sample, can do more harm than good, when used with WLS. If the sample 
                                                 
24 The variables describe the level of vertical integration and divisionalisation. That is, they affect 
the TCE-based moderators (asset specificity and M-form), but do not relate to diseconomies of 
scale. 
25 See further discussion in Footnote 39 (p. 166) and Footnote 41 (p. 171), below. 
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size is not sufficiently large to produce an accurate estimate of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix, it is probably better to use ML” (1996, 239). 
Thus, one can either use Amos and treat ordinal data as continuous data, 
or use LISREL with a sample size that is too small—neither of which are 
optimal approaches. For the purposes of this research, a choice was made 
to use Amos because of its other positive attributes, but no attempt was 
made to compare which software package would handle the ordinal data 
best, or if this really would make a difference. The choice is in line with 
Wothke26 (1997), who recommends that for sample sizes smaller than 2000, 
“your best bet would be to treat the ordinal data as continuous”, and with 
Hayduk (1996, 213), who claims that the continuous-data assumption is of 
little practical significance: “ordinal variables have continued to receive 
considerable attention, though the problems may not be as serious as 
popular opinion suggests.” 
Finally, choosing Amos and the existence of missing data made two more 
choices automatic. Alternative estimation techniques such as generalised 
least squares and asymptotically distribution-free (ADF) estimation could 
not be used, because they do not allow missing data. ADF might otherwise 
have been useful, because it handles non-normality well. In addition,  
                                                 
26 Co-creator of Amos. 
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Amos does not allow bootstrapping when data are missing. Bootstrapping 
might otherwise have increased the reliability of the analysis, because it 
reduces the impact of non-normality. Fortunately, as will be discussed in 
Section 5.2.3, non-normality is not a major issue in the current analyses. 
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5.2 DATA OVERVIEW 
This section discusses the data used in the statistical model. The first part 
of the section defines the variables and discusses data sources. The 
following part tests the sample data for inconsistencies and outliers and 
then reviews the sample sizes. The final part transforms the variables 
using commonly accepted transformation techniques and then tests the 
data for heteroscedasticity, linearity and other potential problems. The 
conclusion is that the sample data are reasonably well-behaved and are 
suitable for further analysis. 
Throughout this section, reference is made to two sub-models: (a) the 
relationship between size and diseconomies of scale and economies of 
scale; and (b) the impact of diseconomies of scale, economies of scale and 
moderating factors on firm performance. These sub-models are used in the 
statistical analyses in Chapter 6. 
5.2.1 Definitions and Sources 
The conducted analyses were cross-sectional. Data were collected for 
publicly traded manufacturing firms (SIC codes 10–39) with headquarters 
in the US and with sales of more than $500 million. The benchmark period 
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was 1998. All data are available for downloading at http://canback.com/ 
henley.htm in the files Source98.xls and Source98.sav. 
1998 saw high economic growth, but it was not a peak in the business 
cycle. Table 8 shows key indicators for the time period surrounding the 
year and the rank of the indicator for the time period 1961–2000. 
Table 8. Select Economic Indicators for the United States 
SELECT ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Indicator 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 ’61–’00 Rank 
GDP Growth (%) 3.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.1 Medium: 15 of 40 
Mfg. GDP Growth (%) 2.4 5.4 4.1 6.1 4.1 Medium: 14 of 40 
Mfg. Return on Equity (%) 16.7 16.7 15.8 16.4 15.1 High: 7 of 40 
Mfg. Capacity Utilisation (%) 81.6 82.7 81.4 80.6 80.7 Medium: 20 of 40 
Inflation (%) 3.0 2.3 1.6 2.2 3.4 Low: 34 of 40 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2002) 
 
 
 
The analyses ultimately involved 14 variables. Of these, 9 were direct 
variables and 5 were calculated from other direct variables. For example, 
the calculated variable ROE was determined by dividing two direct 
variables: Net Income and Equity. Direct, on the other hand, implies that 
the variable was taken directly from one of the data sources. To create the 
5 calculated variables, an additional 10 direct variables were used. Thus, 
the analyses encompassed a total of 19 (9+10) direct variables. Moreover, 
44 other variables were collected although they were not used in the final 
analysis. 
  
98
Primary and secondary data were collected from several sources, 
including company organisation charts, official filings such as 10-Ks and 
proxy statements,27 annual reports, biographies of executives, historical 
company documents, corporate web sites, articles in Business Week and 
Fortune, corporate watchdogs such as the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC), Compustat and academic research. 
Table 9 depicts the 14 variables used. Specific information about the 
variables appears under each analysis section in Chapter 6. 
Table 9. Overview of Variables Used in the Analyses 
OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSES 
Usea Nameb Labelc Type Description Metric Sources 
Size (a) empl Employeesd Direct No. of employees ’000 Compustat 
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
ulabour Atmospheric 
Consequences 
Calculated Unit labour cost 
defined as labour 
cost  employees 
[ulabour = labour  
empl] 
$’000  
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
tenure Leadership 
Tenure 
Direct Average years of 
employment with 
firm for officers 
Years 10-Ks, proxy 
statements. 
annual 
reports, 
corporate 
web sites, 
executive 
biographies 
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
age Company Age Direct Years since 
founding of 
company 
Years 10-Ks, proxy 
statements. 
annual 
reports, 
corporate 
web sites, 
historical 
sources 
                                                 
27 Filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission: the 10-K is the full annual 
report and usually differs in content from the company’s shareholder annual report; proxy 
statements (report DEF 14A) contain information pertaining to voting at security holders’ 
meetings (annual meetings or special meetings). Available from EDGAR at 
http://www.sec.gov/. 
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Usea Nameb Labelc Type Description Metric Sources 
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
rd Incentive Limits Calculated Research and 
development 
expense  Sales [rd 
= rdexp  sales] 
%  
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
levels Communication 
Distortion 
Direct No. of hierarchical 
levels 
# Annual 
reports, 
corporate 
web sites, 
10-Ks, 
company 
organisation 
charts 
Economies of 
Scale (a, b) 
fixhigh Economies of 
Scale 
Calculated Defined as (fixed 
cost)2  sales 
[fixhigh = fixexp2  
sales] 
$M  
Moderators (b) foreign Geographic 
Reach 
Direct % of sales derived 
outside the United 
States 
% Compustat, 
annual 
reports, 10-
Ks 
Moderators (b) dr Product Breadth Calculated Defined as the 
diversification ratio 
(1  Rumelt’s 
specialisation ratio) 
= % of sales not 
related to the 
company’s core 
activities [dr = 1  
sr] 
%  
Moderators (b) vert Vertical Depth Direct 2 = Very high; 1 = 
High; 0 = Average 
or low 
Ordinal 10-Ks, 
annual 
reports, 
corporate 
web sites, 
Compustat 
Moderators (b) govern Governance Direct Qualitative 
rankings 
Index Business 
Week, 
IRRC, 
Fortune
Moderators (b) div Divisionalisation Direct 2 = Divisionalised; 
1 = Hybrid; 0 = 
Unitary 
Ordinal 10-Ks, proxy 
statements, 
annual 
reports, 
corporate 
web sites 
Performance 
(b) 
growth Growthd Direct 5-year compound 
annual growth rate 
(1993–1998) 
% Compustat 
Performance 
(b) 
eva Profitabilityd Calculated Economic value 
added defined as 
return on equity 
(ROE) less cost of 
equity (COE) [eva 
= roe  coe] 
%  
a
 a and b in the “Use” column indicate whether the variable is used in sub-models a or b 
b
 The “Name” column shows the name given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
c
 The “Label” column shows the label given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
d
 Appendix B discusses other definitions of size and performance 
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Table 10 below gives further definitions for those variables that were 
calculated from other (direct) variables. The table includes the 10 
additional direct variables discussed above, as well as variables used to 
support the main analyses in Chapter 6 (see also Appendix B). 
Table 10. Overview of Supporting Variables 
OVERVIEW OF SUPPORTING VARIABLES 
Usea Nameb Labelc Type Description Metric Sources 
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
labour Labour Direct Labour cost $M Compustat 
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
rdexp R&D Direct Research and 
development 
expense 
$M Compustat 
Diseconomies 
of Scale (a, b) 
sales Sales Direct Revenue $M Compustat 
Economies of 
Scale (a, b) 
fixexp Fixed Cost Calculated Fixed cost defined 
as SG&A + 
depreciation + 
interest [fixexp = 
sgaexp + depr + 
int] 
$M  
Economies of 
Scale (a, b) 
sgaexp SG&A Direct Selling, general 
and administrative 
expense 
$M Compustat 
Economies of 
Scale (a, b) 
depr Depreciation Direct Depreciation $M Compustat 
Economies of 
scale (a, b) 
int Interest Direct Interest expense % Compustat 
Moderators (b) sr Specialisation 
Ratio 
Calculated Defined as share of 
sales derived from 
core business = 
core sales  sales 
[sr = csales  sales] 
%  
Moderators (b) csales Core Sales Direct Core sales defined 
as sales derived 
from the firm’s 
main SIC code 
$M Compustat, 
annual 
reports,  
10-Ks, 
corporate 
web sites 
Moderators (b) vi VI% Calculated Vertical integration 
defined as value 
added  factor costs 
[vi = va  factor] 
  
Moderators (b) factor Factor Costs Calculated Factor costs 
defined as sales  
net income + cost 
of equity · equity 
[sales  ni + (coe · 
equity)] 
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Usea Nameb Labelc Type Description Metric Sources 
Moderators (b) as AS Calculated Composite asset 
specificity defined 
as the product of 
geographic reach, 
product breadth, 
and vertical depth 
[as = (1 + foreign) 
(1 + dr)(3 + vert)] 
  
Performance 
(b) 
roe ROE Calculated Return on equity = 
net income  equity 
[roe = ni  equity] 
%  
Performance 
(b) 
ni Net Income Direct Net income $M Compustat 
Performance 
(b) 
equity Equity Direct Book value of 
equity 
$M Compustat 
Performance 
(b) 
coe COE Calculated Cost of equityd 
defined as COE = 
risk free rate + risk 
premium · (0.371 + 
(0.635)) [coe = 
5.4% + (8.0% · 
(0.371 + (0.635 
beta)))] 
%  
Performance 
(b) 
beta Beta Direct Beta ratio Compustat 
a
 a and b in the “Use” column indicate whether the variable is used in sub-models a or b 
b
 The “Name” column shows the name given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
c
 The “Label” column shows the label given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
d
 Formula taken from Ibbotson Associates (1999) 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Inconsistent Data, Outliers and Effective Sample 
Sizes 
The original sample contained 901 firm records, derived from Compustat. 
Of these, ninety were eliminated because the firms were based outside the 
United States, did not contain revenue numbers, or ceased to exist during 
or immediately after 1998. Thirteen records were eliminated because they 
contained so-called Pre-FASB data.28 The thirteen firms with pre-FASB 
                                                 
28 Compustat presents two (or more) records for some companies, with financial data in one record 
based on non-consolidated statements and the other(s) based on consolidated statements. The 
non-consolidated statements are referred to as "Pre-FASB", and were not included in the analyses 
because the results of the consolidated concern were the object of the study here. 
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data also had regular records that were kept in the sample. Four firms 
with revenues less than $500 million were eliminated. Six limited 
partnerships were eliminated because their records did not contain 
enough information to be of interest. Six firms had duplicate records. One 
firm had recently been spun out from its corporate parent and did not 
provide meaningful data. Thus, the final sample contained 784 firm 
records. 
For these 784 records, each variable was first screened for inconsistent 
data; then outliers were eliminated if a rationale for exclusion was found. 
The following are examples of inconsistent data found in the records: 
negative equity, zero foreign sales of well-known international companies, 
negative beta and negative market value. 
Outliers were identified by standardising the variables and then 
identifying those records which fell more than three standard deviations 
from the mean, in line with Hair et al. (1998, 65). Those outliers for which 
the data made sense were kept, while, again, inconsistent data were 
eliminated. All changes to the original database described above can be 
found in the file Source98.xls at http://canback.com/henley.htm. Table 11 
shows the number of outliers retained in the database. 
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Table 11. Overview of Outliers 
OVERVIEW OF OUTLIERS 
Variable 
No. of Outliers 
before Screening 
No. of Outliers 
after Screening 
Employees 0 0 
Atmospheric Consequences 2 2 
Leadership Tenure 0 0 
Company Age 2 2 
Incentive Limits 0 0 
Communication Distortion 3 3 
Economies of Scale 9 8 
Geographic Reach 0 0 
Product Breadth 20 20 
Vertical Depth not meaningful (ordinal) 
Governance 4 4 
Divisionalisation not meaningful (ordinal) 
Growth 9 6 
Profitability 5 4 
 
 
 
Multivariate outliers were detected using DeCarlo’s macro (1997) 
normtest.sps for SPSS. This macro calculates, among other things, the 
Mahalanobis D2 measure. Missing values were assigned the mean for the 
variable. The results are summarised in Table 12. 
Table 12. Multivariate Outliers 
MULTIVARIATE OUTLIERS 
 
No. of Outliers 
before Screening 
No. of Outliers 
after Screening 
Sub-Model a 4 4 
Sub-Model b 7 7 
 
 
 
Eleven cases could have been considered outliers, if a significance 
exceeding 0.01 was used as the hurdle for critical F. However, in none of 
the cases was there a compelling reason to exclude the observation. 
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Tables 13 and 14 show the effective sample sizes for the two sub-models 
after the screening. 
Table 13. Effective Sample Sizes for Sub-Model a 
EFFECTIVE SAMPLE SIZES FOR SUB-MODEL A 
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Employees 784      
Atmospheric Consequences 146 146     
Leadership Tenure 163 57 163    
Company Age 638 145 153 638   
Incentive Limits 489 108 111 419 489  
Communication Distortion 386 137 123 347 258 386 
Economies of Scale 752 143 155 612 473 374 752
 
 
 
Table 14. Effective Sample Sizes for Sub-Model b 
EFFECTIVE SAMPLE SIZES FOR SUB-MODEL B 
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Atmospheric 
Consequences 146            
Leadership 
Tenure 57 163           
Company Age 145 153 638          
Incentive Limits 108 111 419 489         
Communication 
Distortion 137 123 347 258 386        
Economies of 
Scale 143 155 612 473 374 752       
Geographic 
Reach 134 143 553 412 343 642 663      
Product Breadth 131 152 565 423 348 650 594 670     
Vertical Depth 133 152 569 424 350 655 596 670 675    
Governance 73 74 214 162 172 223 205 209 211 229   
Divisionalisation 135 119 337 252 372 364 333 340 341 166 375  
Growth 143 157 614 472 374 725 644 646 651 228 363 756 
Profitability 145 162 636 489 384 751 663 670 674 229 373 753 781
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The tables show that all variables except for 2 had more than 200 
observations; 9 out of 14 variables had more than 400 observations (see the 
diagonals). On average, sub-model a contained 480 observations and sub-
model b contained 517 observations. The fairly low number of 
observations for Atmospheric Consequences (146) and Leadership 
Tenure (163) reduces the integrity of the upcoming analyses, but far from 
a point where they become meaningless. 
According to Hair et al. (1998, 604–605), four criteria determine an 
appropriate sample size. When maximum likelihood estimation is used, as 
here, a minimum sample size of 100 to 150 is recommended. Sample sizes 
of more than 400 or 500 often become “too sensitive”. Hair et al. 
recommends a sample size of 200 as a starting point. In addition, the 
sample size should be at least five times the number of parameters 
estimated. The most important sub-model in this analysis (b) had 13 
variables and thus a maximum of 91 parameters (13 variances and 78 
covariances) were estimated, requiring at least 455 observations—close to 
the 396 average number of observations actually available. More 
observations are required if misspecification is suspected or if data are 
strongly non-normal (not the case here, as was shown in Section 5.2.3). 
Sub-model a met the requirement more easily (28 parameters, 140 
observations required, 455 average number of observations available). 
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The sample-size tables also indicate that most covariances had a 
reasonable number of observations. Again, Hair et al. (1998, 604–605) 
recommends a minimum of 100 to 150 observations. In sub-model b, only 
Atmospheric Consequences / Leadership Tenure (57), Atmospheric 
Consequences / Governance (73) and Leadership Tenure / Governance 
(74) had less than 100 observations, while 17 of 78 covariances had less 
than 150 observations. There was an average of 353 observations per 
covariance in sub-model b. Sub-model a included 7 of 21 covariances with 
less than 150 observations and one came with less than 100: Atmospheric 
Consequences / Leadership Tenure (57). There were an average of 295 
observations per covariance in sub-model a. 
Because a significant number of observations were missing, their 
randomness had to be tested. The test was made by calculating 
dichotomised variable correlations. Each variable (except for Employees, 
which had no missing values) was recoded with the value 1 if the data 
existed, and 0 if the data was missing (Hair et al. 1998, 60). Table 15 shows 
the resulting correlations. For low correlations, the data can be considered 
missing completely at random (MCAR)—and most correlations were low 
in this analysis. Two correlations exceeded 0.4, signifying moderate non-
randomness; one correlation exceeded 0.9, signifying strong non-
randomness. The strong non-randomness of Communication Distortion / 
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Divisionalisation is unsurprising: the data were collected simultaneously 
for the two variables. 
Table 15. Multivariate Test for Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) 
MULTIVARIATE TEST FOR MISSING COMPLETELY AT RANDOM (MCAR) 
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Atmospheric 
Consequences 1             
Leadership Tenure 0.22 1            
Company Age 0.22 0.16 1           
Incentive Limits 0.11 0.06 0.14 1          
Communication 
Distortion 0.43 0.27 0.22 0.09 1         
Economies of Scale 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.05 1        
Geographic Reach 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.11 1       
Product Breadth 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.27 1      
Vertical Depth 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.97 1     
Governance 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.33 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11 1    
Divisionalisation 0.43 0.26 0.21 0.10 0.96 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.32 1   
Growth 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 1  
Profitability 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 1
Note: Figures show dichotomised correlations 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Data Transformation, Non-Normality, 
Heteroscedasticity and Linearity 
Most continuous variables were transformed to reach more univariate 
normal distributions. This was done by studying histograms for each 
variable and by analysing the skewness and kurtosis statistics. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (with the Lilliefors modification) normality test was  
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also performed. Those variables that deviated significantly from normal 
distribution were transformed. The transformations were based on the 
standard approach of using the square root for mild non-normality, the 
logarithm for moderate non-normality, and the inverse for severe non-
normality. In addition, in some instances the arctangent transformation 
was used to reduce kurtosis. Table 16 summarises the transformations 
used. While the use of transformations increases the accuracy of the test 
statistics, it sometimes makes it more difficult to interpret the results for 
each variable because scales change and the variable itself make take on a 
new meaning (Hair et al. 1998, 78). The current research is not concerned 
with the variables’ scales and thus the data transformations on balance 
benefit the statistical analysis. 
Table 16. Overview of Transformation Formulas 
OVERVIEW OF TRANSFORMATION FORMULAS 
Variable Transformation 
Employees atan(0.67(sqrt(ln(Employees · 1000))  mean)  sdev);  
mean = 2.9956; sdev = 0.18056 
Atmospheric Consequences sqrt(Atmospheric Consequences) 
Leadership Tenure none 
Company Age none 
Incentive Limits ln(Incentive Limits + 0.001) 
Communication Distortion ln(Communication Distortion) 
Economies of Scale ln(Economies of Scale) 
Geographic Reach ln(1 + Geographic Reach) 
Product Breadth ln(1 + Product Breadth) 
Vertical Depth none 
Governance 1000  Governance 
Divisionalisation none 
Growth atan(0.5(ln(Growth + 0.35) + 0.9)  sdev); sdev = 0.30597 
Profitability atan(0.9(Profitability  2.432)  sdev); sdev = 17.847 
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The skewness, kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are listed 
below in Tables 17 and 18. In general, the variables exhibited mild to 
severe skewness and kurtosis before the transformations, while most of 
them were normal at the 5 per cent confidence level after transformations. 
Table 17 shows the statistics before transformation. Most untransformed 
variables were non-normal at the 1 per cent probability level (z<2.58). The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov z was larger than the often-used benchmark 2.0 for 
7 of 12 variables. 
Table 17. Univariate Normality Statistics for Untransformed Variables 
UNIVARIATE NORMALITY STATISTICS FOR  
UNTRANSFORMED VARIABLES 
Variable 
Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov z Statistic SE z Statistic SE z 
Employees 8.78 0.09 100.50 115.40 0.17 661.68 8.96
Atmospheric 
Consequences 0.32 0.20 1.61 0.23 0.40 0.58 0.60
Leadership 
Tenure 0.19 0.19 0.99 0.74 0.38 1.96 0.83
Company Age 0.74 0.10 7.63 2.06 0.19 10.67 1.35
Incentive Limits 2.60 0.11 23.51 8.14 0.22 36.94 4.94
Communication 
Distortion 0.24 0.12 1.91 0.05 0.25 0.20 1.10
Economies of 
Scale 5.48 0.09 61.45 35.68 0.18 200.39 9.54
Geographic 
Reach 0.77 0.09 8.16 0.24 0.19 1.26 3.55
Product Breadth 0.37 0.09 3.91 1.25 0.19 6.63 4.99
Vertical Depth not meaningful (ordinal) 
Governance 0.96 0.16 5.95 1.22 0.32 3.81 1.46
Divisionalisation not meaningful (ordinal) 
Growth 2.11 0.09 23.68 9.52 0.18 53.60 3.72
Profitability 0.04 0.09 0.51 5.13 0.17 29.33 2.74
Note: SE = Standard Error 
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Table 18 shows the statistics after transformation. All variables, except for 
Geographic Reach and Product Breadth, had Kolmogorov-Smirnov z 
below (or close) to 2; the skewness z and kurtosis z were usually less than 
2.58. Thus, the variables were close to normally distributed. 
Table 18. Univariate Normality Statistics for Transformed Variables 
UNIVARIATE NORMALITY STATISTICS FOR  
TRANSFORMED VARIABLES 
Variable 
Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov z Statistic SE z Statistic SE z 
Employees 0.16 0.09 1.86 0.80 0.17 4.59 1.28
Atmospheric 
Consequences 0.07 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.40 0.29 0.59
Leadership 
Tenure 0.33 0.19 1.76 0.55 0.38 1.45 0.85
Company Age 0.23 0.10 2.37 0.22 0.19 1.12 2.25
Incentive Limits 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.39 0.22 1.78 0.76
Communication 
Distortion 0.08 0.12 0.63 0.04 0.25 0.16 0.71
Economies of 
Scale 0.28 0.09 3.17 0.07 0.18 0.42 0.82
Geographic 
Reach 0.77 0.09 8.16 0.24 0.19 1.26 3.37
Product Breadth 0.37 0.09 3.91 1.25 0.19 6.63 5.24
Vertical Depth not meaningful (ordinal) 
Governance 0.05 0.16 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.73 0.64
Divisionalisation not meaningful (ordinal) 
Growth 0.10 0.09 1.08 0.15 0.18 0.86 0.84
Profitability 0.21 0.09 2.38 0.16 0.17 0.93 0.57
 
 
 
Note that neither Geographic Reach nor Product Breadth could be further 
improved because they had severely non-normal distributions (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Histograms for Non-Normal Variables 
HISTOGRAMS FOR NON-NORMAL VARIABLES 
Geographic Reach Product Breadth 
 
 
 
 
 
Transformations for non-normality often reduce heteroscedasticity and 
improve linearity. To test for heteroscedasticity and linearity after the 
transformations, the standardised residuals were plotted against the 
standardised predicted values for each pair of variables used in the 
analyses in the next chapter. 
Figure 7 shows scatterplots for the most important pairs of variables in 
sub-model b. None of the plots indicate significant heteroscedasticity or 
non-linearity as evidenced by the lack of patterns29 in the plots, except for 
Product Breadth / Growth, Product Breadth / Profitability, Geographic 
Reach / Growth and Geographic Reach / Profitability (see also Figure 6). 
                                                 
29 A pattern could, for example, be a plot where the points are inside a triangle or cone, indicating 
heteroscedasticity, or a plot where the points follow a curve, indicating non-linearity. 
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Box’s M, the standard test for assessing heteroscedasticity, was calculated 
for these four covariances. Table 19 shows that only Geographic Reach / 
Profitability had a problematic significance when the standard benchmark 
of 0.01 was used (Hair et al. 1998, 328). 
Figure 7. Heteroscedasticity and Linearity Analysis 
HETEROSCEDASTICITY AND LINEARITY ANALYSIS 
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Not relevant 
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Table 19. Box’s M Test for Heteroscedastic Variables 
BOX’S M TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTIC VARIABLES 
 Geographic Reach Product Breadth 
 Growth Profitability Growth Profitability 
Box’s M 2.22 23.28 2.52 8.23
Significance 0.91 0.001 0.88 0.24
 
 
 
All 76 scatterplots (sub-model a: 21 plots; b: 55 plots) are available in the 
SPSS output file Heteroscedasticity.spo at http://canback.com/henley.htm. 
One last issue regarding the quality of the data had to be resolved: 
checking whether the ordinal variables Vertical Depth and 
Divisionalisation had uniform variance across the ordinal values and the 
missing values. The boxplots in Figure 8 show that the dependent 
variables Growth and Profitability were normally distributed across 
ordinal values (as indicated by the symmetrical boxes and whiskers), 
except for Vertical Depth = 2, which only had 13 observations. Moreover, 
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the dependent variables appear to be well-behaved across ordinal values 
in the sense that the averages were the same or the slope was in one 
direction, and variances were similar in size. Nothing in these boxplots 
indicates problems with the data. 
Figure 8. Boxplots for Ordinal Variables 
BOXPLOTS FOR ORDINAL VARIABLES 
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A Levene test revealed, however, that the variances were homogeneous 
across the ordinal values for Growth, but not for Profitability (Table 20). 
Table 20. Levene Test for Ordinal Variables 
LEVENE TEST FOR ORDINAL VARIABLES 
 Vertical Depth Divisionalisation 
Growth Profitability Growth Profitability 
Levene statistic 0.161 4.093 0.190 3.890
Significance 0.852 0.017 0.827 0.021
 
 
 
This suggested that Profitability should be transformed, but doing this 
reduced normality and homoscedasticity even more than in the earlier 
tests. Thus, no adjustment was made. Note, also, that the Levene test for 
Vertical Depth is misleading because there were only 13 observations for 
Vertical Depth = 2. By recoding 2 to 1, the test improves markedly to a 
significance of more than 0.05. 
It should now be apparent that despite issues such as many missing 
values, non-normality of certain variables and some heteroscedasticity, the 
data are sufficiently robust for the structural equation models. The next 
chapter turns to the structural equation models. At this point, it has been 
shown that a robust framework based on transaction cost economics can 
be constructed, that the framework is supported in the literature, and that 
data are available and well behaved so that the five hypotheses can be 
tested. 
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6. RESULTS 
This chapter describes the structural equation models used to test the 
hypotheses. The philosophy of the approach has been to use as simple 
models and definitions as possible and to use the theoretical framework 
without alterations. The focus is on practical significance, rather than 
statistical significance, as discussed by Hair et al. (1998, 22): “Many 
researchers become myopic in focusing solely on the achieved significance 
of the results without understanding their interpretations, good or bad. A 
researcher must instead look not only at the statistical significance of the 
results but also at their practical significance”. Here, the analyses are used 
in a confirmatory sense. That is, the model is derived from the literature 
review and there is no attempt to explore new relations between variables 
based on the outcome of the analyses. This means that the correlations and 
conclusions probably are weaker than they need be in a statistical sense. 
Thus, the purpose of the statistical analyses is not to optimise test 
statistics, but rather to gain insights into the nature of diseconomies of 
scale. These insights were gained, as is hopefully demonstrated. 
The chapter is divided into the following main sections: “Sub-Model a; 
Relationship between Firm Size and Diseconomies of Scale and Economies 
of Scale” determines whether the theorised diseconomies of scale are 
driven by size (H1) and whether there is a link between size and 
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economies of scale (H2); “Sub-Model b: Relationship between 
Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale, Moderating Factors and Firm 
Performance” establishes the impact of diseconomies of scale on firm 
performance (H3), the influence of economies of scale on firm performance 
(H4) and the relationship between firm performance and the moderating 
factors organisation form and asset specificity (H5). Below is a recap of the 
hypotheses articulated in Chapter 4: 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of atmospheric consequences, 
bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and communication 
distortion, increases with firm size 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure have a negative 
impact on firm performance 
H3a: Atmospheric consequences have a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
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H3c: Incentive limits have a negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
H3d: Communication distortion has a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large firms 
over smaller firms 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two transaction cost-
related factors: organisation form and asset specificity 
H5a: Large M-form firms perform better than large U-form firms 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects a firm’s performance 
positively 
Figure 9 summarises the hypotheses graphically. As is seen, the 
expectation is that as the overall relationship between firm performance 
and size is deconstructed, insights into the true nature of managerial 
diseconomies of scale will be gained. 
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Figure 9. Theoretical Framework, Hypotheses and Analytical Models 
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The path diagrams follow the standard SEM nomenclature (e.g., Arbuckle 
and Wothke 1999, 135) with rectangles representing observed variables, 
ovals representing latent variables, curved lines representing correlations 
and arrows representing causal links. The error terms include both errors 
and influences from variables exogenous to the model. 
Throughout the chapter, the hypotheses were evaluated against 
commonly used test statistics. Critical ratios were calculated for the 
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regression coefficients and the significance thresholds of 10%, 5%, 1% and 
0.1% probability were applied. Squared multiple correlations were used to 
evaluate how much of the dependent variables’ variance were explained 
by the independent variables. The normed chi-square statistic (chi-square 
divided by degrees of freedom) was calculated to evaluate a model’s 
overall goodness of fit. Excellent fit was defined as values smaller than 2, 
good fit for values between 2 and 5, and acceptable fit for values between 
5 and 10 (see also Footnote 33 (p. 137), below). However, this test was not 
strictly applied because the measure of overall fit deteriorates quickly if 
individual relationships in the model have low significance. A model with 
poor overall fit can still be used for practical interpretation, especially in 
confirmatory analysis. In addition, the normed fit index (NFI) was used to 
evaluate how closely a given model fit the saturated model. A value less 
than 0.9 indicated a poor fit. Finally, a parsimonious fit index (PFI) was 
used occasionally to compare models. This is a relative index and a higher 
relative ratio indicates a more parsimonious fit when two models are 
compared. 
It is now time to turn to the actual structural equation models, starting 
with sub-model a. 
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6.1 SUB-MODEL A: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM SIZE 
AND DISECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ECONOMIES OF 
SCALE 
This section tests sub-model a, which explores one aspect of the theoretical 
framework. Sub-model a shows the relationship between a firm’s size and 
the hypothesised diseconomies of scale and economies of scale, as defined 
in the first and second hypotheses: 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of atmospheric consequences, 
bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and communication 
distortion, increases with firm size 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale 
At this point, nothing is said about the importance of the diseconomies of 
scale and economies of scale. That is, while firm size may lead to 
diseconomies and economies of scale, this does not necessarily imply that 
firm performance is influenced. That relationship is explored in sub-model 
b in Section 6.2. 
6.1.1 Diseconomies of Scale 
Chapter 3 showed that there are four types of scale-related diseconomies: 
atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and 
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communication distortion. Each of these factors is analysed in this section 
with the aim to determine whether it is driven by firm size. Each factor is 
first analysed individually (Sections 6.1.1.1–6.1.1.4). The last section 
(6.1.1.5) then explores the integrated relationship between firm size and 
diseconomies of scale. In addition, more precise definitions of variables are 
given and some variables collected as part of the research, but not 
included in the final analysis, are discussed. 
6.1.1.1 Atmospheric Consequences 
Based on the reasoning in Section 3.2.1.4, atmospheric consequences 
should exhibit themselves as alienation, which in turn requires firms to 
pay higher wages in order to keep their employees. Thus, unit labour cost 
(defined as total labour cost divided by number of employees) should be a 
good indicator of atmospheric consequences (see also Scherer’s research 
(1976) discussed on pp. 55–56, above). Unfortunately, it proved difficult to 
collect these data for the 784 firms. Labour cost data for 1998 were only 
available for 52 firms in Compustat and annual reports; an additional 43 
cases where calculated by taking available labour cost data from 1991 till 
1997 (mostly from 1997) and extrapolating them to 1998. This was done by 
calculating unit labour cost for the observed year and then inflating this 
figure by the annual average increase in compensation for the whole 
sample. Finally 51 cases were estimated in a similar way using pre-1991 
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data, but only for firms which had a stable business mix over time that 
could be cross-checked against other data such as R&D expense and 
selling, administrative and general expense. The estimates were also 
corroborated by comparing the firm’s unit labour cost with its industry 
unit labour costs. 
Attempts were made (1) to run a separate regression and (2) carefully to 
impute additional observations as suggested by, for example, Jöreskog 
and Sörbom (1996, 78). First, the regression was run with unit labour cost 
as dependent variable and with industry unit labour cost, sales per 
employee, relative R&D expense and foreign revenue share of total 
revenue as independent variables. Second, LISREL was used to impute 
values for the missing data (Amos does not have imputational capability). 
The results in both cases were too erratic to warrant inclusion in the 
sample, even though they would have increased the sample size from 146 
to 435 and 399 observations, respectively, for atmospheric consequences. 
Figure 10 shows that unit labour cost increases with the size of the firm, in 
line with earlier research described in the literature review (Chapter 3). 
However, only 3% of the variance is accounted for. (Here, and in the 
following path diagrams, the figure above a causal link shows the 
standardised regression coefficient, and the figure above the dependent 
variable shows the squared multiple correlation.) 
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Figure 10. Atmospheric Consequences versus Size 
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Table 21 shows that the regression coefficient approaches significance at 
the 5% level (a critical ratio of 1.885 implies a 5.9% significance). 
Table 21. Regression Weight for Atmospheric Consequences versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHT FOR ATMOSPHERIC CONSEQUENCES VERSUS SIZE 
Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Atmospheric Consequences 0.160 0.317 0.168 1.885†** 
†
 p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
Note: SE = Standard Error; CR = Critical Ratio 
 
 
 
Thus, to the extent that unit labour cost is a good proxy for atmospheric 
consequences, large firms seem to suffer mildly from atmospheric 
consequences. The conclusion was the same when control variables 
(Incentive Limits, Geographic Reach) were introduced. Not much can be 
said from a practical point of view at this point. 
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6.1.1.2 Bureaucratic Insularity 
Bureaucratic insularity was defined as executives’ propensity to become 
increasingly isolated from market opportunities and from the lower levels 
of the organisation as the firm grows and procedures and processes are 
added to the organisational fabric. Indicators of bureaucratic insularity 
could be the compensation of senior executives (because a prediction is 
that executives will maximise their own gains rather than shareholder 
gains), the age of the firm (because older firms should have built up more 
of the insulating mechanisms), the tenure of the firm’s CEO and officers 
(because high tenure should lead to higher insularity), or the share of free 
cash flow being reinvested in the business with sub-standard (below cost-
of-capital) returns. 
The choice was made to use the firm’s age (Company Age) and officers’ 
average tenure (Leadership Tenure) as indicators. Executive 
compensation proved impossible to define in a meaningful way, as did 
cash flow reinvestment, while CEO tenure was uncorrelated with other 
variables. 
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Figure 11. Bureaucratic Insularity versus Size 
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The path diagram in Figure 11 shows a strong relationship between 
Leadership Tenure and Employees and between Company Age and 
Employees. The regression weights (Table 22) are significant beyond the 
0.1% level. 
Table 22. Regression Weights for Bureaucratic Insularity versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR BUREAUCRATIC INSULARITY VERSUS SIZE 
Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Leadership Tenure 0.364 0.695 0.139 4.992***
Employees → Company Age 0.321 1.634 0.191 8.560***
*** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The relationship between Employees and Company Age is in reality even 
stronger, because almost all large firms are old, leading to 
heteroscedasticity. This is evidenced by running the model with the large 
firm sub-sample (392 largest firms). The critical ratio for Employees → 
  
129
Company Age drops from 8.560 for all firms to 3.336 for large firms. In 
practical terms, it is possible to conclude that bureaucratic insularity 
increases with firm size and that the theoretical predictions are valid. 
6.1.1.3 Incentive Limits 
The third factor driving diseconomies of scale is incentive limits. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, incentive limits are most serious in firms with 
indivisible tasks such as product development, were the outcome of 
activities is dependent on the collaboration of many individuals and the 
contribution of each individual is hard to measure. Two indicators were 
tested: (1) the research and development intensity, measured as R&D 
expense divided by sales; and (2) general and administrative costs, 
measured as SG&A expense less advertising expense, divided by sales. 
The assumption behind the latter definition is that the bulk of general and 
administrative activities are indivisible (e.g., general management tasks). 
The two indicators have a fairly high correlation (52%). However, R&D% 
has 489 observations, while SG&A%  Adv% only has 177 observations 
and thus R&D% was chosen as the better indicator. 
In the analysis of the relationship between incentive limits and size, the 
approach is different from the one taken in the preceding two sections. 
Large firms should try to avoid incentive limits. Consequently, one would 
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expect a negative regression coefficient for Employees → R&D%. This 
should be especially true for firms in R&D-intense environments. The 
three graphs in Figure 12 show this to be case. The first diagram shows the 
regression for the whole sample of 784 firms. The second regression 
includes only those firms with higher than average R&D intensity (245 
firms). The third regression includes those firms with lower than average 
R&D intensity (244 firms).30 
Figure 12. Incentive Limits versus Size 
INCENTIVE LIMITS VERSUS SIZE
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30 295 companies did not report their R&D expense. 
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The regression weights are reported in Table 23. The critical ratio for the 
difference between the regression coefficient Employees → Incentive 
Limits for the high R&D-intensity and the low R&D-intensity sub-samples 
is 2.721. That is, the difference is significant at better than the 1% level and 
one can conclude that firms in R&D-intense industries tend to be relatively 
smaller. This lends support to the hypothesised impact of incentive limits 
because large firms tend to avoid R&D-intense industries. 
Table 23. Regression Weights for Incentive Limits versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR INCENTIVE LIMITS VERSUS SIZE 
Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Total Sample:  
Employees → Incentive Limits 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.003***
High R&D-Intensity Sub-Sample: 
Employees → Incentive Limits 0.127 0.165 0.082 2.000***
Low R&D-Intensity Sub-Sample: 
Employees → Incentive Limits 0.118 0.169 0.091 1.860†**
†
 p<10%, * p<5% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The practical implication is that large firms suffer from incentive limits, in 
line with the theoretical prediction. 
6.1.1.4 Communication Distortion 
The fourth and final factor contributing to diseconomies of scale is 
communication distortion. Communication distortion can be defined as 
the length of the communications process through the organisational 
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hierarchy, or as the time it takes for decisions to go from issue 
identification to resolution. The first definition has usually been 
operationalised with the number of hierarchical levels within the firm and 
this is the definition used here as well. Unfortunately, it proved impossible 
to operationalise the second definition. 
A number of studies, including Child (1973), demonstrate that the number 
of hierarchical levels increases logarithmically with the number of 
employees. The current research reached the same conclusion by studying 
the organisational structure of 386 firms within the total sample of 784 
firms. They had an average of 7.9 hierarchical levels and a standard 
deviation of 0.8 levels. No firm had more than 10 levels. 
As expected, there is a strong dependency between number of employees 
and the number of levels, as is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Communication Distortion versus Size 
COMMUNICATION DISTORTION VERSUS SIZE
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The critical ratio is very high (Table 24). Additional regressions were run 
with control variables such as organisational form (M-Form), but no such 
control variable proved to be important. 
Table 24. Regression Weight for Communication Distortion versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHT FOR COMMUNICATION DISTORTION VERSUS SIZE 
Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Communication 
Distortion 0.866 0.177 0.005 34.017***
*** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The next section combines the variables discussed so far into an integrated 
model for understanding diseconomies of scale, using latent variables in a 
structural equation model. 
6.1.1.5 Integrated Model for the Relationship between Diseconomies of 
Scale and Size 
At this juncture, it appears likely that the four factors driving 
diseconomies of scale according to transaction cost economics do indeed 
increase with firm size. It is instructive to test this further by combining 
atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and 
communication distortion in one model to see how they collectively relate 
to firm size. This is the first true structural equation model of the analysis 
because two latent variables are introduced: Diseconomies of Scale and 
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Bureaucratic Insularity (so far, the analyses were run as standard 
univariate linear regressions). 
Figure 14 shows the structural equation model (partially31 corresponding 
to sub-model a in Figure 9). Incentive Limits has Leadership Tenure and 
Company Age as indicators. Diseconomies of Scale is a latent variable 
constrained on the one hand by Employees, on the other hand by the four 
factors driving diseconomies of scale. It should be noted that Incentive 
Limits, which in the previous section was analysed differently than the 
other three factors, has been modified in the model below. Because 
incentive limits are most pronounced in R&D-intense industries, this had 
to be taken into account. This was done by multiplying the original 
Incentive Limits variable by a dummy factor of 1 for high R&D intensity 
and 0 for low R&D intensity. (This is the only place in the thesis where this 
alternative indicator for Incentive Limits is used.) 
                                                 
31 The other part of sub-model a is analysed in Section 6.1.2. 
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Figure 14. Diseconomies of Scale versus Size 
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A matrix representation of the path diagram is provided in Figure 15.32 It 
follows the notational conventions developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom 
(see, e.g., Hair et al. 1998, 648–652). 
                                                 
32 The matrix equations are mathematically equivalent to the path diagram in Figure 14, but differ 
in the arrangement of variables. The reason for this is that the path diagram does not make a 
clear distinction between the path diagram and the measurement model. The formal 
representation in the matrixes makes this distinction and it leads to a different layout of the path 
diagram. This layout increases the number of variables and makes the diagram unnecessarily 
complex, without changing the underlying equations. Thus, simplified path diagrams are used 
throughout the thesis. 
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Figure 15. Matrix Representation of Diseconomies of Scale versus Size 
 
 
 
The path diagram in Figure 14 shows the standardised regression weights 
and the squared multiple correlations. All the regression weights are 
positive. This shows that the relationships have the hypothesised sign: 
increasing size leads to increasing diseconomies of scale and all four 
factors contribute to this increase. The squared multiple correlations vary 
significantly though, from 0.04 to 0.88. 
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Table 25 shows that the critical ratios are significant at better than the 5% 
level for all regression coefficients available (two coefficients were set to 1 
to constrain the model). Furthermore, the model has a normed chi-square 
of 4.152, indicating a good fit,33 and the normed fit index (NFI) is 0.995, 
well above the threshold of 0.900.34 
Table 25. Regression Weights for Diseconomies of Scale versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR DISECONOMIES OF SCALE VERSUS SIZE 
 Std. 
Coeff 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Diseconomies of Scale 0.924 0.333 0.138 2.424***
Diseconomies of Scale → Atmospheric 
Consequences 0.212 1  
Diseconomies of Scale → Bureaucratic 
Insularity 0.589 1.981 0.901 2.197***
Diseconomies of Scale → Incentive Limits 0.189 0.072 0.035 2.082***
Diseconomies of Scale → Communication 
Distortion 0.938 0.534 0.220 2.424***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Leadership 
Tenure 0.642 1  
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.594 2.491 0.526 4.733***
* p<5%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The first hypothesis 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of atmospheric consequences, 
bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and communication 
distortion, increases with firm size 
                                                 
33 Excellent fit is defined as normed chi-square (chi-square  degrees of freedom) <2, good fit < 5, 
and acceptable fit < 10. This is in line with Kelloway (1998, 28) and Hair et al. (1998, 623). 
34 Recommended by Hair et al. (1998, 635–636). 
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is now expressed as: If 11>0, then H1 cannot be rejected. The standardised 
coefficient is 11 = 0.92 and the significance is better than the 5% level, 
supporting the hypothesis. The practical statistical significance is good 
because of the strength of most of the relationships and the high 
explanatory power of the analysis. 
6.1.2 Economies of Scale 
The literature survey was inconclusive regarding the effects of economies 
of scale. The reasons were that while it is easy to conjecture that average 
cost per unit of output falls with firm size, the scale effects may be 
exhausted at fairly small firm sizes and they may apply to entire industries 
rather than individual firms (because information travels fast and easily 
between firms). Thus the choice of market or hierarchy may not matter. 
This conclusion is somewhat at odds with the theory developed in this 
research, as was noted in Section 3.2.2. It is therefore instructive to 
incorporate economies of scale in the model to see whether there are any 
scale effects. 
Two indicators were tested. Both build on the assumption that economies 
of scale exist when relative fixed costs are high. The chosen definition was 
to take fixed and semi-fixed costs from the income statement and divide 
these by total factor costs (including purchased goods and services). Factor 
  
139
costs differ slightly from revenue because they are the sum of all inputs, 
including cost of equity, regardless of if the sum of these inputs is larger or 
smaller than revenue. This definition is equivalent to revenue less net 
income plus cost of equity. By using factor costs rather than sales, spurious 
business cycle effects due to yearly fluctuations in net income are 
eliminated. The observed variable Fixed Cost% was consequently defined 
as (SG&A + Depreciation + Interest)  Factor Costs. The definition 
assumes that fixed costs are composed of more than the contribution from 
fixed assets. Specifically, the level of SG&A expense (including R&D) is 
not easily varied and can be considered fixed. The definition is equivalent 
to Penrose’s definition ([1959] 1995, 89–95). 
The second definition, which was discarded, was to use the classical 
definition of fixed assets divided by sales. This definition had no statistical 
significance, lending some credence to the argument made by Scherer and 
Ross (1990) that if economies of scale exist, then they apply primarily to 
bureaucratic costs (see also p. 64, above) and not to neoclassical 
production costs. 
Figure 16 shows the relationship between number of employees and 
relative fixed cost. The significance of the regression coefficient is 
negligible (with a critical ratio of 0.506), possibly because there are 
countervailing forces at work, or because economies of scale do not exist. 
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The countervailing forces argument is that economies of scale on the one 
hand lead large firms to be active in fixed cost-intense industries; on the 
other hand, these very firms would realise the benefits of scale and thus 
have lower relative fixed costs. 
Figure 16. Fixed Cost versus Size: Total Sample 
FIXED COST VERSUS SIZE
Group: Total
0.00
0.02
e1 Fixed Cost% Employees
 
 
 
 
With a similar logic as was employed in the case of incentive limits, it is 
possible to test which of the two arguments is correct. If there are no 
economies of scale then, two sub-samples consisting of (1) firms active in 
high fixed-cost industries, and (2) firms active in low fixed-cost industries, 
should not differ, while the opposite is true if economies of scale exist. 
Figure 17 shows the path diagrams for these sub-samples with high fixed-
cost industries defined as those 377 firms with the highest fixed-cost ratio, 
and low fixed-cost industries being the 376 remaining firms (with an 
additional 31 firms having missing values). This categorisation is not 
totally accurate because it would be better to use the fixed-cost intensity of 
the entire industries to determine whether a firm is active in high or low 
fixed-cost industries. Data were not available for this refinement. 
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Figure 17. Fixed Cost versus Size: High Fixed-Cost and Low Fixed-Cost Sub-Samples 
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Group: High Fixed Cost
Fixed Cost%e1 Employees
0.01
0.11
Group: Low Fixed Cost
Fixed Cost%e1 Employees
0.03
0.18
 
 
 
The regression coefficients differ for the two subsets and the critical ratio 
for the difference is 3.472, implying significance better than the 0.1% level. 
The regression weights for the total sample and the sub-samples are 
shown in Table 26. The conclusion is that large firms have lower relative 
fixed cost when operating in fixed cost-intense industries. 
Table 26. Regression Weights for Fixed Cost versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIXED COST VERSUS SIZE 
Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Total Sample:  
Employees → Fixed Cost% 0.018 0.004 0.008 0.506***
High Fixed-Cost Sub-Sample: 
Employees → Fixed Cost% 0.107 0.017 0.008 2.096***
Low Fixed-Cost Sub-Sample: 
Employees → Fixed Cost% 0.176 0.015 0.004 3.469***
* p<5%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
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A problem with the approach taken above is that the two sub-samples 
reduce the number of observations too much for the variables 
Atmospheric Consequences and Leadership Tenure, which already in the 
total sample have uncomfortably few observations. Rather than 
performing the structural equation analysis on the two subsets defined 
above, the variable Fixed Cost% was replaced with Economies of Scale. 
Economies of Scale was constructed using the following logic: economies 
of scale are large for those firms which simultaneously are active in high 
fixed cost environments and have high (absolute) fixed costs. Thus, the 
variable Economies of Scale multiplies the fixed cost ratio with the 
absolute level of fixed cost (Economies of Scale = Fixed Cost% · Fixed 
Cost). The relationship between economies of scale and firm size is shown 
in Figure 18. 
Figure 18. Economies of Scale versus Size 
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Not surprisingly, the regression coefficient is highly significant at better 
than the 0.1% level (Table 27). 
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Table 27. Regression Weight for Economies of Scale versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHT FOR ECONOMIES OF SCALE VERSUS SIZE 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Economies of Scale 0.605 1.797 0.086 20.800***
*** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The matrix representation in Figure 15 (p. 136, above) can now be 
expanded to include economies of scale by adding 6 = 611 + 6 to  
 = x +  +  and Y6 = 6 to Y = 	y + 
. This completes the matrix 
representation of sub-model a. 
At this point, the argument that economies of scale exist among large firms 
(hypothesis two) cannot be rejected because  61>0, with better than 0.1% 
significance and  
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale 
is confirmed. The practical significance is also good because of the strength 
of the relationship. 
The analysis next continues with the structural equation models for sub-
model b. 
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6.2 SUB-MODEL B: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
DISECONOMIES OF SCALE, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, 
MODERATING FACTORS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
This section explores various aspects of sub-model b, which is the most 
important part of the current research. It starts by testing the relationship 
between a firm’s financial performance and the diseconomies-of-scale 
factors (Section 6.2.1). It then adds economies of scale to the model to test 
whether they do influence firm performance positively, as predicted by 
the theoretical framework (Section 6.2.2). Next, the moderating factors (M-
form organisation and high asset specificity) are included in the sub-
model (Section 6.2.3). The final section (6.2.4) discusses the full sub-model 
and introduces alternative specifications to achieve parsimony. The 
statistical findings are shown to be congruent with the TCE framework. 
6.2.1 Diseconomies of Scale and Their Impact on Firm 
Performance 
Similar to the treatment of sub-model a in Section 6.1.1, this section first 
discusses each of the diseconomies-of-scale factors individually, and then 
combines them in an integrated model to test the relationship between 
diseconomies of scale and firm performance. The individual analyses 
should be seen as initial indications of dependencies and will guide the 
design of the integrated model. Four sections (6.2.1.1–6.2.1.4) discuss 
atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and 
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communication distortion, respectively. The fifth section (6.2.1.5) tests the 
integrated model. 
6.2.1.1 Atmospheric Consequences 
Figure 19 shows that Atmospheric Consequences have a negative 
influence on Growth and have no material influence on Profitability. 
Atmospheric Consequences explains 11% of the variance in Growth. 
Figure 19. Firm Performance versus Atmospheric Consequences 
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Table 28 shows that the regression coefficient for Atmospheric 
Consequences → Growth is significant beyond the 0.1% level. The results 
were similar for two sub-samples; the largest 392 firms and the smallest 
392 firms (the critical ratio for the differences were 0.129 for Atmospheric 
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Consequences → Growth and 0.570 for Atmospheric Consequences → 
Profitability). 
Table 28. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Atmospheric Consequences 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS  
ATMOSPHERIC CONSEQUENCES 
Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.337 0.139 0.030 4.691***
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.069 0.040 0.040 1.010***
*** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The practical implication is that atmospheric consequences influence 
growth negatively and may have the same influence on profitability. 
6.2.1.2 Bureaucratic Insularity 
The discussion in Section 6.1.1.2 showed that bureaucratic insularity can 
be indicated by leadership tenure and firm age. The path diagram in 
Figure 20 shows that both these indicators exhibit strong negative 
influences on growth and that tenure also influences profitability 
negatively. However, firm age has a positive influence on profitability. It 
can be hypothesised that this is because of survivor bias, as discussed 
earlier (see pp. 65–66, above). That is, the firms in the sample are by 
definition survivors and thus can be expected to show higher profitability 
than non-surviving firms. This implies that firms that have survived over 
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a long time period should be more profitable than young firms because 
younger firms (usually in younger industries) include a more 
heterogeneous mix of performers. This hypothesis is tested in 
Section 6.2.1.5, where the larger, integrated model is analysed using latent 
variables. 
Figure 20. Firm Performance versus Bureaucratic Insularity 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS BUREAUCRATIC INSULARITY
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At this point, the analysis suggests support for Penrose’s ([1959] 1995, 261–
263) assertion that diseconomies of scale are mainly related to difficulties 
of growth. Bureaucratic Insularity (indicated by Leadership Tenure and 
Company Age) explains 23% of the variance in Growth, but only 3% of 
the variance in Profitability. For Growth, the regression weights are 
significant at better than the 5% level (Table 29). 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.1 (Appendix C) 
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Table 29. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Bureaucratic Insularity 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS  
BUREAUCRATIC INSULARITY 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Leadership Tenure → Growth 0.177 0.070 0.029 2.431***
Leadership Tenure → Profitability 0.114 0.063 0.044 1.445***
Company Age → Growth 0.386 0.056 0.007 8.498***
Company Age → Profitability 0.190 0.039 0.010 3.832***
* p<5%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
6.2.1.3 Incentive Limits 
Do incentive limits have an impact on a firm’s performance (indicated as 
before through Growth and Profitability)? In this analysis, Company Age 
was introduced as a control variable because older firms tend to be active 
in mature industries. Figure 21 indicates a modest impact. 
Figure 21. Firm Performance versus Incentive Limits 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS INCENTIVE LIMITS
0.20
Growthe1
0.03
Profitabilitye2
0.01
0.10
0.46
0.12
Incentive
Limits
Company
Age
 
 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.2 (Appendix C) 
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The regression shows a negative impact of incentive limits on profitability 
(at better than the 5% significance level). The impact on growth is 
negligible (Table 30). 
Table 30. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Incentive Limits 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS INCENTIVE LIMITS 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.010 0.003 0.014 0.235***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.102 0.047 0.021 2.193***
Company Age → Growth 0.455 0.066 0.005 12.195***
Company Age → Profitability 0.121 0.025 0.008 2.962***
* p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
There should be a difference between the high R&D-intensity and the low-
R&D% intensity sub-samples. The R&D% → Profitability standardised 
coefficient is 0.134 for the high R&D-intensity sub-sample and 0.130 for 
the low R&D-intensity sub-sample, in support of the theory. The critical 
ratio for this difference is 2.853 and the significance is better than the 1% 
level. There is considerable support for the hypothesis (H3c), that incentive 
limits affect performance by having a negative impact on profitability. 
6.2.1.4 Communication Distortion 
In isolation, communication distortion does not have a significant impact 
on firm performance as is evidenced by the regression in Figure 22. Less 
than 2% of the variance in growth and profitability are accounted for. 
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Figure 22. Firm Performance versus Communication Distortion 
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Table 31 shows that only the negative impact on growth is statistically 
significant (at better than the 1% level), but it is hard to draw any practical 
conclusions at this stage. 
Table 31. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Communication Distortion 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS  
COMMUNICATION DISTORTION 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Communication Distortion → Growth *0.136 0.484 0.180 2.688***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.075 0.372 0.251 1.481***
** p<1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The next section (6.2.1.5) combines the variables into an integrated model 
for understanding the relationship between firm performance and 
diseconomies of scale. 
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6.2.1.5 Integrated Model for the Relationship between Firm Performance 
and Diseconomies of Scale 
It is now time to put together an integrated diseconomies-of-scale model, 
bearing in mind economies of scale and the moderating factors (M-form 
organisation and asset specificity) have not yet been introduced, nor has 
survivor bias. The path diagram in Figure 23 shows the design which tests 
the third hypothesis and its four sub-hypotheses. The latent variable 
Bureaucratic Insularity is again used and is indicated by Leadership 
Tenure and Company Age. 
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Figure 23. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale: Not Adjusted for Survivor Bias 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
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The model has a chi-square of 16.490 and 4 degrees of freedom, leading to 
a normed chi-square of 4.123 (a good fit). The normed fit index (NFI) is 
0.997, well beyond any reasonable requirement, and the parsimonious fit 
index (PFI) is 0.143. 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.3 (Appendix C)
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Table 32 shows the regression weights with standard errors and critical 
ratios. 
Table 32. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale: Not Adjusted 
for Survivor Bias 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS  
DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Not Adjusted for Survivor Bias 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.179 0.071 0.044 1.644†** 
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.210 0.118 0.056 2.117***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.626 0.123 0.042 2.947***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.261 0.072 0.035 2.072***
Bureaucratic Insularity →  
Leadership Tenure 0.502 0.249 0.049 5.037***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.737 1.000  
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.087 0.028 0.034 0.824***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.009 0.004 0.035 0.114***
Communication Distortion → Growth 0.113 0.399 0.317 1.259***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.008 0.042 0.344 0.121* *
†
 p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic insularity has a strong negative impact on growth 
(Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth = 0.63) and is significant at better 
than the 1% level (critical ratio = 2.947), while it has a significant positive 
impact on profitability (Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability = 0.26) 
before the adjustment for survivor bias. Communication distortion has a 
non-significant (less than 10% level) positive impact on both growth and 
profitability (critical ratio = 1.259 and 0.121, respectively). Atmospheric 
consequences have a negative impact on both growth (Atmospheric 
Consequences → Growth = 0.18) and profitability (Atmospheric 
Consequences → Profitability = 0.21) with significance better than the 
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10% level (critical ratios 1.650 and 2.117 respectively). It should be 
remembered that Atmospheric Consequences has few (146) observations. 
Finally, incentive limits have a negative impact on profitability with a low 
significance (critical ratio = 0.824) and there is a negative, non-significant, 
impact on growth (critical ratio = 0.114). The regression coefficients thus 
are either directionally in line with the hypothesis for each factor, or they 
are insignificant (except for Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability).35 In 
no case was there a statistically significant contradiction of the hypothesis. 
Finally, the squared multiple correlation is a high 0.425 for Growth and a 
low 0.077 for Profitability. 
A second path diagram was constructed to take survivor bias into account. 
This was done by introducing a link between Company Age and 
Profitability, as was explained in Section 6.2.1.2. This model is less 
parsimonious (PFI = 0.107) and has a slightly higher normed chi-square 
(4.670) than the non-adjusted model. Yet it is probably a more realistic 
representation of the underlying theory and hypotheses and it will be used 
in the later analyses. 
                                                 
35 The correlations between the diseconomies of scale factors also have the expected signs (see 
Appendix C). 
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Figure 24. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale: Adjusted for Survivor Bias 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
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The regression coefficients, standard errors and critical ratios are reported 
in Table 33. Without repeating the discussion from the previous path 
diagram, it should be noted that bureaucratic insularity now has the 
hypothesised (but non-significant) negative impact on profitability. The 
survivor bias (Company Age → Profitability = 0.32) has a positive 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.4 (Appendix C) 
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coefficient and is close to significant at the 10% level, in line with 
expectations. 
Table 33. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale: Adjusted for 
Survivor Bias 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS  
DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Adjusted for Survivor Bias 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.150 0.060 0.049 1.227* *
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.061 0.034 0.075 0.455***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.671 0.137 0.048 2.883***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.329 0.094 0.110 0.855***
Bureaucratic Insularity →  
Leadership Tenure 0.532 0.274 0.051 5.391***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.713 1.000  
Company Age → Profitability 0.320 0.065 0.041 1.599***
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.116 0.038 0.038 0.995***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.166 0.076 0.058 1.304***
Communication Distortion → Growth 0.140 0.493 0.350 1.410***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.138 0.685 0.531 1.290***
** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
Thus, a test of the third hypothesis 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure have a negative 
impact on firm performance 
shows that it can not be refuted (the sub-hypotheses are discussed in 
Section 6.2.4). The practical interpretation is that it is impossible to confirm 
the hypothesis at this point, but nothing contradicts it either. 
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6.2.2 Economies of Scale 
The next step is to study the impact of economies of scale on profitability 
(there is no hypothesised impact on the other indicator of firm 
performance: growth). This was done by adding diseconomies of scale to 
the path diagram containing diseconomies of scale. The path diagram in 
Figure 25 shows the results. Chi-square is 8.995 and with 5 degrees of 
freedom the normed chi-square ratio is 1.799, indicating an excellent fit 
(p = 0.109). The normed fit index (NFI) is an excellent 0.999 and the 
parsimonious fit index (PFI) is 0.139, which is slightly better than for the 
previous model (Figure 24) which only incorporated diseconomies of 
scale. The squared multiple correlation is 0.44 for Growth and 0.12 for 
Profitability. 
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Figure 25. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale and Economies of Scale 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE
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Table 34 reports the regression coefficients. All coefficients have the 
hypothesised sign except for Communication Distortion → Growth. This 
aberration could be because the theory does not specify any relationship 
between economies of scale and growth—only between economies of scale 
and profitability. If such an atheoretical relationship exists, then 
communication distortion’s positive impact on growth could be due to the 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.5 (Appendix C) 
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unobserved positive relationship between economies of scale and growth. 
This was tested separately. The standardised regression coefficient was 
0.00 for Economies of Scale → Growth and it remained at 0.15 for 
Communication Distortion → Growth with this respecification of the 
model. Fit measures deteriorated slightly. Thus, the structural equation 
model in Figure 25 appears to be correctly specified because economies of 
scale do not influence growth, as hypothesised. 
The regression coefficients mostly do not have high significance. The 
exceptions are Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth and Bureaucratic 
Insularity → Leadership Tenure which are significant at better than the 
0.1% level, Economies of Scale → Profitability at better than 1% and 
Incentive Limits → Profitability and Company Age → Profitability at 
better than 10%. All other coefficients have the predicted sign except for 
Communication Distortion → Growth. 
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Table 34. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale and  
Economies of Scale 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS  
DISECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.079 0.031 0.051 0.621***
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.142 0.079 0.073 1.085***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.715 0.150 0.045 3.364***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.318 0.093 0.110 0.850***
Bureaucratic Insularity →  
Leadership Tenure 0.530 0.279 0.049 5.650***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.698 1.000  
Company Age → Profitability 0.301 0.062 0.038 1.658†** 
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.117 0.038 0.034 1.110***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.247 0.112 0.064 1.749†** 
Communication Distortion → Growth 0.150 0.538 0.364 1.478***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.009 0.047 0.511 0.092***
Economies of Scale → Profitability 0.267 0.094 0.030 3.188***
†
 p<10%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The introduction of economies of scale into the model leads to the 
following preliminary findings. Hypothesis four 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large firms 
over smaller firms 
is supported. At a practical level, the analysis above indicates that 
diseconomies of scale and economies of scale play an important role in 
explaining firm performance. Individual relationships in the model are 
sometimes weak, but the overall assessment is nevertheless that the 
significance is high. 
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An interpretation of the statistical results is that firms are able to maintain 
specific knowledge internally and that the flow of ideas and methods in 
external markets is not efficient enough to make economies of scale 
available to all industry participants. A further test of this was made by 
splitting the sample by the age of firms. The assumption was that older 
firms, active in older, well-structured industries where information 
presumably flows efficiently, would not benefit from economies of scale. 
Younger firms, active in less mature industries, would, if they are larger 
than their competitors, reap the benefits because knowledge should be 
easier to keep proprietary to the firm. If this was true, then Riordan and 
Williamson’s theoretical prediction (1985) that economies of scale affect 
firm performance could be questioned. A comparison of the sub-samples 
indicates that this is not the case. The two sub-samples have almost 
identical regression coefficients for Economies of Scale → Profitability 
(0.291 for the old sub-sample, 0.292 for the young sub-sample) and the 
critical ratio for the difference is a negligible 0.115. 
The next step is to incorporate the potential effects of moderating factors 
into the model. While additional insights are gained from this, it should 
also be noted that the model becomes less statistically robust as variables 
are added—especially because some of the variables are non-normal—and 
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the model fit will deteriorate. At the same time though, the practical 
significance increases. 
6.2.3 Moderating Factors 
At this stage the final two variables are introduced into the model: the 
moderating factors organisational form and asset specificity. 
6.2.3.1 M-Form Organisation 
Williamson (1970, 120–139) argued that the large multidivisional firm (M-
form) on average outperforms the large unitary firm (U-form). 
Williamson’s definition of M-form was (pp. 120–121): 
1. The responsibility for operating decisions is assigned 
to…operating divisions or quasifirms. 
2. The elite staff attached to the general office performs both 
advisory and auditing functions… 
3. The general office is principally concerned with strategic 
decisions… 
4. …separation of the general office from operations… 
5. The resulting structure displays both rationality and 
synergy…the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. 
This definition can be operationalised with two indicators. The first 
describes the ability of a firm to effectively to divide the tasks performed 
  
163
by senior executives and their staffs, as well as the division of 
responsibility between the board of directors and executive management 
(pp. 138–139)—what today often is referred to as governance.36 The second 
variable measures whether the organisational structure is multidivisional 
or functional, or somewhere in between. 
The governance indicator was operationalised as Governance, based on 
CalPERS’s definitions (1999).37 CalPERS evaluates corporate governance 
using financial results (three-year shareholder returns and EVA) and a 
corporate governance screening procedure which assesses the quality of 
governance. For the current purposes the governance screen is of interest, 
so that co-linearity with the dependent variables is avoided. The screen 
uses 25 criteria divided into four main categories: “Board 
Composition/Structure”, “Director Compensation/Stock Holdings”, 
“Management” and “Anti-Takeover Devices”. 
The data were taken from three sources: (1) Business Week’s annual survey 
of corporate governance (Byrne 2000). Business Week measures six 
attributes of governance and of these, four were used in Governance 
because they correspond reasonably well to the CalPERS criteria, while  
                                                 
36 A fuller treatment of this dual relationship is found in Bolton and Scharfstein (1998). 
37 CalPERS (California Public Employees’ Retirement System) is arguably the world’s leading 
authority on governance issues. 
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two (relating to the quality of the board members) where excluded. (2) The 
compilation of governance data for 1,500 companies published by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC 1999).38 (3) Fortune’s annual 
ranking of America’s most admired companies (Colvin 2000) in which 
three variables (of eight) relate to CalPERS’s governance criteria. The three 
sources were merged into a single index. No attempt was made 
independently to validate the definitions and underlying research, except 
for using this researcher’s general understanding of the quality of 
governance at those firms surveyed. This crude test corroborated the data. 
The organisational structure indicator was operationalised as 
Divisionalisation. The indicator is ordinal with 2 representing a clean, 
multidivisional structure, 1 representing a mixture of multidivisional and 
unitary structures and 0 representing unitary structures. The classification 
was done by this researcher using annual reports, corporate web sites, 
company organisation charts and 10-Ks. The data collection approach was 
similar to Rumelt’s (1974, 43), with three factors influencing the judgments 
made: titles of senior executives, descriptions of large operating units and 
the reporting or lack of reporting of operating unit financials. For example, 
if senior executives at headquarters have titles such as Senior Vice 
President of Business Development and similar staff descriptions, while 
                                                 
38 CalPERS subcontracts the governance screening to IRRC. 
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senior executives of the operating units are called President, Operating 
Unit, then this would suggest a multidivisional structure. Conversely, if a 
firm does not discuss its operating units as autonomous businesses and 
there is no financial reporting for business units, then this would suggest a 
unitary structure. 
Governance has 229 observations, mainly among the largest 400 firms in 
the sample and Divisionalisation was randomly collected for 375 firms. 
Figure 26 shows that quality of governance and use of divisionalisation 
increase with firm size. 
Figure 26. M-Form Organisation versus Size 
M-FORM ORGANISATION VERSUS SIZE
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Employees → Governance has a critical ratio of 7.701 with better than 
0.1% significance and Employees → Divisionalisation has a critical ratio  
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of 3.230, approaching better than 0.1% significance (Table 35). It should be 
remembered that Divisionalisation is an ordinal variable and Amos treats 
it as continuous. Results would perhaps be more accurate if polyserial 
correlations were used and the squared multiple correlation would then 
increase somewhat, while the significance would be better than the 0.1% 
level.39 
Table 35. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale,  
Economies of Scale and M-form Organisation 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF 
SCALE, ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND M-FORM ORGANISATION 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Governance 0.454 0.545 0.071 7.701***
Employees → Divisionalisation 0.165 0.257 0.080 3.230***
** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
Turning to the prediction that M-form organisation improves firm 
performance, the latent variable M-Form was introduced into the sub-
model b path diagram together with the indicators Governance and 
Divisionalisation. The results are shown in Figure 27. M-form 
organisation has a significant, positive impact on both growth and 
profitability with most of the impact emanating from governance. This is 
not surprising because, as was discussed in the literature survey (p. 67, 
                                                 
39 This analysis was performed using LISREL which allows for polyserial correlation analysis. The 
regression coefficient increased to 0.20 from 0.16 and the squared multiple correlation to 0.049 
from 0.025. However, the use of polyserial correlations assumes that the underlying distribution 
of the indicator is normal, which may not be the case here (see also discussion in Section 5.1.2.3). 
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above), the positive impact of divisionalisation was exploited more than 25 
years ago. 
Figure 27. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and  
M-Form Organisation 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF SCALE,
ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND M-FORM ORGANISATION
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Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.6 (Appendix C)
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Table 36 shows similar results as in earlier analyses, with all coefficients 
(except for Communication Distortion → Growth) having the predicted 
sign and with critical ratios ranging from highly significant to non-
significant. The standardised regression coefficients are fairly large for M-
Form → Growth (0.21) and M-Form → Profitability (0.38), but the 
statistical significance is low. The practical significance is good though, 
because a good part of the variance in firm performance is explained and 
all relationships (with one exception) support the underlying theoretical 
framework. 
Table 36. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of 
Scale and M-Form Organisation 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF 
SCALE, ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND M-FORM ORGANISATION 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.080 0.032 0.048 0.669***
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.085 0.048 0.071 0.674***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.706 0.149 0.044 3.412***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.433 0.127 0.106 1.192***
Bureaucratic Insularity →  
Leadership Tenure 0.534 0.282 0.049 5.709***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.696 1.000  
Company Age → Profitability 0.355 0.073 0.038 1.934†** 
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.124 0.040 0.032 1.253***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.312 0.142 0.062 2.296***
Communication Distortion → Growth 0.108 0.395 0.407 0.971***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.062 0.316 0.746 0.423***
Economies of Scale → Profitability 0.284 0.100 0.035 2.835***
M-Form → Growth 0.207 0.170 0.228 0.747***
M-Form → Profitability 0.385 0.439 0.578 0.760***
M-Form → Governance 0.792 1.000  
M-Form → Divisionalisation 0.091 0.156 0.184 0.852***
†
 p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
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6.2.3.2 High Internal Asset Specificity 
The last variable to be introduced is asset specificity. As was discussed in 
the literature survey (Chapter 3), firms can, according to transaction cost 
economics, moderate diseconomies of scale by increasing their internal 
asset specificity. Asset specificity was measured in three ways: product 
breadth, geographic reach and vertical depth. Each of these was 
operationalised. 
Product breadth was defined in several ways. In the end, Rumelt’s 
(1974, 14–15) specialisation ratio was used because it is commonly 
accepted (Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989, 539) and it minimises 
information loss. It also has the benefit of not being based on this 
researcher’s judgement. To avoid confusion, product breadth was 
operationalised as a diversification ratio equal to 1  specialisation ratio 
(so that the indicator increases when product breadth increases). The 
specialisation ratio is defined as SR = (sales from the largest business unit) 
 (total firm sales). Alternative measures (available at http://canback.com/ 
henley.htm in the file Asset Specificity.xls) are (1) number of business 
segments the firm is active in; (2) number of SICs the firm is active in; 
(3) Rumelt’s relatedness ratio (pp. 15–16): RR = (sales from the largest 
business unit plus other business units with related activities)  (total firm 
sales); (4) Rumelt’s five category classification of firms into single, 
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dominant-unrelated, dominant, related and unrelated businesses (p. 31); 
and (5) a Herfindahl index of corporate diversity. Measures 1, 2 and 4 are 
based on categorical data and are as such less rich on information than the 
other measures. Measures 3 and 5 are continuous but less accurate than 
the specialisation ratio for the current purpose. 
Geographic reach was measured as the per cent of sales derived from 
foreign countries. No other measures were available from Compustat or 
other sources and the measure appears to be logical. Sullivan (1994), in an 
overview of how geographic reach is measured, showed that all 17 studies 
in his sample used this measure: “glaring in its consistency is the 
inevitable use of foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (FSTS) as the 
sole estimator” (pp. 327, 330). 
Vertical depth was more problematic to define, however. Vertical 
integration has been studied empirically many times (Shelanski and Klein 
1995). The best measure (described by D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994)) is 
arguably to quantify the amount of internal forward or backward transfers 
by line of business. Unfortunately such data were not available for 
individual firms. Another measure often used is value added (factor costs 
other than purchased goods) divided by sales. This measure has been 
criticised because it is sensitive to current year profitability; spuriously 
high or low profitability increases or decreases vertical integration (Levy 
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1981, 86). A modification to this ratio is to adjust the nominator by using 
cost of equity rather than net income and the denominator by using factor 
costs, as defined earlier (i.e., VI% = Value Added  Factor Costs). Even 
with this adjustment the definition is open to criticism.40 For example, 
large US petrochemical companies are among the most vertically 
integrated firms in the world, ranging in activities from exploration, to 
production, to refining, to retailing. Their vertical integration ratios, with 
this definition, are among the lowest, however (e.g., ExxonMobil has a 
vertical integration of 19.1%, against 41.3% for the total sample). 
Instead, the vertical integration variable was based on a qualitative 
assessment by the researcher, similar to Armour and Teece’s (1980, 472) 
and Harrigan’s (1986, 538–540) methodologies. The 784 firms were 
classified based on their degree of vertical integration with Vertical Depth 
equal to 2 for firms with very high vertical integration (13 firms), 1 for 
highly integrated firms (145 firms) and 0 for firms with normal or low 
integration (512 firms).41 No judgement was passed on 114 firms. 
Vertically integrated firms were mainly found among resource-based 
companies and among aerospace contractors. The data are available in the 
file Asset Specificity.xls at http://canback.com/henley.htm. The polyserial 
                                                 
40 Furthermore, there were only 146 observations of the vertical integration ratio in the sample. 
41 The underlying actual distribution of Vertical Depth is most likely normal, because VI% is 
normally distributed, and Vertical Depth should have the same distributional characteristics (see 
discussion in Section 5.1.2.3). 
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correlation between Vertical Depth and VI% was 0.418, which seems to 
confirm the criticism of the use of the value added-to-factor costs ratio. 
Figure 28 shows the relationship between product breadth, geographic 
reach, vertical depth and firm size. 
Figure 28. Asset Specificity versus Size 
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Large size on average leads to less asset specificity along all three 
dimensions even though only a small part of the variance is explained. The 
critical ratios in Table 37 show significance better than 5% for Vertical 
Depth42 and better than 0.1% for Product Breadth and Geographic Reach. 
                                                 
42 A perhaps more appropriate polyserial correlation between Vertical Depth and Employees 
calculated with LISREL (Amos does not calculate polyserial correlations) increases the 
significance of Vertical Depth → Employees beyond the 0.1% level (critical ratio 3.406). 
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Table 37. Regression Weights for Asset Specificity versus Size 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR ASSET SPECIFICITY VERSUS SIZE 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Employees → Geographic Reach 0.274 0.104 0.014 7.706***
Employees → Product Breadth 0.285 0.090 0.012 7.342***
Employees → Vertical Depth 0.096 0.090 0.036 2.498***
* p<5%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
It is now possible to complete the model and do the final test of whether 
degree of asset specificity affects profitability and growth. Again, a latent 
variable, Asset Specificity, is introduced to capture the total impact of 
asset specificity. Figure 29 shows the path diagram. 
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Figure 29. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and  
Asset Specificity 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES OF SCALE,
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High asset specificity appears to have a positive impact on profitability 
and growth and the three indicators for asset specificity have the 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.7 (Appendix C) 
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hypothesised signs, but the significance is relatively low and at best 
approaching the 5% level (Table 38). 
Table 38. Regression Weights for Firm Performance versus Diseconomies, Economies of Scale and 
Asset Specificity 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS DISECONOMIES, 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ASSET SPECIFICITY 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.134 0.053 0.043 1.236***
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.132 0.074 0.067 1.103***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.633 0.126 0.038 3.315***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.336 0.094 0.106 0.885***
Bureaucratic Insularity →  
Leadership Tenure 0.529 0.266 0.050 5.308***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.731 1.000  
Company Age → Profitability 0.318 0.065 0.044 1.478***
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.061 0.020 0.029 0.673***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.262 0.119 0.060 1.984***
Communication Distortion → Growth 0.136 0.483 0.310 1.558***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.020 0.100 0.517 0.194***
Economies of Scale → Profitability 0.319 0.117 0.048 2.445***
Asset Specificity → Growth 0.113 1  
Asset Specificity → Profitability 0.150 1.864 1.677 1.112***
Asset Specificity → Geographic Reach 0.499 1.937 0.998 1.942†** 
Asset Specificity → Product Breadth 0.253 1.097 0.587 1.868†** 
Asset Specificity → Vertical Depth 0.188 2.084 1.193 1.747†** 
†
 p<10%, * p<5%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
While the hypothesis regarding asset specificity is supported, the strong 
non-normal distribution of the three indicators (Vertical Depth is an 
ordinal, Geographic Reach and Product Breadth are highly skewed (see 
pp. 110–111, above)) reduces the statistical accuracy of the analysis. 
Another way to test the impact of asset specificity may be the following: 
Instead of using the latent variable Asset Specificity, the single indicator 
AS is introduced. AS is defined as the normalised product of the three 
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dimensions of asset specificity (AS = ln((1 + Product Depth)(1 + Geogra-
phic Reach)(3 + Vertical Depth))). This indicator has 594 observations and 
is much closer to normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov z = 1.477). 
AS → Growth = 0.15 (standardised) with a significance better than 0.1% 
and AS → Profitability = 0.089 (standardised) with a significance better 
than 5%. The squared multiple correlations remain almost the same. It is 
therefore fair to conclude that high asset specificity does indeed lead to 
better firm performance. The practical interpretation is the same as for M-
form organisation in the previous section. 
6.2.4 Complete Sub-Model b 
At this point it is possible to analyse the complete sub-model b. One 
additional variable, industry, could have been included, but was left out 
for two reasons. First, Section 3.2.4 showed that a firm’s industry does not 
influence results significantly, at least not in the manufacturing sector. 
Second, it proved impossible to collect relevant variables to test this 
proposition and thus industry has been left as an exogenous factor, 
included in the error terms. Attempts were made to relate each firm to its 
industry’s averages, but this proved impossible to do because most firms 
are active in several industries. In the end, the industry-adjusted 
constructs did not improve the statistical analysis. This is in line with 
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Rumelt’s finding (1974, 98) that “industry corrected results were not only 
elusive, but essentially unattainable and possibly meaningless”. 
6.2.4.1 Basic Model 
The complete sub-model b is shown in Figure 30. The structural equation 
model explains 44% of the variance in growth and 34% of the variance in 
profitability. This has, however, been achieved by adding variables. Even 
though the complete model reflects the underlying theory and the 
hypotheses and can be viewed as a confirmatory model, it is equally true 
that it is unwieldy. The normed chi-square ratio is a reasonable 9.252 
(397.823  43) and the normed fit index is 0.966 (above the 0.900 often 
recommended). Figure 31 shows a matrix representation of the path 
diagram in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30. Complete Sub-Model b: Includes Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and 
Moderating Factors 
COMPLETE SUB-MODEL B
Includes Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale
and Moderating Factors
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Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.8 (Appendix C)
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Figure 31. Matrix Representation of Complete Sub-Model b 
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF COMPLETE SUB-MODEL B 
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The regression coefficients (Table 39) are still of the hypothesised sign 
(except for the non-significant Communication Distortion → Growth) 
and many coefficients are significant at the 5% or better level (compared to 
earlier, the significance has dropped because so many variables are 
included that each individual coefficient cannot have a high significance). 
Table 39. Regression Weights for Complete Sub-Model b: Includes Diseconomies of Scale, 
Economies of Scale and Moderating Factors 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR COMPLETE SUB-MODEL B 
Includes Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and Moderating Factors 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.142 0.057 0.041 1.417***
Atmospheric Consequences → Profitability 0.087 0.049 0.066 0.746***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.609 0.120 0.036 3.348***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.465 0.128 0.103 1.244***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Leadership Tenure 0.531 0.263 0.050 5.244***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.740 1.000  
Company Age → Profitability 0.386 0.079 0.047 1.689†** 
Incentive Limits → Growth 0.059 0.019 0.027 0.706***
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.375 0.170 0.063 2.688***
Communication Distortion → Growth 0.092 0.333 0.312 1.067***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.157 0.793 0.833 0.952***
Economies of Scale → Profitability 0.483 0.176 0.079 2.232***
Asset Specificity → Growth 0.149 1.000  
Asset Specificity → Profitability 0.365 3.431 2.213 1.550***
Asset Specificity → Geographic Reach 0.507 1.487 0.675 2.201***
Asset Specificity → Product Breadth 0.268 0.880 0.421 2.091***
Asset Specificity → Vertical Depth 0.179 1.510 0.806 1.872†** 
M-Form → Growth 0.213 0.168 0.117 1.427***
M-Form → Profitability 0.498 0.548 0.409 1.339***
M-Form → Governance 0.819 1.000  
M-Form → Divisionalisation 0.163 0.270 0.169 1.596***
†
 p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The hypotheses relating to sub-model b have now been tested: 
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H3a: Atmospheric consequences have a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms. 
Neither confirmed nor rejected. The regression coefficients have the 
hypothesised sign (11 = 0.14 and 21 = 0.09), but are not significant. 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
Confirmed. Bureaucratic insularity has a strong negative impact on 
growth (12 = 0.61) with a significance better than 0.1%. It also has a 
strong negative impact on profitability (22 = 0.46), but without meeting 
threshold levels of significance. 
H3c: Incentive limits have a negative impact on the performance of large 
firms 
Confirmed. Incentive limits have a strong negative impact on profitability 
(23 = 0.37) with better than 1% significance. The impact on growth is also 
negative (13 = 0.06), but the significance is low. 
H3d: Communication distortion has a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
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Neither confirmed nor rejected. Communication distortion has a non-
significant positive impact on growth (14 = 0.09), contrary to the 
hypothesis, and a non-significant negative impact on profitability 
(24 = 0.16), in line with the hypothesis. The inconclusive nature of the 
finding may, however, agree with Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001). 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large firms 
over smaller firms 
Confirmed. The presence of economies of scale have a strong positive 
influence on firm profitability (25 = 0.48) at a significance better than the 
5% level. 
H5a: Large M-form firms perform better than large U-form firms 
Possibly confirmed. M-form appears to lead to both higher growth 
(17 = 0.21) and higher profitability (27 = 0.50). The significance is low in 
both cases though, mainly because Divisionalisation reduces the 
significance. 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects a firm’s performance 
positively 
  
183
Confirmed. Asset specificity has the predicted positive impact on both 
growth (16 = 0.15) and profitability (26 = 0.36), but the significance is low. 
The non-normal nature of the indicators probably leads to a large 
underestimate of significance. Using the AS indicator, the significance is 
better than the 1% level for growth and 10% level for profitability. 
The practical significance is quite high at this point. The fit between the 
theoretical framework and the statistical analysis for sub-model b is in 
some ways surprisingly good, even though the test statistics vary in 
strength. 
6.2.4.2 Competing and Parsimonious Models 
First, alternative models were tested to see if a competing model with 
better fit could be constructed. Second, the chosen model was pruned for 
parsimony so that only the important variables and relationships were 
maintained. Hair et al. (1998, 614–616) and Bollen (1989, 289–305) 
underpin the respecification approach used in the current research. 
As the matrix representation in Figure 31 shows, the complete sub-model b 
includes almost all possible causal relationships and correlations for 
diseconomies of scale and economies of scale. The search for parsimony 
therefore focused on testing changes in the relationships between the 
  
184
moderating factors and diseconomies of scale by changing the last two 
rows in the  matrix. In words, this means that correlations were added 
or deleted to the model in Figure 31: Alternative 1: a correlation was 
added between M-form and Atmospheric Consequences. The logic 
behind this is that employees in M-form firms presumably are more 
motivated than employees in U-form firms because they work in smaller 
organisational units and with better governance. Alternative 2: a 
correlation was added between M-form and Bureaucratic Insularity 
because individual units in an M-form firm should be more exposed to the 
surrounding market and less isolated from external pressures. Alternative 
3: both the above correlations were added. Alternative 4: the correlation 
between M-form and Communication Distortion was deleted. The logic 
for this is that the adoption of M-form organisation may not be driven by 
communication distortion, but rather by other, exogenous factors such as 
established practices in a given industry. These added or deleted 
correlations are theoretically plausible, but not theoretically prescribed. 
Table 40. Comparison of Parsimony for Competing Models 
COMPARISON OF PARSIMONY FOR COMPETING MODELS 
Alt. Description Normed Chi-Square 
Parsimonious Fit 
Index (PFI) 
 (chosen model) 9.252 0.473
1 71 added 9.465 0.462
2 72 added 9.414 0.462
3 71 and 72 added 9.642 0.451
4 74 deleted 8.799 0.484
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Table 40 demonstrates that the alternative models are similar to the chosen 
model. Alternative 4 is the only model with a better fit and parsimony, but 
only marginally so. It was nevertheless rejected because the exclusion of 
the correlation between M-Form and Communication Distortion does not 
agree well with the theory. 
The second step was to reduce the number of relationships in the model. 
This builds on the assumption that while the theoretical predictions 
captured in the hypotheses may be correct, they are not significant for 
certain relationships and thus the theory should be modified. The pruned 
model in Figure 32 uses the AS indicator defined in Section 6.2.3.2. The 
pruned model also eliminates the non-significant regression coefficients 
and correlations for the four diseconomies of scale factors. The squared 
multiple correlation for Profitability improves dramatically from 0.34 to 
0.64 (again because AS is more well-behaved than the three individual 
measures (Product Depth, Geographic Reach and Vertical Depth) of 
asset specificity), while it remains the same for Growth (0.44 versus 0.42). 
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Figure 32. Pruned Sub-Model b 
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The normed chi-square improves from 9.252 to 6.999 and the normed fit 
index is slightly higher at 0.980 versus 0.966. The parsimonious fit ratio is 
0.424 compared to 0.473. The regression coefficients in Table 41 show that 
Note: The complete diagram, with correlations, is found in Figure C.9 (Appendix C) 
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all coefficients have the hypothesised sign and all, except one, are 
significant at better than the 10% level. 
Table 41. Regression Weights for Pruned Sub-Model b 
REGRESSION WEIGHTS FOR PRUNED SUB-MODEL B 
 Std. 
Coeff. 
Unstd. 
Coeff. SE CR 
Atmospheric Consequences → Growth 0.131 0.053 0.028 1.926†** 
Bureaucratic Insularity → Growth 0.508 0.092 0.013 6.961***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Profitability 0.695 0.179 0.102 1.754†** 
Bureaucratic Insularity →  
Leadership Tenure 0.500 0.231 0.045 5.107***
Bureaucratic Insularity → Company Age 0.797 1.000  
Company Age → Profitability 0.588 0.120 0.064 1.870†** 
Incentive Limits → Profitability 0.391 0.178 0.047 3.806***
Communication Distortion → Profitability 0.182 0.921 0.739 1.247***
Economies of Scale → Profitability 0.459 0.166 0.053 3.111***
AS → Growth 0.318 0.386 0.120 3.231***
AS → Profitability 0.525 0.902 0.433 2.081***
M-Form → Growth 0.355 0.479 0.247 1.940†** 
M-Form → Profitability 0.786 1.499 0.859 1.746†** 
M-Form → Governance 0.474 1.000  
M-Form → Divisionalisation 0.270 0.769 0.222 3.468***
†
 p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
The validity of the hypotheses has been strengthened. H3a is now 
confirmed at the 10% level, H3b is (even more) strongly supported, H3c is 
(more) strongly confirmed, H3d has increased its significance, but is still 
not at the 10% level, H4 is strongly supported, H5a is supported at the 10% 
level, while H5b is strongly supported.43 
Finally, the 784 observations were randomly divided in two groups to test 
whether similar results are achieved for different samples. The procedure 
                                                 
43 Full descriptions of the hypotheses are found on pages 119–120. 
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was repeated eight times and the critical ratios of the differences were 
compiled for the main-effects model. Out of 104 possible differences, the 
analysis indicated sixteen instances of differences significant at better than 
the 10% level, of which ten where significant at better than the 5% level, of 
which two were significant at better than the 1% level. This leads to the 
conclusion that the results are homogenous across samples. Table 42 
shows the results by regression coefficient for the main-effects model. No 
single relationship appears to differ systematically between samples. 
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Table 42. Occurrence of Significant Critical Ratios of Differences during Random Sample Test 
OCCURRENCE OF SIGNIFICANT CRITICAL RATIOS OF DIFFERENCES DURING 
RANDOM SAMPLE TEST 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Number of Observations 
No 
Significant 
Difference 
Better than 
10% Sign. 
Of Which 
Better than 
5% Sign. 
Of Which 
Better than 
1% Sign. Total 
Atmospheric 
Consequences → 
Growth 5 3 1 1 8
Bureaucratic 
Insularity → Growth 7 1 1 0 8
Bureaucratic 
Insularity → 
Profitability 8 0 0 0 8
Bureaucratic 
Insularity → Tenure 5 3 3 0 8
Company Age → 
Profitability 8 0 0 0 8
Incentive Limits → 
Profitability 7 1 0 0 8
Communication 
Distortion → 
Profitability 5 3 1 0 8
Economies of 
Scale → Profitability 8 0 0 0 8
AS → Growth 7 1 0 0 8
AS → Profitability 7 1 1 0 8
M-Form → Growth 6 2 2 1 8
M-Form → 
Profitability 7 1 1 0 8
M-Form → 
Divisionalisation 8 0 0 0 8
Total 88 16 10 2 104 
 
 
 
The next section summarises the findings from the statistical analyses of 
the two sub-models and evaluates the five hypotheses. 
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6.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM STRUCTURAL 
EQUATION MODELS 
Table 43 shows the hypotheses and their associated findings. As was seen 
throughout this chapter, most of the hypotheses were confirmed. The 
findings seem to be robust for a number of reasons. The data were 
screened and tested extensively (Chapter 5). They were found to be well-
behaved in most respects. The path diagrams confirm well with the 
underlying theory. The indicators appear to reflect the unobserved 
phenomena fairly well. Finally, the results were similar when random sub-
samples were used. It should be remembered though that the findings 
apply only to one economic sector (manufacturing), in one country (the 
United States), in one year (1998). 
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Table 43. Summary of Statistical Findings 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL FINDINGSa 
Hypothesis Test Result CR and Sign. Interpretation 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the 
form of atmospheric 
consequences, bureaucratic 
insularity, incentive limits and 
communication distortion, 
increases with firm size 
11(a) > 0 11(a) = +0.92 +2.424 (p<1%) Confirmed 
H2: Large firms exhibit 
economies of scale 
61(a) > 0 61(a) = +0.60 +20.800 (p<0.1%) Confirmed 
H3a: Atmospheric 
consequences have a 
negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
11(b) < 0 
21(b) < 0 
11(b) = 0.13 
– 
1.926 (p<10%) 
– 
Confirmed 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity 
has a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
12(b) < 0 
22(b) < 0 
12(b) = 0.51 
22(b) = 0.70 
6.961 (p<0.1%) 
1.754 (p<10%) 
Confirmed 
H3c: Incentive limits have a 
negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
13(b) < 0 
23(b) < 0 
– 
23(b) = 0.39 
– 
3.806 (p<0.1%) 
Confirmed 
H3d: Communication distortion 
has a negative impact on the 
performance of large firms 
14(b) < 0 
24(b) < 0 
– 
24(b) = 0.18 
– 
1.247 (p=21.2%) 
Inconclusive 
H4: Economies of scale 
increase the relative 
profitability of large firms over 
smaller firms 
25(b) < 0 25(b) = +0.46 +3.111 (p<1%) Confirmed 
H5a: Large M-form firms 
perform better than large U-
form firms 
17(b) > 0 
27(b) > 0 
17(b) = +0.36 
27(b) = +0.79 
+1.940 (p<10%) 
+1.746 (p<10%) 
 
Confirmed 
H5b: High internal asset 
specificity affects a firm’s 
performance positively 
16(b) > 0 
26(b) > 0 
16(b) = +0.32 
26(b) = +0.52 
+3.231 (p<1%) 
+2.081 (p<5%) 
Confirmed 
a
 For simplicity, the word ”confirmed” is used, although ”not rejected” is more accurate. 
 
 
 
The practical significance of the statistical analyses is that both sub-model 
a and sub-model b validate the theoretical framework. Both the main 
analyses and the supporting analyses that tested particular aspects of the 
theory (e.g., the separate analysis of the relationship between economies of 
scale and growth in Section 6.2.2) are in line with the theoretical 
predictions. It is not surprising that some of the relationships are weak 
because executives have a tendency to exploit obvious opportunities for 
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improvement. Yet, most of the posited relationships in the theoretical 
framework are non-trivial. Thus, the statistical analyses have delivered 
practical insights. 
Next, Chapter 7 explores the practical implications of the literature review 
and the statistical analyses and ties the findings to the cost curves 
discussed in Chapter 2. It also discusses the limitations of the research and 
suggests avenues for further research. 
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7. INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION 
Diseconomies of scale appear to be real. The literature overview discussed 
the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, indicating that a wide range of 
theoretical development and empirical research, quantitative and 
qualitative, supports pieces of the current theoretical predictions. The 
statistical analysis section took a broader and more general approach to 
testing the hypotheses, and nothing uncovered there disproved them. The 
analyses also showed that diseconomies of scale vary in magnitude and 
impact, and economies of scale and the moderating factors are important 
when we try to understand the limits of the firm. 
In the first section, the findings are summarised and interpreted by linking 
them back to the cost curves discussed in Chapter 2 (pp. 14–17, above). By 
doing this, the results from the somewhat unwieldy statistical analysis can 
be presented in an effective shorthand. It is shown that the findings are 
consistent with neoclassical theory and with transaction cost economics. 
Building on this set of modified cost curves, further implications are 
discussed, including the relative importance of the various factors that 
affect a firm’s limits. The second section discusses the limitations of the 
research, while the final section suggests paths for further research. 
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7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The findings regarding the hypotheses are summarised in Table 44: 
Table 44. Summary of Findings 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGSa 
Hypothesis Literature Finding Statistical Finding 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of 
atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic 
insularity, incentive limits and 
communication distortion, increases with 
firm size 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale Confirmed Confirmed 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from 
bureaucratic failure have a negative impact 
on firm performance 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3a: Atmospheric consequences have a 
negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative 
impact on the performance of large firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3c: Incentive limits have a negative impact 
on the performance of large firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H3d: Communication distortion has a 
negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
Confirmed Inconclusive 
H4: Economies of scale increase the 
relative profitability of large firms over 
smaller firms 
Inconclusive Confirmed 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated 
by two transaction cost-related factors: 
organisation form and asset specificity 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H5a: Large M-form firms perform better than 
large U-form firms 
Confirmed Confirmed 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects a 
firm’s performance positively 
Confirmed Confirmed 
a
 For simplicity, the word ”confirmed” is used, although ”not rejected” is more accurate. 
 
 
 
As is shown, the theoretical framework is supported by both the literature 
and the statistical findings. It is now possible to interpret the findings by 
returning to the neoclassical cost curves. First, the cost curve shown in 
Figure 3 is modified to reflect the characteristics of diseconomies of scale, 
economies of scale and the moderating factors. Second, a similar curve is 
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constructed for firm growth. Third, these two curves are combined to 
show the overall impact of these two factors on firm performance. 
Average cost. To begin with, the elongated U-shaped average total cost 
curve44 used in neoclassical theory can be split into two parts: the average 
production cost curve and the average transaction cost curve. Not much 
evidence exists for what the relative magnitude of production and 
transaction costs is. However, Wallis and North (1986) attempted to 
quantify the relative contribution each type of cost makes to the overall 
economy. They found that the transaction-cost part of the economy grew 
from 25 per cent to 50 per cent of gross national product between 1890 and 
1970 (p. 121). This suggests that an even split is a reasonable assumption. 
The modified cost curves are depicted in a stylised fashion in Figure 33. 
The top graph shows a curve for average production cost )( PAC  consistent 
with the findings in the current research. One characteristic of the curve is 
important: the curve has a negative slope for all levels of firm output (Q). 
This agrees with the view that economies of scale can be kept proprietary 
to the firms that reap them. It also agrees with the statistical finding that 
economies of scale are not exhausted at small firm sizes. 
                                                 
44 It would be more stringent to talk about ray average total costs because the firms analysed are 
usually multi-product firms, but simplicity wins. 
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The middle graph in Figure 33 shows the average transaction cost curve 
).( TAC  The negative slope for smaller firms, indicating bureaucratic 
economies of scale, is supported in the literature review (but was not 
tested in the statistical analysis). The positive slope for larger firms, 
indicating diseconomies of scale and bureaucratic failure, is supported by 
both the literature and by the statistical analysis. 
The middle graph also shows a shifted and slightly tilted average 
transaction cost curve ).( TCA ′  The curve reflects the positive contribution 
from the moderating factors. TCA ′  is supported by the literature and by 
the statistical analysis. This analysis indicates that the shift can be quite 
large. 
Finally, the bottom graph in Figure 33 shows the average total cost curve 
(AC), with a shifted curve CA ′  for the moderators (AC = PAC + TAC ; 
CA ′  = PAC  + TCA ′ ). The curve resembles the neoclassical curve in Figure 
3. The question now is: where along this curve do firms operate? The 
statistical analyses suggest that, on average, the largest firms in the sample 
operate at outputs somewhere close to 2M′  in the upward-sloping region 
of CA ′ . That is, they show some diseconomies of scale, but they also 
benefit from economies of scale and they manage to take advantage of the 
moderating factors. 
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Figure 33. Stylised Cost Curves 
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Growth. The underlying logic of the cost curves can also be applied to 
firm growth. Figure 34 shows the same set of graphs as above for the 
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relationship between firm growth and output. The top graph illustrates 
the relationship between growth and output, under the hypothetical 
assumption that firms only have neoclassical production costs ).( PG  
Neither the literature nor the statistical analysis indicated an influence (see 
pp. 158–159, above) and thus the graph shows a constant relationship. 
The middle graph in Figure 34 portrays the growth curve resulting from 
bureaucratic, transaction cost-based, failure ).( TG  The literature and the 
statistical analysis make it fair to assume that TG  should be monotonously 
declining for increasing outputs. Again, the moderating influences can 
shift the curve, which is illustrated by TG′  in the graph. The statistical 
analysis indicates that the shift is smaller than in the case of average costs 
).( CA ′  
The bottom graph in Figure 34 convolutes the production- and 
transaction-cost contributions to growth into overall growth (G). The 
graph shows that the growth capacity of firms is steadily declining as a 
function of output, but it can be moderated ).(G′  Interestingly, this 
interpretation of the research contradicts Gibrat’s law of proportional 
effects (1931, 74–81), which will be discussed later in this section. 
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Figure 34. Stylised Growth Curves 
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Performance. Finally, it is instructive to combine the cost and growth 
curves to see how they jointly contribute to a firm’s performance (Figure 
35). Other factors also contribute to firm performance and the graph shows  
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the partial contribution to performance.45 By convoluting the average total 
cost (AC) and growth (G) curves, the partial performance curve  results.46 
Several, perhaps speculative, interpretations can be derived from the 
graph: (1) Firms operating at small outputs suffer from a lack of economies 
of scale and this is most likely not compensated for by the higher relative 
growth achievable by smaller firms. Thus, the slope 1k >0. (2) There is an 
area where performance is fairly independent of firm size. On the one 
hand, economies of scale should lead to steadily lower costs. On the other 
hand, diminishing growth prospects reduce performance. On balance, the 
analyses show that 2k <0, but only slightly so. (3) As diseconomies of scale 
due to bureaucratic failure set in, the combined negative contribution of 
increasing transaction costs and lower growth far outweigh economies of 
scale. Thus, 3k <0. (4) The moderating factors shift the performance curve 
outwards from   to  ′  and 3k < 3k′ <0, while 2M′ > 2M . That is, if firms 
judiciously apply the moderating factors, then bureaucratic failure will set 
in at a larger level of output and the impact from the failure will be less 
severe. 
                                                 
45 Total performance (TOT) is a function of, profitability(π), growth(G), risk(β) and other factors (ε):  
TOT = f(π, G, β, ε) = f(TR  TC, G, β, ε) = f(TR  AC · Q, G, β, ε). 
46 The result from this convolution should not be taken for granted, but the statistical analysis 
showed that AC and G are reasonably independent and that they should have similar weights. 
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The four interpretations above are supported by the literature review; 
while the last three are supported by the statistical analysis (the statistical 
analysis did not explore what happens at small firm sizes). 
Figure 35. Stylised Partial Performance Curve 
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The set of curves discussed above agree well with neoclassical theory (e.g., 
Panzar 1989) and transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson 1975), 
individually. The curves also agree with the joined perspectives on 
production and transaction costs expressed by, for example, Riordan and 
Williamson (1985) and Wallis and North (1986). What may make them 
interesting is the unbundling of the production cost and transaction cost 
contributions to firm performance, and the attempt to transform the 
research findings into rough estimates of the shapes of the curves. 
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The conceptual curves depicted in Figures 33 to 35 can also be used to 
show the shape of the data in the sample of 784 firms. This was done with 
three analyses which replicated the cost (AC), growth (G) and partial 
performance ( ) curves. Figures 36 to 38 show the resulting graphs, which 
are surprisingly similar to the conceptual curves. It should be remembered 
though, that the scatterplots presented are somewhat simplistic. They use 
the sample data as is and no attempt was made to include control 
variables or to make other corrections. The underlying assumptions and 
SPSS scatterplots are found at http://canback.com/henley.htm in the file 
Curves.spo. 
First, Figure 36 reports the results for the cost curve (AC), which plots 
average total cost (average factor costs, defined in Table 10, was used as 
the proxy) against output (firm size was used as the proxy). A quadratic 
regression line has been added to show the underlying trend in the data. 
The data conform well to the conceptual AC curve in Figure 33. 
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Figure 36. Cost Curve for Current Sample 
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Second, growth data (5-year growth, defined in Table 9) were plotted 
against output (Figure 37). Again, the curve has the predicted shape and 
the quadratic regression line is similar to the conceptual G curve in Figure 
34. The plot points are quite scattered though, and firms seem to have 
considerable leeway to deviate from the growth rate prescribed by their 
size. 
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Figure 37. Growth Curve for Current Sample 
Output (Q)
5-Year 
Growth 
(G)
GROWTH CURVE FOR CURRENT SAMPLE
 
 
 
Third, the joint contribution to firm performance by the two factors is 
shown in Figure 38. The average cost and growth data have been weighted 
and added ( = 0.6AC + 0.4G, normalised). The weights for the current 
sample came from an analysis of the relative contribution of AC and G to 
Tobin’s Q, a commonly used composite measure of a firm’s performance 
(e.g., Brainard and Tobin 1968; Lang and Stulz 1993). 
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The performance curve ( ) is not unlike the conceptual curve shown in 
Figure 35. There is significant variation around the trend line, but overall 
the data conform to the theoretical and empirical predictions. 
Figure 38. Partial Performance Curve for Current Sample 
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These results now make it possible to prescribe certain remedies for 
underperforming large firms, especially when poor performance stems 
from low growth. Consider the impact of diseconomies of scale: 
Bureaucratic insularity at both the institutional and individual levels 
appears to be endemic in large firms, leading to low growth and low 
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profitability. Incentive limits negatively influence both growth and 
profitability. Atmospheric consequences have a moderately negative 
impact on growth, while communication distortion does not seem to be an 
important source of diseconomies of scale. 
Economies of scale can offset this to some extent; indeed, large firms tend 
to exist in industries in which economies of scale are important. Moreover, 
the negative effects of diseconomies of scale can be moderated by paying 
attention to governance and organisational issues and by increasing asset 
specificity. These factors more or less offset the diseconomies of scale for 
large firms, resulting in a low overall correlation between performance 
and size. 
The diseconomies of scale exhibit a stronger negative influence on growth 
than on profitability. This may indicate that Penrose’s suggestion that the 
limits of a firm are related to dynamic factors rather than static factors is 
correct (see p. 12, above). A large firm will find it relatively easy to 
maximise profitability, but difficult to spur growth. An extension of this 
argument is that Gibrat’s law of proportional effects (1931, 77) may not be 
valid for growth and firm size, in line with corporate demography 
research (Carroll and Hannan 2000, 315–319) and the findings of Sutton 
(1997). 
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One way of expressing the impact of diseconomies of scale is to calculate 
the market value of the largest firms if the diseconomies of scale did not 
exist (and the economies of scale and moderating factors stayed the same). 
The largest 100 firms in the sample had a combined market capitalisation 
of 4.8 trillion dollars at the end of 1998, out of a total 6.7 trillion dollars for 
the whole sample of 784 firms. If diseconomies of scale were reduced to 
zero, then the expected growth of these firms would increase significantly 
(around 4 percentage points) and the profitability would be somewhat 
higher (around 0.5 percentage point). The combined effect (all other things 
equal) might be an increase in market capitalisation from 4.8 trillion 
dollars to 5.4 trillion dollars. It would also imply a higher growth in 
productivity and a commensurate increase in the growth of GDP related to 
the US manufacturing sector, up to 0.7 annual percentage points.47 This is 
a crude estimate and it only serves to illustrate orders of magnitude. 
                                                 
47 This was calculated by taking the large companies’ contribution to the US GDP in 1998 (around 
$650 billion; total GDP was $8,790 billion), and then increasing this number based on the increase 
in Tobin’s Q, estimated under the assumption of no diseconomies of scale. The estimate is a static 
assessment and the true impact is most likely lower. 
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7.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The current research is limited by a number of factors. Some of the 
variables were not properly operationalised (for example vertical depth). 
Other, more targeted, studies have used better definitions, but replicating 
those definitions here would have expanded the work too much 
(generalisability was prioritised over precision). As a result, simple, but 
somewhat less reliable, definitions were used. 
The selection of data also had a number of limitations. Potential industry 
effects—while hypothesised to be small—were not incorporated. Data 
were only collected for the manufacturing sector (strictly manufacturing, 
construction, and mining). This sector represents only 22 per cent of the 
US economy (26 per cent of the private sector) and includes less than half 
of all large firms. In addition, international comparisons were not made 
and longitudinal comparisons proved difficult to make. 
Furthermore, no competing theories were introduced (see p. 11, above). 
Although the transaction-cost-economics approach to studying 
diseconomies of scale has yielded some insights, other theoretical 
approaches may also contribute to the bureaucratic failure debate. 
Finally, the statistical analyses consciously sacrificed precision at certain 
points. For example, ordinal values were not analysed with polyserial and 
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polychoric correlations (see Section 5.1.2.3) and the influence of asset 
specificity was not fully explored because these data were not normally 
distributed. The model was therefore not optimised to extract the 
maximum explanatory power. 
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7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
Four avenues for further research may provide clarification and further 
insights: 
1. Proving the existence of diseconomies of scale by studying a more 
narrowly defined problem such as focusing on an industry rather than 
a whole economic sector. For example, earlier studies have explored 
similar issues in the petrochemicals (Armour and Teece 1978), the 
automotive (Masten, Meehan and Snyder 1989; Monteverde and Teece 
1982) and the information technology industries (Rasmusen and 
Zenger 1990; Zenger 1989, 1994). It may be worthwhile to build on this 
body of knowledge and test particular aspects of the current work. 
2. Expanding the analysis across geography and time. In particular, a 
longitudinal study over a full business cycle would most likely lead to 
more robust findings. 
3. Finding better ways to operationalise unobserved diseconomies of 
scale, perhaps by using panel data from primary research. Specifically, 
communication distortion is often discussed qualitatively in the 
literature, but the operationalisation of this concept remains elusive. In 
this and other research efforts, the number of hierarchical levels in the 
organisation was used as an indicator. It is not clear, however, why 
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information would be more distorted when it flows inside the firm, 
than when it flows a similar distance in the market. 
4. Replicating the current research with better statistical approaches and a 
larger sample, with a particular eye towards industry effects. Industry 
effects have proven difficult to quantify in general, but recent advances 
in analytical techniques by, for example, McGahan and Porter (1997), 
show that it may be possible to quantify these effects. 
These suggestions are positivist and universal in nature. Clearly, other 
approaches such as a phenomenological perspective can add insights into 
the nature of diseconomies of scale. 
The concluding chapter which now follows builds on the findings 
discussed above and combines them with the researcher’s own experience 
as a management consultant to large corporations. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Over the years, I have often been struck by how inefficient and 
dysfunctional large corporations can be. Yet at the same time most of them 
are immensely successful and deliver outstanding value to their 
customers, while they perform well in the stock market. I base these 
paradoxical comments on my interaction with large corporations, their 
executives and employees during almost twenty years as a management 
consultant at McKinsey & Company and Monitor Group. I struggled with 
the paradox for many years and tried privately to reconcile the advantages 
and disadvantages of large-scale organisation. In 1991, I happened to come 
across Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” (1937). After reading a twice-
faxed copy of the article on a (slow) bus between the terminal and an 
airplane at Stuttgart airport, I became convinced that I could use 
transaction cost economics to improve upon my advice to large 
corporations, especially when working on strategic and organisational 
development issues. This in turn led to the ambition to do formal research 
on the limits of firm size. The research has confirmed many of my real-life 
observations. Large corporations are inefficient in many ways, but for 
good reasons. The benefits of large organisations are substantial, but there 
are inescapable drawbacks as well. 
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The thesis demonstrates the need for research on limits of firm size, creates 
a framework for thinking about the problem and indicates—based on the 
literature survey and the statistical analysis—that there are real and 
quantifiable diseconomies of size. 
The heart of the research is a transaction cost economics-based framework 
which combines four distinctive aspects of Williamson’s theory: (1) the 
sources of firm-size limits: atmospheric consequences due to 
specialisation, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits of the employment 
relation and communication distortion due to bounded rationality; (2) the 
impact economies of scale have at the firm level; (3) the importance of 
organisational form in reducing diseconomies; and (4) the positive 
influence of high internal asset specificity on both transaction-cost and 
production-cost diseconomies. The qualitative and quantitative analyses 
conducted confirm the explanatory and predictive power of the theory. As 
such, the research contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms 
behind bureaucratic failure. 
There are a number of real-life implications of the research. First, strategy 
and structure appear to be intimately linked. Executives at large 
corporations have to grapple with real trade-offs when they consider 
expansion. Certain growth strategies are easier to execute than others, and 
the choice of organisation has major implications for which strategies 
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make sense. Indeed, structure does not necessarily follow strategy; 
strategy and structure inform each other continuously and forever. 
Second, much of the rationale for mergers and acquisitions seems to be 
weak, at best. Proponents of mergers typically argue that the resulting 
larger entity after a merger will realise economies of scale, benefiting 
customers and shareholders; in addition, they claim that growth will be 
accelerated through the introduction of new products and services that 
were previously too expensive to develop. But the analysis here shows 
that although some economies of scale may be realised, they are likely to 
be offset by diseconomies of scale. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
larger, merged entities innovate more and grow faster. Instead, the 
opposite appears to be true: innovation and growth declines, on average. 
This is particularly true in knowledge-intensive industries like 
pharmaceuticals. To be sure, mergers and acquisitions often do make 
sense. But executives need to think through how to minimise 
diseconomies of scale, as well as to maximise moderating influences, when 
post-merger integration is carried out. 
Third, boards of directors may want to emphasise the importance of 
executive renewal and the elimination of rigid processes to stimulate 
growth. Old, large firms with entrenched management often find 
themselves with a fundamental dilemma. There is no indication that they 
  
215
can achieve above-average, profitable growth. They must choose either to 
pay out excess cash flow to shareholders (as is often done) or to try to find 
ways to break the firm’s bureaucratic insularity. Maximising the quality of 
governance, which is part of the board’s fiduciary duties, appears to be an 
important lever for maximising the value of large corporations. 
Fourth, firms that strive for high internal asset specificity appear to be 
better off than those that expand reach, breadth, or depth. This does not 
imply that single-product or single-geography strategies are optimal 
(because this reduces growth in the long run), but it does imply that any 
expansion strategy should strive for high asset specificity and that some 
firms are best off reducing their scope of activities. By and large, anecdotal 
and empirical evidence suggests that this has happened over the last 20 to 
30 years. “Focus on the core business” and “outsourcing” have been 
hallmarks of restructuring programs for many years, and the current 
research verifies that this is often a valid strategy. 
Finally, in a world in which companies increasingly try to sell solutions 
rather than basic products and services, incentive limits have become real 
and problematic. In businesses that involve team selling or large product-
development efforts, attention should be paid to creating well-functioning 
incentive schemes for employees. The superior productivity of research 
and development in small firms, in which incentives are tailored to 
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individual performance, demonstrates why effective incentive schemes 
matter. 
It may be that the average large firm has neither a competitive advantage 
nor a disadvantage when compared with small and mid-size firms. 
However, the individual large firm will prosper or fade depending on 
how well it manages diseconomies of scale. 
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APPENDIX B: CORRELATION ANALYSES 
Below follow two correlation analyses to support the structural equation 
models. The purpose was to find whether the chosen definitions of size 
and firm performance are meaningful from a statistical point-of-view. For 
example, it could be that size measured as number of employees did not 
correlate with other definitions such as revenue or assets. SPSS was used 
for the correlation analyses. The appendix shows that robust and relevant 
definitions can be construed for each variable. 
DEFINITION OF SIZE 
In line with the definitions of size in Section 2.2 (“Dimensions of Firm 
Size”) number of employees (Employees), revenue (Sales), net assets (Net 
Assets) and value added (Value Added), where correlated against each 
other. These size-related variables are defined in Table B.1. 
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Table B.1. Size Variables 
SIZE VARIABLES 
Use Namea Labelb Type Description Metric Sources 
Size empl Employees Direct No. of employees ’000 Compustat 
Size sales Sales Direct Sales $M Compustat 
Size va Value Added Calculated Value added 
defined as sales 
less cost of 
purchased goods 
and services  
EBIT + labour cost 
+ depreciation [va 
= ebit + labour + 
depr] 
$M  
Size na Net Assets Calculated Net assets defined 
as total assets less 
current assets plus 
current liabilities 
[na = ta  ca + cl] 
$M  
Size ebit EBIT Direct Earnings before 
interest and tax 
$M Compustat 
Size ta Total Assets Direct Total assets $M Compustat 
Size ca Current Assets Direct Current assets $M Compustat 
Size cl Current Liabilities Direct Current liabilities $M Compustat 
a
 The “Name” column shows the name given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
b
 The “Label” column shows the label given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the four definitions are highly correlated (at better than 
1% significance), as is seen in Table B.2. 
Table B.2. Correlations between Various Definitions of Size 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF SIZE 
 Employees Sales Value Added Net Assets 
Employees 
Correlation 1**   
Sign. (2-tailed)    
N 784**   
Sales 
Correlation 0.844** 1**  
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.000**   
N 784** 784**  
Value 
Added 
Correlation 0.923** 0.964** 1** 
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.000** 0.000**  
N 146** 146** 146** 
Net Assets 
Correlation 0.724** 0.877** 0.925** 1**
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
N 744** 744** 139** 744**
**
 Indicates correlations significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
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Based on the high correlations above, it was decided to perform the 
structural equation analyses using one definition of size. The number of 
employees was chosen to represent size because it is available for all firms 
in the sample; it follows Child’s (1973) logic described in Section 2.2.2; it 
has been used extensively in other studies of size-related issues (e.g., Hall 
1986, 5–6; Kumar, Rajan and Zingales 1999, 12); and it is highly correlated 
with the other variables. Section 2.2.2 also showed that sales is an 
unsuitable measure and a separate analysis (not included in this thesis) 
concluded that value added is too highly correlated with profitability to be 
a good measure. 
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DEFINITION OF FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Quantitative measures of firm performance include profitability measures 
such as gross margin, net margin (i.e., return on sales), return on equity, 
economic value added (i.e., return on equity less cost of equity), return on 
capital employed; cash flow measures such as free cash flow over sales; 
and growth measures such as 1-, 3-, 5- and 10-year historical revenue 
growth. 
Ideally, forward-looking measures such as expected profitability, cash 
flow and growth should be used to measure a firm’s performance because 
the current operating conditions (such as number of hierarchical levels or 
organisation form) will influence future performance. However, the only 
way to get such data without relying on analyst estimates is to perform the 
analyses on a sample older than 5 years. This would significantly reduce 
the number of variables in the model because most nonfinancial data are 
not available five years back in time. Thus, the decision was made to use 
current and historical data. The definitions are shown in Table B.3. 
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Table B.3. Performance Variables 
PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 
Use Namea Labelb Type Description Metric Sources 
Performance ros ROS Calculated Return on sales = 
net income  sales 
% Compustat 
Performance roe ROE Calculated Return on equity = 
net income  equity 
[roe = ni  equity] 
%  
Performance eva Profitability Calculated Economic value 
added defined as 
return on equity 
(ROE) less cost of 
equity (COE) [eva 
= roe  coe] 
%  
Performance fcf Free Cash Flow% Calculated Relative free cash 
flow defined as free 
cash flow  sales 
[fcf = fcftot  sales] 
%  
Performance growth3 Growth3 Direct 3-year compound 
annual sales 
growth 
% Compustat 
Performance growth Growth Direct 5-year compound 
annual sales 
growth 
% Compustat 
Performance growth10 Growth10 Direct 10-year compound 
annual sales 
growth 
% Compustat 
Performance fcftot Free Cash Flow Direct Free cash flow $M Compustat 
a
 The “Name” column shows the name given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
b
 The “Label” column shows the label given to the variable in SPSS and in Amos 
 
 
 
Table B.4 shows the correlations between the seven alternative definitions 
of firm performance. Return on sales (ROS), return on equity (ROE) and 
economic value added (Profitability)48 are highly correlated (better than 
1% significance). Economic value added was chosen as the 
operationalisation of profitability because it most accurately measures 
profitability and is available for all but two firms. 
                                                 
48 The variable could have been named EVA, but since this variable was chosen to represent 
profitability in the statistical analyses, the generic variable name Profitability is used already 
here. 
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Growth measures show similarly high correlations. The best measure was 
5-year growth (Growth)49 because it has higher correlation with 3- and 10-
year growth than they have with 5- and 10-, and 3- and 5-year growth, 
respectively. It also has a large number of observations (756). Free cash 
flow (FCF%) was not chosen as a measure of performance because it is too 
prone to fluctuations between years. 50 
Table B.4. Correlations between Various Definitions of Firm Performance 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
ROS ROE 
Profita-
bility FCF% Growth3 Growth Growth10 
ROS 
Correlation 1**      
Sign. (2-tailed)       
N 784**      
ROE 
Correlation 0.683** 1**     
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.000**      
N 782** 782**     
Profita-
bility 
Correlation 0.682** 0.993** 1**    
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.000** 0.000**     
N 781** 781** 781**    
FCF% 
Correlation 0.370** 0.332** 0.331** 1**   
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**    
N 750** 750** 749** 750**   
Growth3 
Correlation 0.055** 0.020** 0.002** 0.017** 1**  
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.124** 0.570** 0.948** 0.635**   
N 777** 775** 774** 744** 777**  
Growth 
Correlation 0.040** 0.007** 0.039** 0.012** 0.879** 1** 
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.272** 0.854** 0.280** 0.745** 0.000**  
N 756** 754** 753** 725** 756** 756** 
Growth10 
Correlation 0.020** 0.059** 0.098** 0.063** 0.719** 0.858** 1**
Sign. (2-tailed) 0.605** 0.126** 0.011** 0.111** 0.000** 0.000** 
N 671** 669** 668** 643** 671** 668** 671**
*
 Indicates correlations significant at the 5% level (2-tailed) 
**
 Indicates correlations significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
 
                                                 
49 Again, 5-year growth is labelled Growth, and not Growth5 since it was chosen as the indicator of 
firm growth. 
50 An additional benefit of using Profitability and Growth is that they correspond to Penrose’s 
([1959] 1995) distinction between static economies (pp. 89–99) and diseconomies (pp. 12–13) of 
size (i.e., Profitability) and dynamic economies (pp. 99–101) and diseconomies (pp. 212–214) of 
growth (i.e., Growth). 
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It is worth noting (but is not surprising) that profitability and growth are 
uncorrelated (0.04), and that free cash flow is uncorrelated with growth 
(0.01) and somewhat correlated with profitability (0.33). 
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Figure C.1. Firm Performance versus Bureaucratic Insularity 
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Figure C.2. Firm Performance versus Incentive Limits 
FIRM PERFORMANCE VERSUS INCENTIVE LIMITS
0.20
Growthe1
0.03
Profitabilitye2
0.01
0.10
0.29
0.46
0.12
Incentive
Limits
Company
Age
 
  
230
Figure C.3. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale: Not Adjusted for Survivor Bias 
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Figure C.4. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale: Adjusted for Survivor Bias 
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Figure C.5. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale and Economies of Scale 
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Figure C.6. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and  
M-Form Organisation 
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Figure C.7. Firm Performance versus Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and  
Asset Specificity 
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Figure C.8. Complete Sub-Model b: Includes Diseconomies of Scale, Economies of Scale and 
Moderating Factors 
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Figure C.9. Pruned Sub-Model b 
PRUNED SUB-MODEL B
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